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1INTRODUCTION
V a l u e s  a n d  Aims
I t  h a s  b e e n  s t a t e d  t h a t r
"The p r o c e s s  o f  r a t i o n a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  a l w a y s  g r o u n d s  i t s e l f  
u l t i m a t e l y  o n  a n  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  v a l u e  o r  t h e  p r e s u m e d  t r u t h  o f  
a  v a l u e  j u d g m e n t  w h i c h  i t s e l f  i s  n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
s a v e  by  way p e r h a p s  o f  c i r c u l a r  a r g u m e n t a t i o n "  .
The  a r g u m e n t s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  a c c o r d i n g l y ,  a r e  g r o u n d e d  
on  t h e  a s s u m e d  v a l u e  o f  t h e  w e l l  known c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  
w h ic h  c a n  be  summed up  i n  t h e  L a t i n  maxim:
Nemo I u d e x  i n  Sua  C a u s a
M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  'nem o  i u d e x '  p r i n c i p l e  i s ,  i n  t h i s  p a p e r ,  t r e a t e d  a s  
a  n e c e s s a r y  c o r o l l o r y  o f  t h a t  e q u a l l y  w e l l  known c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
p r i n c i p l e  -  t h e  ' R u l e  o f  Law' o r  'G o v e r n m e n t  u n d e r  L a w ’ (whose  
v a l u e  i s  i t s e l f  p r e s u m e d ) .
T h i s  t h e s i s  a i m s  t o  e x p l o r e  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  'nem o  i u d e x '  
p r i n c i p l e  i n  c o n t e m p o r a r y  l e g a l  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g .  I n  d o i n g  s o ,  i t  
s h a l l  a d d r e s s  two  c e n t r a l  i s s u e s :  f i r s t ,  w h i c h  c r i t e r i a  c a n  we
1 .  L u c i n d a  V a n d e r v o r t ,  " P o l i t i c a l  C o n t r o l  o f  I n d e p e n d e n t  
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  A g e n c i e s " ,  (19 7 9 )  Law R efo rm  C o m m is s io n  o f  
C a n a d a ,  1 0 4 .

1 1
em ploy  t o  d e f i n e  j u d i c i a l  o r  a d j u d i c a t i v e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  a n d  
d i s t i n g u i s h  i t  f r o m  n o n - a d j u d i c a t i v e  (m ore  s i m p l y ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e )  
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g ? ;  s e c o n d ,  t o  w h a t  e x t e n t  d o  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  
a d j u d i c a t i o n  t h e m s e l v e s  i m p l y  s t r u c t u r a l  g u a r a n t e e s  o f  t h e  'nemo 
iudex*  v a r i e t y ?
The  t h e s i s  a l s o  a im s  t o  c o m b in e  t h i s  t h e o r e t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  w i t h  an  
e x a m i n a t i o n  a n d  c r i t i q u e  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  e s t a b l i s h e d  by  C o u n c i l  
R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2  EEC f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  i n f r i n g e m e n t s  o f  A r t i c l e s  
8 5 ( 1 )  an d  86 o f  t h e  T r e a t y  o f  Rome.
The  M e t h o d o l o g y  u s e d  i n  t h i s  T h e s i s
T h e r e  a r e  two m e t h o d s  o f  a n a l y s i n g  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a n d  a d j u d i c a t i v e  
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g :  t h e  f o r m a l  an d  t h e  f u n c t i o n a l . The e s s e n t i a l  
d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  two m e th o d s  i s  s u c c i n c t l y  n o t e d  by a n  FIDE 
c o n f e r e n c e ,  w h i c h ,  s e l e c t i n g  t h e  f i r s t  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  s e c o n d ,  
s t a t e d ,
"We . . .  a g r e e d  t h a t  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  a  p r o c e d u r e  was  t o  be  
r e g a r d e d  a s  ' a d m i n i s t r a t i v e '  [ o r  ' a d j u d i c a t i v e ]  s h o u l d  d e p e n d  
upon t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t a k i n g  t h e  d e c i s i o n , n o t  upon 
t h e  s u b j e c t  m a t t e r  o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n " . 2
2 .  F e d e r a t i o n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l e  P ou r  l e  D r o i t  E u r o p é e n  (F I D E ) ,  "Les  
g u a r a n t i e s  f o n d a m e n t a l e s  d a n s  l a  p r o c é d u r e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e " ,  
R a p p o r t s  du  8eme C o n g r è s ,  2 2 -2 4  j u i n  1 9 7 8 ,  C o p e n h a g u e  1 9 7 8 ,  
V o l .  3 ,  G e n e r a l  R e p o r t  o f  J . P .  W a r n e r ,  2 . 1  ( e m p h a s i s  a d d e d ) .  
See a l s o  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  ’E n g l i s h '
( f u n c t i o n a l )  a n d  t h e  ' C o n t i n e n t a l '  ( f o r m a l )  a p p r o a c h e s  t o  
d e f i n i t i o n  -  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  -  i n  
" I n f o r m a t i o n  i n  EEC C o m p e t i t i o n  Law C a s e s " ,  J .M .  J o s h u a ,  1986 
ELRev, 4 1 9 ,  4 2 8 - 4 2 9 .

I l l
U n l i k e  t h a t  c o n f e r e n c e ,  t h i s  t h e s i s  w i l l  e m p lo y  a  f u n c t i o n a l , a s  
o p p o s e d  t o  a  f o r m a l , a p p r o a c h  i n  a n a l y s i n g  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and  
a d j u d i c a t i v e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  e a c h  s h a l l  be  
d e f i n e d  a n d  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  i n h e r e n t  n a t u r e  
r a t h e r  t h a n  by  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  b o d i e s  w h ic h  e x e r c i s e  them .  
T h e r e  a r e  two r e l a t e d  r e a s o n s  f o r  a d o p t i n g  t h i s  a p p r o a c h .
The  P r o b le m  o f  H i s t o r y
I t  i s  t h e  a u t h o r ' s  o p i n i o n  t h a t  t h o s e  who d i s c u s s  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
a n d  a d j u d i c a t i v e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  i n  a f o r m a l  way e n c o u n t e r  s e r i o u s  
d e f i n i t i o n a l  p r o b l e m s  w h i c h  d e r i v e  f r o m  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  
c o n t i n g e n c i e s  o f  t h e i r  m e t h o d .  D e f i n i n g  a  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  power  
a s  " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e "  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  e x e r c i s e d  b y  an  E x e c u t i v e  Agency  
a n d  n o t  by  a C o u r t  o f  Law p r e s u p p o s e s  a  g o v e r n m e n t a l  s e t - u p  w h ic h  
i s  h i s t o r i c a l l y  s p e c i f i c .  J u s t  a s  o n e  c o u l d  be  c e r t a i n  i n  t h e  
e a r l y  1 9 t h  C e n t u r y  t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  a  C o u r t  was ' j u d i c i a l ' ,  s o  
o n e  c o u l d  r e l y  on  a  M i n i s t e r i a l  d e c i s i o n  b e i n g  a n  ' e x e c u t i v e '  o n e .  
The  t im e  i n  q u e s t i o n  was o n e  i n  w h i c h  t h e  d i v i s i o n  o f  l a b o u r  
b e t w e e n  E x e c u t i v e  a n d  C o u r t s  was c l e a r l y  d e m a r c a t e d .  The 
e x e c u t i v e  b r a n c h  o f  W e s t e r n  g o v e r n m e n t  t h e n  d e a l t  l a r g e l y  w i t h  t h e  
l i m i t e d  r a n g e  o f  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  a c t i v i t i e s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  c o n d u c t  
o f  f o r e i g n  r e l a t i o n s ,  t h e  s a f e g u a r d i n g  o f  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  and  
t h e  m a i n t e n a n c e  o f  p u b l i c  o r d e r .  The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  
e x e c u t i v e  an d  j u d i c i a l  p o w e r s  i n  F r a n c e  f o l l o w i n g  o n  t h e  e v e n t s  o f  
1 7 8 9 ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  r e f l e c t s  a  c o n c e r n  t o  g u a r a n t e e  t h i s  same
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c l e a r  d i v i s i o n  o f  l a b o u r 3  4.
Nowadays ,  h o w e v e r ,  i t  w o u ld  b e  d a n g e r o u s  i n d e e d  t o  r e l y  u p o n  s u c h  
a  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n .  W i th  t h e  r i s e  o f  t h e  W e l f a r e  S t a t e ,  t h e  
d e c i s i o n a l  p o w e r s  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  b r a n c h  h a v e  e x p a n d e d  
e n o r m o u s l y ,  i n t r u d i n g  i n t o  a r e a s  w h i c h ,  two  h u n d r e d  y e a r s  a g o ,  
w e r e  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  t h e  e x c l u s i v e  c o n c e r n  o f  e i t h e r  t h e  
l e g i s l a t i v e  o r  j u d i c i a l  b r a n c h e s .  I n  f a c t ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  o f  a 
M i n i s t e r  ( o r ,  m o re  u s u a l l y ,  a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a g e n c y )  t a k e n  i n  
1989 a r e  j u s t  a s  l i k e l y  t o  b e a r  on  t h o s e  two f i e l d s  a s  on  t h e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  p r e s e r v e s  o f  t r e a t y - m a k i n g ,  d e f e n c e  o r  p o l i c i n g .
The r i s e  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a g e n c i e s  w i t h  c o m p e t e n c e s  w h ich  
' s t r a d d l e 1 t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  d i v i d e  h a v e  c a u s e d  m a j o r  p r o b l e m s  f o r  
t h o s e  a d h e r i n g  t o  t h e  f o r m a l  a p p r o a c h .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  F r a n c e ,  
t h e s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r e  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  c o n t e m p o r a r y  d e b a t e  o v e r  
t h e  i n e f f i c a c y  o f  t h e  f o r m a l  b i - p a r t i t i t e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  
' o r g a n e s  a d m i n i s t r a t i f s '  a n d  ' o r g a n e s  j u r i d i c t i o n n e l s '  . "Le 
j u r i s t e  q u i  a i m e  l e s  c a t é g o r i e s  j u r i d i q u e s  c l a i r e s  e t  p r é c i s e s " ,  
o b s e r v e s  L o r t h e ,  "ne  m a n q u e r a  p a s  d ' é p r o u v e r  un e  c e r t a i n e  34
3 .  See C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  3 S e p te m b e r  1 7 9 1 ,  C h a p t e r  I ,  T i t l e  I I I ,  
A r t i c l e s  3 ,  4 and  5 ;  a l s o  C h a p t e r  V, A r t i c l e s  1 an d  3 .
4 .  D i s q u i e t  a b o u t  t h e  c o n t i n u i n g  v a l u e  o f  t h e  f o r m a l  d i s t i n c t i o n
was v o i c e d  a s  e a r l y  a s  1945 by J a c q u e s  M a b i l e a u  i n  h i s ,  "De 
l a  D i s t i n c t i o n  d e s  A c t e s  d ' A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  A c t i v e  e t  d e s  A c t e s  
A d m i n i s t r a t i f  J u r i d i c t i o n n e l s '  T h è s e ,  P a r i s ,  a t  p a g e s  266-
267 .  R e c e n t  j u d i c i a l  d e c i s i o n s  p r o v o k i n g  c r i t i c i s m  f o r  t h e i r  
a d h e r e n c e  t o  t h i s  f o r m a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  i n c l u d e :  D e c i s i o n  o f  
C o n s e i l  d ' E t a t  o f  1 3 . 3 . 8 1  [ R e c u e i l  D a l l o z  S i r e y  
( J u r i s p r u d e n c e )  1 9 8 1 ,  4 1 8 ,  w i t h  c r i t i c i s m  by C. G a v a l d a  a t
421] an d  D e c i s i o n  o f  C o n s e i l  C o n s t i t u t i o n n e l  o f  2 3 . 1 . 8 7  
[ R e c u e i l  D a l l o z  S i r e y  ( J u r i s p r u d e n c e )  1988 1 1 7 ,  1 2 0 ,  w i t h  
c r i t i c i s m  by  R. D rag o  i n  La S e m a in e  J u r i d i q u e  ( D o c t r i n e )  
1987 ,  3 3 0 0 ,  p a r a .  7 ] .

Vi n s a t i s f a c t i o n  d a n s  l a  m e s u r e  ou i l  l u i  s e r a  i m p o s s i b l e  de 
c a r a c t é r i s e r  a v e c  s u f f i s a m m e n t  d e  n e t t e t {  l ' o r g a n e  q u ' i l  
{ t u d i e " ^ .  By e m p l o y i n g  a  f u n c t i o n a l  a p p r o a c h ,  t h i s  t h e s i s  a im s  
t o  u s e  c l e a r  an d  p r e c i s e  l e g a l  c a t e g o r i e s  t o  c a t e g o r i s e  
g o v e r n m e n t a l  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  ( a n d ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t o  t h e  EC 
C o m m iss io n )  m o r e  p r e c i s e l y  t h a n  L o r t h e  a n d  o t h e r s  u s i n g  t h e  f o r m a l  
a p p r o a c h  f i n d  p o s s i b l e .
F u n c t i o n a l i s m  a s  a m eans  o f  b u i l d i n g  a P o w e r f u l  
C r i t i q u e  o f  E x i s t i n g  L e g a l  I n s t i t u t i o n s
The  i n a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  f o r m a l  a p p r o a c h  a c c u r a t e l y  t o  c h a r a c t e r i s e  
t h e  e v o l v i n g  k i n d s  o f  l e g a l  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  i s  c a u s e  f o r  m o re  t h a n  
m e re  a c a d e m i c  v e x a t i o n .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  i t s  d e f i n i t i o n a l  
s h o r t c o m i n g s  r e n d e r  i t  d e f e c t i v e  a s  a  t o o l  f o r  c r i t i c i s i n g ,  t h e  
s t r u c t u r a l  g u a r a n t e e s  p r o v i d e d  by r e a l - l i f e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  
p r o c e s s e s .
I f  on e  a c c e p t s ,  a s  we h a v e ,  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  'nemo i u d e x '  
p r i n c i p l e  i n  a d j u d i c a t i o n ,  t h e n  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  w h ic h  m e t h o d o l o g y  t o  
u s e  i n  c r i t i c i s i n g  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  g u a r a n t e e s  g r a n t e d  t o  
i n d i v i d u a l s  b y  a  r e a l - l i f e  i n s t i t u t i o n  becom es  an  e x t r e m e l y  
s i g n i f i c a n t  o n e .  A f o r m a l i s t  m e t h o d o l o g y  n e c e s s a r i l y  d e f i n e s  a s  
" a d m i n i s t r a t i v e "  a l l  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  p o w e r s  e x e r c i s e d  by an 
e x e c u t i v e  a g e n c y .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  a  f u n c t i o n a l i s t  m e t h o d o l o g y ,  c an  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a n d  a d j u d i c a t i v e  pow er  w i t h i n  an  
e x e c u t i v e  a g e n c y .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  a 'nemo i u d e x *  c r i t i q u e  b a s e d  on a  5
5 .  "Le C o n t r ô l e  A d m i n i s t r a t i f  F r a n ç a i s  d e s  C o n c e n t r a t i o n s  
E c o n o m i q u e s " ,  Revue  du D r o i t  P u b l i q u e  1 9 8 0 ,  47 1 ,  495 .
i
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f u n c t i o n a l i s t  m e t h o d o l o g y  c a n  be  e m p lo y e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  r e a l - l i f e  
g u a r a n t e e s  p r o v i d e d  t o  i n d i v i d u a l s  by an  a g e n c y  i n  i n s t a n c e s  w here  
a n  a n a l y s i s  d e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e  f o r m a l  a p p r o a c h  c a n n o t .
S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  T h e s i s
The  t h e s i s  w i l l  b e g i n ,  i n  c h a p t e r  o n e ,  w i t h  a n  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  
l e g a l  p o w e r s  o f  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  e x e r c i s e d  b y  t h e  C o m m is s io n  u n d e r  
C o u n c i l  R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2  EEC. I n  c h a p t e r  t w o  we s h a l l  p r o c e e d  t o  
d e f i n e ,  i n  f u n c t i o n a l  t e r m s ,  two p r i n c i p a l  t y p e s  o f  l e g a l  
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g :  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  an d  a d j u d i c a t i o n .  T h i s  c h a p t e r  
s h a l l  a l s o  a t t e m p t  t o  c a t e g o r i s e  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  
p o w e r s  u n d e r  R e g u l a t i o n  17 i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e s e  t y p e s .  C h a p t e r  
t h r e e  i s  d e s i g n e d  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  a n d  p r a c t i c e  o f  t h e  
Com m iss ion  i n  t a k i n g  an  a d j u d i c a t i v e  d e c i s i o n  t o  a p p l y  A r t i c l e  
8 5 ( 1 )  o r  86 EEC t o  an  i n d i v i d u a l  u n d e r t a k i n g  ( a n  i n f r i n g e m e n t  
d e i c i s i o n ) .  I n  c h a p t e r  f o u r  we s h a l l  d e v e l o p  t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  
a n a l y s i s  i n t r o d u c e d  i n  c h a p t e r  two a n d  e x a m i n e  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and  a d j u d i c a t i v e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g .  
I n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  i n  c h a p t e r  f o u r ,  c h a p t e r  f i v e  w i l l  
d i s c u s s  t h e  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  s t r u c t u r a l  g u a r a n t e e s  p r o v i d e d  by t h e  
C om m iss ion  i n  e x e r c i s i n g  a d j u d i c a t i v e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  pow er  u n d e r  
R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 .  C h a p t e r  f i v e  w i l l  a l s o  d i s c u s s  t h e  r e a c t i o n  o f  t h e  
C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  t o  t h e  a r g u m e n t s  t h a t  t h i s  f o r m  o f  
i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  i s  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .
I n  c h a p t e r  s i x  we s h a l l  e x a m i n e  t h e  m an n er  i n  w h ich  t h e  C o u r t  o f  
J u s t i c e  h a s  e m p lo y e d  a d i s t i n c t i v e l y  ' h i g h - l e v e l '  a p p r o a c h  i n  
r e v i e w i n g  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  a d j u d i c a t i v e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  u n d e r  
R e g u l a t i o n  17 a n d  we s h a l l  a s s e s s  t h e  d e g r e e  t o  w h i c h  t h i s  fo r m  o f  
r e v i e w  c a n  c o m p e n s a t e  f o r  t h e  l a c k  o f  'nemo i u d e x '  g u a r a n t e e s  a t
i»
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f i r s t  i n s t a n c e ,  w h ic h  was h i g h l i g h t e d  i n  c h a p t e r  f i v e .  C h a p t e r  
s e v e n  i s  c o n c e r n e d  t o  show t h e  p r a c t i c a l  p r o b l e m s  e n c o u n t e r e d  by 
t h e  C o u r t  -  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  s h o r t a g e  o f  j u d i c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  -  i n  
u n d e r t a k i n g  t h i s  ' h i g h - l e v e l '  fo rm  o f  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w .  The 
c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  C o u r t  o f  F i r s t  I n s t a n c e  i n  O c t o b e r  19 8 8  i s  t h e  
s u b j e c t  o f  c h a p t e r  e i g h t ,  w h i c h  e x a m i n e s  i t s  modus o p e r a n d i  and  
i t s  l i k e l y  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  im p r o v e d  ' h i g h - l e v e l '  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  
o f  C om m iss ion  i n f r i n g e m e n t  d e c i s i o n s .  F i n a l l y ,  i n  c h a p t e r  n i n e  
we w i l l  t a k e  a  b r i e f  l o o k  a t  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  ex p o s t  f a c t o  
' h i g h  l e v e l '  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  f o r  r e c t i f y i n g  'nemo i u d e x '  p r o b l e m s  
i n  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  p r o c e d u r e  f o r  a d j u d i c a t i v e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  u n d e r  
R e g u l a t i o n  17 .
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1THE POWERS OF THE COMMISSION UNDER THE EEC 
COMPETITION REGIME
A r t i c l e s  85 and  86 EEC
A r t i c l e s  85 a n d  86 o f  t h e  T r e a t y  o f  Rome fo rm  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  
c o m p e t i t i o n  la w  r e g i m e  o f  t h e  EEC.
On one h a n d ,  A r t i c l e  8 5 ,  p a r a g r a p h  1 ,  p r o h i b i t s  u n d e r t a k i n g s  from 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  r e s t r i c t i v e  c o m m e r c i a l  a g r e e m e n t s  o r  c o n c e r t e d  
p r a c t i c e s  w h i c h ,  i n t e r  a l i a ,  " h av e  a s  c h e i r  o b j e c t  o r  e f f e c t  t h e  
p r e v e n t i o n ,  r e s t r i c t i o n  o r  d i s t o r t i o n  o f  c o m p e t i t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  
common m a r k e t " .  On t h e  o t h e r ,  A r t i c l e  86 p r o h i b i t s  t h e ,  " a b u s e  by 
o n e  o r  more  u n d e r t a k i n g s  o f  a d o m i n a n t  p o s i t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  common 
m a r k e t  o r  i n  a s u b s t a n t i a l  p a r t  o f  i t " .
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n  o f  A r t i c l e  8 5 { 1 ) ,  p a r a g r a p h  3 o f  
t h a t  A r t i c l e ,  p e r m i t s  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  p a r a g r a p h  1 t o  be  d e c l a r e d  
i n d i v i d u a l l y  o r  c a t e g o r i c a l l y  i n a p p l i c a b l e  t o  a g r e e m e n t s  o r  c o n ­
c e r t e d  p r a c t i c e s  w h ic h  d o  c o n t r i b u t e ,  " t o  i m p r o v i n g  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  
o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  g o o d s  o r  t o  p r o m o t i n g  t e c h n i c a l  o r  e co n o m ic  
p r o g r e s s ,  w h i l e  a l l o w i n g  c o n s u m e r s  a  f a i r  s h a r e  o f  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  
b e n e f i t " ,  and  w h i c h  do n o t ,  " i m p o s e  on  t h e  u n d e r t a k i n g s  c o n c e r n e d  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  w h i c h  a r e  n o t  i n d i s p e n s a b l e  t o  t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  
t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s  [ o r ]  . . .  a f f o r d  s u c h  u n d e r t a k i n g s  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  
o f  e l i m i n a t i n g  c o m p e t i t i o n  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  a s u b s t a n t i a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  
p r o d u c t s  i n  q u e s t i o n " .
föT
2A r t i c l e  87 EEC
A r t i c l e  87 EEC r e q u i r e s  t h e  C o u n c i l  t o  a d o p t  l e g i s l a t i o n  t o  g i v e  
e f f e c t  t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  s e t  o u t  i n  A r t i c l e s  85 a n d  8 6 .  P a r a g r a p h  
2 o f  A r t i c l e  87 p r o v i d e s  t h a t  s u c h  l e g i s l a t i o n  s h a l l  b e  d e s i g n e d ,  
i n t e r  a l i a ,  " t o  e n s u r e  c o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  t h e  p r o h i b i t i o n s  l a i d  down 
i n  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 1 )  and i n  A r t i c l e  86 by m a k in g  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  f i n e s  
a n d  p e r i o d i c  p e n a l t y  p a y m e n t s " ,  a n d ,  " t o  l a y  down d e t a i l e d  r u l e s  
f o r  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 3 ) " .
The  C o u n c i l  h a s  e n a c t e d  tw o  p r i n c i p a l  R e g u l a t i o n s  i n  d i s c h a r g i n g  
i t s  d u t y  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  8 7 :  R e g u l a t i o n s  1 7 / 6 2  an d  1 9 / 6 5  EEC.
R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2  a n d  1 9 / 6 5  EEC
R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2 :  D e c i s i o n  Making  P o w ers
C o u n c i l  R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2  EEC6 , e n a c t e d  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  87 EEC,
g r a n t s  t o  t h e  C o m m is s io n  two b r o a d  s o r t s  o f  d e c i s i o n  making
7p o w e r s  .
6 .  C o u n c i l  R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2  o f  6 t h  F e b r u a r y  19 6 2 ,  OJ ( 1 9 6 2 )  L 
1 3 / 2 0 4 .  7
7 .  The power  o f  t h e  C o m m is s io n  t o  c e r t i f y  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  2 o f  
t h e  R e g u l a t i o n  t h a t ,  on t h e  f a c t s  i n  i t s  p o s s e s s i o n ,  i t  d o e s  
n o t  c o n s i d e r  t h e r e  a r e  g r o u n d  f o r  p r o c e e d i n g  u n d e r  A r t i c l e s  
8 5 (1 )  o r  86 EEC -  " n e g a t i v e  c l e a r a n c e "  -  i s  n o t  i n c l u d e d  h e r e  
a s  a " d e c i s i o n  m ak ing  p o w e r " .

3I t  p r o v i d e s  by A r t i c l e  9 ,  p a r a g r a p h  1 t h a t  t h e  Com m iss ion  h a s  s o l e  
power  t o  d e c l a r e  by A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 1 )  EEC i n a p p l i c a b l e  p u r s u a n t  t o  
A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 3 )  o f  t h e  T r e a t y .  H ow ever ,  t h e  C om m iss ion  i s  b a r r e d  
f ro m  t a k i n g  s u c h  a d e c i s i o n  u n l e s s  a n d  u n t i l  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
a g r e e m e n t  o r  p r a c t i c e  h a s  b e e n  n o t i f i e d  by o n e  o r  b o t h  o f  t h e  
p a r t i e s  [ A r t i c l e  4 ( 1 ) ] .  U nde r  A r t i c l e  8 ( 1 )  t h e  C o m m is s io n  must 
i s s u e  i t s  d e c i s i o n  t o  d i s a p p l y  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 1 )  f o r  a  s p e c i f i e d  
p e r i o d  and  may make t h e  " e x e m p te d "  s t a t u s  o f  a n  a g r e e m e n t  o r  
p r a c t i c e  s u b j e c t  t o  c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s  a n d  o b l i g a t i o n s .  I f  (a )  
t h e  f a c t s  b a s i c  t o  m a k in g  t h e  " e x e m p t i o n "  d e c i s i o n  c h a n g e ;  o r  (b) 
t h e  p a r t i e s  b r e a c h  an  o b l i g a t i o n  a t t a c h e d  t h e r e t o ;  o r  ( c )  t h e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  u p o n  w h ic h  t h e  d e c i s i o n  i s  b a s e d  i s  i n c o r r e c t  o r  was 
i n d u c e d  by d e c e i t ;  o r  ( d )  t h e  p a r t i e s  a b u s e  t h e  e x e m p t i o n  g r a n t e d  
b y  t h e  d e c i s i o n ,  t h e n  t h e  Com m iss ion  may, u n d e r  A r t i c l e  8 ( 3 ) ,
o
r e v o k e  o r  amend i t s  d e c i s i o n  o r  p r o h i b i t  s p e c i f i e d  a c t s  by t h e  
p a r t i e s .  B r e a c h e s  o f  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n s  a t t a c h e d  t o  d e c i s i o n s  u n d e r  
A r t i c l e  8 ( 1 )  may a t t r a c t  a f i n e  by C o m m is s io n  d e c i s i o n  u n d e r  
A r t i c l e  1 5 ( 2 ) ( b )  o f  up t o  10% o f  a n n u a l  t u r n o v e r .  C o m p l i a n c e  w i t h  
a p r o h i b i t i o n  o r d e r e d  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  8 ( 3 )  c a n  be  c o m p e l l e d  by 
C o m m iss io n  d e c i s i o n  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  1 6 ( 1 ) ( b )  i m p o s i n g  a  p e r i o d i c  
p e n a l t y  p a y m e n t  o f  b e t w e e n  50 an d  1000 u n i t s  o f  a c c o u n t  p e r  d a y .
By A r t i c l e  9 ,  p a r a g r a p h  2 ,  t h e  R e g u l a t i o n  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  t h e  
C o m m iss io n  s h a l l  h a v e  p o w e r ,  t o  a p p l y  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 1 )  a n d  A r t i c l e  86 8
8 .  I n  c a s e s  ( b ) ,  ( c )  a n d  (d )  r e v o c a t i o n  c a n  be  r e t r o a c t i v e
[ A r t i c l e  8 ( 3 ) ] .
j
I{
i
, I
4j Q
o f  t h e  T r e a t y "  . The C o m m is s io n  may e x e r c i s e  t h i s  p o w e r ,  "upon 
a p p l i c a t i o n "  by  Member S t a t e s  o r  by n a t u r a l  o r  l e g a l  p e r s o n s  who 
c l a i m  a l e g i t i m a t e  i n t e r e s t ,  o r  , "u pon  i t s  own i n i t i a t i v e "  
[ A r t i c l e ' 3 ( 1 ) , ( 2 ) 1 .  D e c i s i o n s  i n  e x e r c i s e  o f  t h i s  p o w e r  may 
r e q u i r e  U n d e r t a k i n g s  f o u n d  t o  h a v e  i n f r i n g e d  A r t i c l e s  8 5 ( 1 )  o r  86,  
" t o  b r i n g  s u c h  i n f r i n g e m e n t  t o  a n  end"  [ i b i d ]  and  t h e  C om m iss ion  
i s  empowered  by  A r t i c l e  1 6 ( 1 ) ( a )  t o  i m p o s e  p e r i o d i c  p e n a l t y  
p a y m e n t s  o f  b e t w e e n  50 a n d  1000  u n i t s  o f  a c c o u n t  p e r  d a y  on 
u n d e r t a k i n g s  t o  com pel  them  t o  do  s o .  I n d e p e n d e n t  o f  t h e  p o w er  t o  
o r d e r  c e s s a t i o n  o f  a n  i n f r i n g e m e n t .  A r t i c l e  1 5 ( 2 ) ( a )  o f  t h e  
R e g u l a t i o n  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  t h e  C o m m iss io n  may impose  f i n e s  o f  up  t o  
10% o f  a n n u a l  t u r n o v e r  on  u n d e r t a k i n g s  a g a i n s t  which  i t  h o l d s  t o  
h a v e  v i o l a t e d  A r t i c l e s  8 5 ( 1 )  a n d / o r  86 EEC.
R e g u l a t i o n  1 9 / 6 5 :  L e g i s l a t i v e  P ow ers
1 10C o u n c i l  R e g u l a t i o n  1 9 / 6 5  EEC , a l s o  e n a c t e d  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  87 
EEC, p r o v i d e s  by  A r t i c l e  1 t h a t  t h e  C o m m is s io n  may "b y  r e g u l a t i o n  
d e c l a r e  t h a t  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 1 )  s h a l l  n o t  a p p l y  t o  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  
a g r e e m e n t s  t o  w h ic h  o n l y  two u n d e r t a k i n g s  a r e  p a r t y "  a n d  which  
p o s s e s s  c e r t a i n  o t h e r  b r o a d  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
9 .  U n l i k e  t h e  power t o  d e c l a r e  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 1 )  EEC i n a p p l i c a b l e ,  
t h i s tpow er  was n o t  g r a n t e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  t o  t h e  C o m m is s io n .  
T h i s ^ w a s  i n t e n d e d  t o  e n a b l e  n a t i o n a l  c o u r t s  t o  s h a r e  t h e  
b u r d ë n  o f  e n f o r c i n g  A r t i c l e s  8 5 ( 1 )  a n d  86 EEC. The C o u r t  o f  
J u s t i c e ,  by  d e c l a r i n g  t h e s e  p r o v i s i o n s  d i r e c t l y  e f f e c t i v e ,  
h a s  ë m o h a s i s e d  t h i s  c o n c u r r e n t  j u r i s d i c t i o n  ( C a s e  1 2 7 / 7 3 ,
' BRT v" SABAM [1 9 7 4 ]  ECR 5 ,  pp  6 2 - 6 3 ) .  10
1 0 .  C o u n c i l  R e g u l a t i o n  1 9 / 6 5  EEC o f  2nd M arch  19 6 5 ,  OJ ( 1 9 6 5 )  L 
3 6 / 5 3 3 .
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5Summary
I n  summary, t h e n ,  we s e e  t h a t  t h e  C o m m is s io n  h a s  p o w e r ,  ( a ) . ,  t o  
a p p l y  A r t i c l e s  8 5 ( 1 )  a n d  86 EEC b y  d e c i s i o n  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  
u n d e r t a k i n g s  ( w i t h  t h e  o p t i o n  o f  im p o s i n g  f i n e s  upon t h e m ) ;  ( b ) . ,  
t o  t a k e  d e c i s i o n s  d i s a p p l y i n g  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 1 )  i n  i n d i v i d u a l  c a s e s  
p u r s u a n t  t o  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 3 )  EEC; a n d  ( c ) . ,  t o  e n a c t  r e g u l a t i o n s  
w h i c h  exem pt  w h o l e  c l a s s e s  o f  a g r e e m e n t s  o r  c o n c e r t e d  p r a c t i c e s  
f r o m  t h e  same p r o h i b i t i o n .  We c a n  s a f e l y  d i s t i n g u i s h  b e tw ee n  
p o w e r s  ( a )  an d  ( b )  on o n e  h a n d ,  and  power ( c )  on t h e  o t h e r .  Power
( c ) ,  wi t h  w h ic h  we a r e  n o t  i n t e r e s t e d ,  i s  a l e g i s l a t i v e  pow er ,  
( i . e .  a power  t o  p r o m u l g a t e  g e n e r a l  r u l e s  o f  l aw  c a p a b l e  o f  
a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  c o n c r e t e  c a s e s )  w h i l e  t h e  o t h e r  two a r e  e x a m p l e s  o f  
d e c i s i o n  m ak in g  pow er  ( i . e .  pow er  t o  a p p l y  g e n e r a l  r u l e s  o f  law in  
t h e s e  c o n c r e t e  c a s e s ) .  We s h a l l  now p r o c e e d  t o  e x am in e  t h e  r u l e s  
o f  law  t o  w h ic h  t h i s  d e c i s i o n  making  p r o c e s s  m us t  c o n f o r m ,  which  
a r e  im posed  by t h e  T r e a t y  a n d  by s e c o n d a r y  l e g i s l a t i o n  e n a c t e d  by 
t h e  C o u n c i l  a n d  t h e  C o m m is s io n  i t s e l f .
L e g i s l a t i v e  R u l e s  G o v e r n i n g  D e c i s i o n  Making u n d e r  
v R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2 :  A r t i c l e s  190 a n d  191
a n d  R e g u l a t i o n s  1 7 /6 2  a n d  9 9 / 6 3  EEC
t r .
A r t i c l e  190
A r t i c l e  190 o f  t h e  T r e a t y  p r o v i d e s  i n t e r  a l i a  t h a t ,  
" [ r l e g u l a t i o n s , d i r e c t i v e s  a n d  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l  a n d  o f  t h e  
C om m iss ion  s h a l l  s t a t e  t h e  r e a s o n s  o n  w h ic h  t h e y  a r e  b a s e d " .  I t  
w i l l  be c l e a r  t h a t  A r t i c l e  190 a p p l i e s  t o  d e c i s i o n s  i s s u e d  by t h e

6Com m iss ion  u n d e r  R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2 ,  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  
p r o p o s i t i o n s  o f  law  a n d  f a c t  up o n  w h ic h  t h e y  a r e  f o u n d e d .
A r t i c l e  191
A r t i c l e  191 o f  t h e  T r e a t y  p r o v i d e s  i n t e r  a l i a  t h a t ,  " [ d ] i r e c t i v e s  
a n d  d e c i s i o n s  s h a l l  b e  n o t i f i e d  t o  t h o s e  t o  whom t h e y  a r e  
a d d r e s s e d  a n d  s h a l l  t a k e  e f f e c t  upon s u c h  n o t i f i c a t i o n " .  A r t i c l e  
191 t h e r e f o r e  im p o s e s  a  c l e a r  d u t y  upon t h e  Com m iss ion  t o  n o t i f y  
d e c i s i o n s  t a k e n  u n d e r  R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 /6 2  t o  a f f e c t e d  u n d e r t a k i n g s  i n  
o r d e r  t h a t  t h e y  c a n  t a k e  e f f e c t .
R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2 :  I n f o r m a t i o n  G a t h e r i n g
The C o m m is s io n  i s  g r a n t e d  a  w ide  s e l e c t i o n  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  
g a t h e r i n g  p o w e r s  by R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2 .  The o n l y  o c c a s i o n s  o n  which  
u n d e r t a k i n g s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  s t e p  f o r w a r d  and p r o v i d e  t h e  Com m iss ion  
v o l u n t a r i l y  w i t h  i n f o r m a t i o n  a r e  e i t h e r  when t h e y  a r e  c o m p l a i n i n g  
a b o u t  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  o t h e r  u n d e r t a k i n g s ,  o r  a r e  n o t i f y i n g  
d e t a i l s  o f  an  a g r e e m e n t  o r  p r a c t i c e  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  o b t a i n i n g  
a n  e x e m p t i o n  { i . e .  a  d e c i s i o n  d i s a p p l y i n g  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 1 )  in  
p u r s u a n c e  o f  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 3 )  EEC).
A r t i c l e  1 1 ( 1 )  p r o v i d e s  t h a t ,  " i n  c a r r y i n g  o u t  t h e  d u t i e s  a s s i g n e d  
t o  i t  . . .  [ i n t e r  a l i a ]  by  p r o v i s i o n s  a d o p t e d  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  87 o f  
t h e  T r e a t y ,  t h e  C o m m is s io n  may o b t a i n  a l l  n e c e s s a r y  i n f o r m a t i o n  
f r o m  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t s  a n d  c o m p e t e n t  a u t h o r i t i e s  o f  t h e  Member
iI
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S t a t e s  a n d  f r o m  u n d e r t a k i n g s  a n d  a s s o c i a t i o n s  o f  u n d e r t a k i n g s " ^ .  
U nder  A r t i c l e  1 1 ( 3 ) ,  t h e  C o m m is s io n  may r e q u e s t  u n d e r t a k i n g s  t o  
p r o d u c e  i n f o r m a t i o n  w h i c h  i t  w i s h e s  t o  s e e  w i t h i n  a s p e c i f i e d  t im e  
l i m i t .  I n  t h e  e v e n t  t h a t  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e q u e s t e d  i s  no t  
s u p p l i e d  w i t h i n  t h e  t i m e  l i m i t , " o r  i s  s u p p l i e d  i n  i n c o m p l e t e  fo rm ,  
A r t i c l e  1 1 ( 5 )  empowers  t h e  C om m iss ion  t o  r e q u i r e  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  t h e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  by d e c i s i o n .
A r t i c l e  1 4 ( 1 )  f u r t h e r  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  i n ,  " c a r r y i n g  o u t  t h e  d u t i e s  
a s s i g n e d  t o  i t  . . .  [ i n t e r  a l i a ]  by p r o v i s i o n s  a d o p t e d  u n d e r  
A r t i c l e  87 o f  t h e  T r e a t y ,  t h e  C om m iss ion  may u n d e r t a k e  a l l  
n e c e s s a r y  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  i n t o  u n d e r t a k i n g s  and  a s s o c i a t i o n s  o f  
u n d e r t a k i n g s " .  D u ly  a u t h o r i s e d  Com m iss ion  o f f i c i a l s  a r e  empowered 
by  A r t i c l e  1 4 ( 1 ) ,  " ( a )  t o  e x amine  t h e  b o o k s  and  o t h e r  b u s i n e s s  
r e c o r d s ;  (b )  t o  t a k e  c o p i e s  o f  o r  e x t r a c t s  f ro m  t h e  b o o k s  and 
b u s i n e s s  r e c o r d s ;  ( c )  t o  a s k  f o r  o r a l  e x p l a n a t i o n s  on t h e  s p o t ;
(d )  t o  e n t e r  a n y  p r e m i s e s ;  l a n d  a n d  m e an s  o f  t r a n s p o r t  o f  
u n d e r t a k i n g s " .  I n v e s t i g a t i o n s  may b e  u n d e r t a k e n  e i t h e r  w i t h  o r  
w i t h o u t  a d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  C o m m is s io n .  U nder  A r t i c l e  1 4 ( 2 ) ,  
a u t h o r i s e d  o f f i c i a l s  p r o d u c i n g  w r i t t e n  a u t h o r i s a t i o n  s t a t i n g  t h e  
s u b j e c t  m a t t e r  a n d  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e i r  v i s i t  c a n  r e q u e s t  t h e  c o ­
o p e r a t i o n  o f  a n  u n d e r t a k i n g  w i t h  an  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  U nder  A r t i c l e  
1 4 ( 3 ) ,  u n d e r t a k i n g s  c a n  be  r e q u i r e d  t o  s u b m i t  t o  an  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
o f  p r e m i s e s  w h i c h  i s  o r d e r e d  by  d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  C o m m is s io n ,  which  
a g a i n  s t a t e s  t h e  s u b j e c t  m a t t e r  and p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  
I f  an  u n d e r t a k i n g  o p p o s e s  a n  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o r d e r e d  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  1
1 1 .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  A r t i c l e  12 p e r m i t s  t h e  C o m m is s io n  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
t o  u n d e r t a k e  i n q u i r i e s  i n t o  an  e n t i r e  e c o n o m i c  s e c t o r  o f  t h e  
common m a r k e t  i f  i t  s u s p e c t s  t h a t  c o m p e t i t i o n  w i t h i n  t h a t  
s e c t o r  i s  b e i n g  r e s t r i c t e d  o r  d i s t o r t e d .
iI
81 4 ( 3 ) ,  t h e  r e l e v a n t  Member S t a t e  i s  o b l i g e d  by  A r t i c l e  1 4 ( 6 )  t o ,  
" a f f o r d  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  o f f i c i a l s  a u t h o r i s e d  by 
t h e  C o m m is s io n " .
The  C om m iss ion  i s  a rm e d  w i t h  s u b s t a n t i a l  p e n a l  w e a p o n s  t o  
d i s c o u r a g e  t h e  i n t e n t i o n a l  o r  n e g l i g e n t  o b s t r u c t i o n  o r  a b u s e  o f  
i t s  i n f o r m a t i o n  g a t h e r i n g  o p e r a t i o n  by u n d e r t a k i n g s .  Under 
A r t i c l e  1 5 ,  U n d e r t a k i n g s  w h ic h  s u p p l y  i n c o r r e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  u n d e r  
A r t i c l e  1 1 ( 3 )  o r  ( 5 ) ,  o r  s u p p l y  i n c o m p l e t e  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e q u i r e d  
u n d e r  A r t i c l e  1 1 ( 5 ) ;  o r  w h i c h  p r o d u c e  b u s i n e s s  r e c o r d s  i n  
i n c o m p l e t e  fo r m  i n  a n  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  1 4 ( 2 )  o r  ( 3 ) ,  o r  
r e f u s e  t o  s u b m i t  t o  a n  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o r d e r e d  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  1 4 ( 3 ) ,  
may ,  by d e c i s i o n ,  be  f i n e d  f r o m  100 t o  5000 u n i t s  o f  a c c o u n t .  In  
a d d i t i o n ,  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  16 t h e  C om m iss ion  may im p o se  p e r i o d i c  
p e n a l t y  p a y m e n t s  upon  u n d e r t a k i n g s  o f  f r o m  50 t o  1000 u n i t s  o f  
a c c o u n t  p e r  d a y ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  c o m p e l  them  t o  s u p p l y  c o m p l e t e  and 
c o r r e c t  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e q u i r e d  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  1 1 ( 5 ) ,  o r  t o  s u b m i t  t o  
a n  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o r d e r e d  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  1 4 ( 3 ) .
R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2 :  D e c i s i o n  P r e p a r a t i o n
|  A r t i c l e  (jJ3JJl) o f  R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 /6 2  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  b e f o r e  t h e  
C o m m iss io n  e x e r c i s e s  i t s  d e c i s i o n  m a k in g  p o w e r  i t  m u s t  c o n s u l t  an 
Ad v i s o r y  Com m i t t e e  on R e s t r i c t i v e  P r a c t i c e s  a n d  M o n o p o l i e s  which  
c o n s i s t s  o f  e x p e r t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  Member S t a t e s .  The 
r e p o r t  o f  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  t h i s  c o n s u l t a t i o n  i s  a n n e x e d  t o  t h e  d r a f t  
v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  C o m m iss io n  d e c i s i o n ,  b u t  i s  n o t  made p u b l i c  
[ A r t i c l e  1 0 ( 4 ) ] .
A r t i c l e  ( 1 9 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  R e g u l a t i o n  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  b e f o r e  t a k i n g  
r e l e v a n t  d e c i s i o n s  t h e  C o m m is s io n  m u s t  g i v e  t h e  u n d e r t a k i n g s
(
9c o n c e r n e d  an  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  h e _ h e a r d on t h e  m a t t e r s  t o  w h i c h  t h e  
Commiss ion  h a s  t a k e n  o b j e c t i o n .  T h e s e  m a t t e r s  w i l l  b e  t h o s e  
e l e m e n t s  o f  a n  a g r e e m e n t  o r  c o n c e r t e d  p r a c t i c e  a g a i n s t  w h i c h  t h e  
Commiss ion  p r o p o s e s  t o  a p p l y  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 1 )  o r  86 EEC, o r ,  
a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  wh ich  t h e  C om m iss ion  r e f u s e s  t o  
d i s a p p l y  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 1 )  EEC. A r t i c l e  1 9 ( 2 )  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  n a t u r a l  
o r  l e g a l  p e r s o n s  d e m o n s t r a t i n g  a s u f f i c i e n t  i n t e r e s t  t o  t h e  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  e i t h e r  t h e  C o m m iss io n  o r  t h e  c o m p e t e n t  a u t h o r i t i e s  
o f  t h e  Member S t a t e s  s h a l l  a l s o  be  g i v e n  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  be 
h e a r d .  A r t i c l e^ 1 9 ( 3 )  f i n a l l y  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  w h e r e ,  i n t e r  a l i a ,  t h e  
Com m iss ion  p r o p o s e s  t o  t a k e  a  d e c i s i o n  d i s a p p l y i n g  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 1 )  
EEC i t  m u s t  a l s o  p u b l i s h  a  summary o f  t h e  n o t i f i e d  
a g reem en t / p i a c t i c e  an d  i n v i t e  a l l  i n t e r e s t e d  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  t o  
s u b m i t  o b s e r v a t i o n s  w i t h i n  a s p e c i f i e d  t i m e  l i m i t  o f  a t  l e a s t  one 
m o n th .
F i n a l l y ,  A r t i c l e  21 o f  t h e  R e g u l a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  t h e  C o m m is s io n  t o  
p u b l i s h  a l l  d e c i s i o n s  by  w h ic h  i t  h a s  a p p l i e d  A r t i c l e s  8 5 ( 1 )  o r  86 
o r  8 5 (3 )  EEC.
R e g u l a t i o n  9 9 / 6 3
. 12C om m iss ion  R e g u l a t i o n  9 9 / 6 3  was e n a c t e d  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  24 o f  
R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2 ,  w h i c h  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  t h e  C o m m is s io n  s h a l l  have  
p o w e r ,  i n t e r  a l i a ,  t o  a d o p t  i m p l e m e n t i n g  p r o v i s i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  
h e a r i n g s  p r e s c r i b e d  by A r t i c l e  1 9 ( 1 )  a n d  ( 2 ) .  12
1 2 .  Com m iss ion  R e g u l a t i o n  9 9 / 6 3  o f  2 5 t h  J u l y  19 6 3 ,  OJ ( 1 9 6 3 )  L 
1 2 7 / 2 2 6 3 .
L
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I m p l e m e n t i n g  A r t i c l e  1 9 ( 1 )  o f  R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2 ,  A r t i c l e  2 o f  t h e  
Com m iss ion  R e g u l a t i o n  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  b e f o r e  t a k i n g  a  d e c i s i o n  t h e  
Com m iss ion  s h a l l  i n f o r m  u n d e r t a k i n g s  i n  w r i t i n g  o f  o b j e c t i o n s  
r a i s e d  a g a i n s t  t h e m .  U n d e r  A r t i c l e  4 ,  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h e  C om m iss ion  
may d e a l  o n l y  w i t h  t h o s e  o b j e c t i o n s  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  w h i c h  t h e  
r e l e v a n t  u n d e r t a k i n g s  h a v e  b e e n  a f f o r d e d  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  o f  making  
known t h e i r  v i e w s .  T h e s e  w r i t t e n  o b j e c t i o n s  m us t  a l s o  f i x  a  t im e  
l i m i t  w i t h i n  w h i c h  t h e  r e l e v a n t  u n d e r t a k i n g s  may i n f o r m  t h e  
Com m iss ion  o f  t h e i r  v i e w s  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  o b j e c t i o n s  r a i s e d .  
A r t i c l e  3 p r o v i d e s  t h a t  s u c h  v i e w s  a r e  t o  be  e x p r e s s e d  i n  w r i t i n g .
: 3
W r i t t e n  comments  may i n c l u d e  a  r e q u e s t  t o  b e  h e a r d  o r a l l y * 1' a n d ,  
by  A r t i c l e  7 ( 1 )  s u c h  r e q u e s t s  s h a l l  b e  h o n o u r e d  i f  t h e  
u n d e r t a k i n g s  show a s u f f i c i e n t  i n t e r e s t  o r  a r e  t h e  p r o p o s e d  
r e c i p i e n t s  o f  a  f i n a n c i a l  s a n c t i o n .  A r t i c l e  7 ( 2 )  a l s o  p e r m i t s  t h e  
C om m iss ion  t o  h e a r  any  o t h e r  p e r s o n  i t  c h o o s e s ,  e . g .  a  p e r s o n  
c i t e d  by an  u n d e r t a k i n g  t o  be i n  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  c o r r o b o r a t i v e  
e v i d e n c e .
I m p l e m e n t i n g  A r t i c l e  1 9 ( 2 ) ,  A r t i c l e  5 p r o v i d e s  t h a t  t h i r d  p a r t i e s
d e m o n s t r a t i n g  s u f f i c i e n t  i n t e r e s t  who a p p l y  t o  be  h e a r d  b e f o r e
d e c i s i o n  m a k in g  m us t  b e  a f f o r d e d  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  make t h e i r
v i e w s  known i n  w r i t i n g  w i t h i n  a t i m e  l i m i t  f i x e d  b y  t h e  
14C om m iss ion  . I f  t h e s e  t h i r d  p a r t i e s  s o  r e q u e s t ,  t h e n ,  u n d e r  
|  A r t i c l e  7 ,  t h e y  a r e  e n t i t l e d  t o  an  o r a l  h e a r i n g  i f  t h e y  show 134
1 3 .  And may i n c l u d e  a  r e q u e s t  t h a t  c o r r o b o r a t i n g  w i t n e s s e s  be  
h e a r d ,  [ A r t i c l e  3 ( 3 ) ] .
1 4 .  The t i m e  l i m i t s  w h i c h  t h e  Com m iss ion  c a n  f i x  u n d e r  A r t i c l e s  
2 an d  5 a r e  r e q u i r e d  by  A r t i c l e  11 t o ,  " h a v e  r e g a r d  b o t h  t o  
t h e  t i m e  r e q u i r e d  f o r  p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  comments  an d  t o  t h e  
u r g e n c y  o f  t h e  c a s e " ,  and  t o  be  a t  l e a s t  two w eeks  l o n g .
1I
í
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s u f f i c i e n t  i n t e r e s t  o r  i f  t h e  C o m m is s io n  e x e r c i s e s  i t s  d i s c r e t i o n  
t o  h e a r  th em  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  7 ( 2 ) .
O r a l  h e a r i n g s  a r e  g o v e r n e d  by A r t i c l e  9 ,  w h ic h  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  t h e y  
a r e  t o  c o n d u c t e d ,  "by t h e  p e r s o n s  a p p o i n t e d  by t h e  C om m iss ion  f o r  
t h a t  p u r p o s e "  . ^ H e a r i n g s  a r e  n o t  o p en  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  ( A r t i c l e  
9 ( 3 ) ] .  The  s t a t e m e n t s  made by t h o s e  h e a r d  a t  t h e  h e a r i n g  a r e  
m in u te d  a n d  a p p r o v e d  by  th em  ( A r t i c l e  9 ( 4 ) ] .
t
R e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  a n d  t h e  
Com m iss ion  u n d e r  t h e  C o m p e t i t i o n  Regime
A r t i c l e  1 7 5 :  F a i l u r e  t o  A c t
A r t i c l e  J JL5, p a r a g r a p h  3 ,  o f  t h e  T r e a t y  p r o v i d e s  i n t e r  a l i a  t h a t ,  
" [ a ] n y  n a t u r a l  o r  l e g a l  p e r s o n  may . . .  c o m p l a i n  t o  t h e  C o u r t  o f  
J u s t i c e  t h a t  an i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  Community  h a s  ( i n  i n f r i n g e m e n t  
o f  t h e  T r e a t y ]  f a i l e d  t o  a d d r e s s  t o  t h a t  p e r s o n  a n y  a c t  o t h e r  t h a n 
a  r e c o m m e n d a t io n  o r  an  o p i n i o n " .  T h i s  a c t i o n  may o n l y  b e  b r o u g h t  
i f  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  h a s  b e e n  c a l l e d  upon  t o  a c t  by  t h a t  p e r s o n  and 
has  f a i l e d  t o  " d e f i n e  i t s  p o s i t i o n "  w i t h i n  tw o  months***. I f  an 156
15. O r a l  h e a r i n g s  a r e  c u r r e n t l y  c o n d u c t e d  by  t h e  " H e a r i n g  
O f f i c e r " ,  an o p e r a t i v e  o f  DGIV who h a s  no o t h e r  p a r t  i n  t h e  
d e c i s i o n m a k i n g  o r  i n v e s t i g a t i v e  p r o c e s s .  The c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  
p o s t  o f  H e a r i n g  O f f i c e r  was a n n o u n c e d  i n  t h e  T h i r t e e n t h  
R e p o r t  on C o m p e t i t i o n  P o l i c y .
16 .  A r t i c l e  1 7 5 (2 )  EEC, w h ic h  f u r t h e r  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  t h e  a c t i o n  
f o r  f a i l u r e  t o  a c t  m u s t  be  b r o u g h t  w i t h i n  tw o  m o n t h s  o f  t h e  
i n s t i t u t i o n ' s  f a i l u r e  t o  d e f i n e  i t s  d e c i s i o n .
m u i U
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a c t i o n  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  175 EEC i s  w e l l  f o u n d e d  a n d  t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  
a c t  i n  q u e s t i o n  h a s  b e e n  d e c l a r e d  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  T r e a t y ,  t h e  
i n s t i t u t i o n  i s  o b l i g e d  by A r t i c l e  176 EEC t o  t a k e  m e a s u r e s  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  com p ly  w i t h  t h e  j u d g m e n t  o f  t h e  C o u r t .
The f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  C o m m iss io n  t o  p r o v i d e  an  u n d e r t a k i n g  w i t h  a 
d e c i s i o n  i n d i c a t i n g  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  i t  i s  d i s a p p l y i n g  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 1 )  
EEC f rom  a n  a g r e e m e n t  t o  w h ic h  h e  i s  p a r t y  c a n  c o n s e q u e n t l y  fo rm 
t h e  b a s i s  f o r  a n  a c t i o n  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  175 EEC. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  
C o u r t  h a s  h e l d  t h a t  an  c o m p l a i n a n t  s e e k i n g  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  
A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 1 )  o r  86 a g a i n s t  a n  u n d e r t a k i n g  h a s  a  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
d i r e c t  a n d  i n d i v i d u a l  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  o u tc o m e  o f  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  he 
may p r o c e e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  C o m m is s io n  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  1 7 5 ( 2 )  i n  o r d e r  
t o  h a v e  h i s  c o m p l a i n t  d e f i n i t i v e l y  d e a l t  w i t h
A r t i c l e  1 7 3 :  D e c i s i o n a l  L e g a l i t y
A r t i c l e  1 7 3 ,  p a r a g r a p h  2 ,  o f  t h e  T r e a t y  p r o v i d e s  t h a t ,  " [ a ] n y  
n a t u r a l  o r  l e g a l  p e r s o n  may [ o n  g r o u n d s  o f  l a c k  o f  c o m p e t e n c e ,  
i n f r i n g e m e n t  o f  an  e s s e n t i a l  p r o c e d u r a l  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  i n f r i n g e m e n t  
o f  t h i s  T r e a t y  o r  o f  a n y  r u l e  o f  law r e l a t i n g  t o  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  
o r  m i s u s e  o f  p o w e r s )  . . .  i n s t i t u t e  p r o c e e d i n g s  [ i n  t h e  C o u r t  o f  
J u s t i c e ]  a g a i n s t  a  d e c i s i o n  a d d r e s s e d  t o  t h a t  p e r s o n  o r  a g a i n s t  a 
d e c i s i o n  w h i c h ,  a l t h o u g h  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  a r e g u l a t i o n  o r  a d e c i s i o n  
a d d r e s s e d  t o  a n o t h e r  p e r s o n ,  i s  o f  d i r e c t  an d  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n c e r n  
t o  t h e  f o r m e r " .  The C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  h a s  s t a t e d  t h a t ,  w i t h  r e g a r d  
t o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  " d e c i s i o n " ,  a n y  " m e a s u r e  w h i c h  p r o d u c e s  l e g a l  *31907
17 .  C ase  1 2 5 / 7 8 ,  'GEMA v C o m m is s io n '  [ 1 9 7 9 ]  ECR 3 1 7 3 ,  p p  3188-
3 1 9 0 ,  p a r a s .  1 4 - 2 3  o f  j u d g m e n t .
f-, t
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e f f e c t s  t o u c h i n g  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  [ p e r s o n s ]  by b r i n g i n g  a b o u t  
a d i s t i n c t  c h a n g e  i n  t h e i r  l e g a l  p o s i t i o n ” i s  c a p a b l e  o f  b e i n g  
a t t a c k e d  b e f o r e  i t  a n d ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h a t  a  d e f i n i t i v e  
n o t i f i c a t i o n  i s s u e d  by a n  i n s t i t u t i o n  ( o f  t h e  same s o r t  a s  t h a t  t o
w h ich  an  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  e n t i t l e d  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  1 7 5 (2 )  EEC) c a n  a l s o
. 19c o n s t i t u t e  su c h  a n  a c t
T h e s e  p r o c e e d i n g s  m us t  b e  i n s t i t u t e d ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  A r t i c l e  1 7 3 ( 3 ) ,  
" w i t h i n  two m o n th s  o f  t h e  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  m e a s u r e ,  o r  o f  i t s  
n o t i f i c a t i o n  t o  t h e  p l a i n t i f f ,  o r ,  i n  a b s e n c e  t h e r e o f ,  o f  t h e  day 
on w h ic h  i t  came t o  t h e  k n o w le d g e  o f  t h e  l a t t e r ,  a s  t h e  c a s e  may 
®  b e " .
I t  i s  o b v i o u s  t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  w h i c h  t h e  Com m iss ion  i s  empowered
t o  t a k e  u n d e r  R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2  a r e  s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  a t t a c k  u n d e r
A r t i c l e  1 7 3 ( 2 )  by  t h e i r  r e c i p i e n t s .  M o r e o v e r ,  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o
n o t e  t h a t  n o t  o n l y  a d d r e s s e e s  o f  d e c i s i o n s  c a n  i n s t i t u t e
p r o c e e d i n g s  u n d e r  t h i s  A r t i c l e  an d  t h a t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h o s e  l i k e
c o m p l a i n a n t s  w i t h  a  s u f f i c i e n t l y  w e l l  d e f i n e d  an d  s t r o n g  i n t e r e s t
. 20i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n a l  p r o c e s s  a l s o  h a v e  s t a n d i n g
«
18. J o i n e d  C a s e s  8 - 1 1 / 6 6 ,  ' C i m e n t e r i e s  v C o m m is s io n ,  [ 1 9 6 7 ]  ECR 
7 5 ,  a t  p .  91 .
19 .  C ase  2 1 0 / 8 1 ,  'D e m o - S t u d i o  S c h m i d t  v C o m m i s s i o n ’ , [ 1 9 8 3 ]  ECR 
3 0 4 5 ,  a t  p .  3 0 6 3 .  20
20. I n  C a s e  2 6 / 7 6 ,  ' M e t r o  v C o m m i s s i o n ' ,  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  
h e l d  t h a t  a c o m p l a i n a n t ,  whose  c o m p l a i n t  a b o u t  a n  a n t i ­
c o m p e t i t i v e  a g r e e m e n t  was r e j e c t e d  by t h e  C o m m is s io n ,  
p o s s e s s e d  s u c h  a  q u a l i f y i n g  i n t e r e s t  t o  a t t a c k  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
o f  t h e  C om m iss ion  t o  d i s a p p l y  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 1 )  f r o m  t h a t  
a g r e e m e n t .  [ 1 9 7 7 ]  ECR 1 8 7 5 ,  a t  p .  1 9 0 1 .
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A r t i c l e  1 7 2 :  D e c i s i o n a l  E q u i t y
A r t i c l e  172 o f  t h e  T r e a t y  p r o v i d e s  t h a t ,  " [ r J e g u l a t i o n s  made by 
t h e  C o u n c i l  p u r s u a n t  t o  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h i s  T r e a t y  may g i v e  t h e  
C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  u n l i m i t e d  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  p e n a l t i e s  
p r o v i d e d  f o r  i n  s u c h  r e g u l a t i o n s " .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  A r t i c l e  17 o f  
R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 /6 2  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  s h a l l  e x e r c i s e  t h i s  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  r e s p e c t  o f ,  " d e c i s i o n s  w h e re b y  t h e  C o m m is s io n  h a s  
f i x e d  a f i n e  o r  p e r i o d i c  p e n a l t y  p a y m e n t " ,  and  e x p r e s s l y  empowers 
i t  t o ,  " c a n c e l ,  r e d u c e  o r  i n c r e a s e  t h e  f i n e  o r  p e r i o d i c  p e n a l t y  
payment  i m p o s e d " .
The C o u r t  may, t h e r e f o r e ,  r e v i e w  w h a t  c an  be c a l l e d  t h e  
' s e n t e n c i n g  p o l i c y '  o f  t h e  C o m m is s io n  i n  i m p o s i n g  f i n a n c i a l  
s a n c t i o n s  on u n d e r t a k i n g s .  U n l i k e  i t s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  
173 EEC, t h e  u n l i m i t e d  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  A r t i c l e  172 e n a b l e s  i t  t o  
a s s e s s  t h e  e q u i t y  o f  a C o m m is s io n  d e c i s i o n ,  i n  s o  f a r  a s  i t  
r e l a t e s  t o  t h e  d e s e r v e d n e s s  o f  a p e c u n i a r y  s a n c t i o n .
I
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A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSION*S 
DECISION-MAKING POWERS
I n t r o d u c t i o n
We h a v e  a l r e a d y  s e e n  t h a t  t h e  p o w e r s  w h ic h  t h e  Commission  
e x e r c i s e s  u n d e r  t h e  T r e a t y  r u l e s  g o v e r n i n g  t h e  a n t i - c o m p e t i t i v e  
c o n d u c t  o f  u n d e r t a k i n g s  c a n  be  d i v i d e d  i n t o  two l a r g e  g r o u p s :  on 
one  h a n d ,  i s  t h e  power t o  e n a c t  m e a s u r e s  o f  g e n e r a l  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  
s u c h  a s  ' b l o c k  e x e m p t i o n s ' ,  w h ic h  we c h a r a c t e r i s e d  a s  a " r u l e ­
m a k in g "  p o w e r ;  on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  we h a v e  t h e  power  t o  a p p l y  r u l e s  
o f  g e n e r a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  u n d e r t a k i n g s  on  a  c a s e  by 
c a s e  b a s i s ,  s u c h  a s  by a p p l y i n g  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 3 )  o r  8 5 ( 1 )  EEC t o  
th e m ,  w h ic h  we c h a r a c t e r i s e d  a s  a " d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g "  p o w e r .
t
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  i t  s h a l l  b e  d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h a t  w i t h i n  t h e  s c o p e  o f  
t h i s  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  p o w e r  f o n e  c a n  l e g i t i m a t e l y  d i s t i n g u i s h 
b e t w e e n  t h e  " r u l ^ a p p l y i n g "  o r  a d j u d i c a t o r y  pow er  e x e r c i s e d  u n d e r  
A r t i c l e s  8 5 ( 1 )  and  86 EEC and  t h e  " p o l i c ^ a ^ p l y i n g "  o r  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  power e x e r c i s e d  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 3 )  EEC.
n n c  :
The Two K i n d s  o f  Lega(l D e c i s i o ^  f f ak in g
A d j u d i c a t i o n  a n d  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  Com pared
To a l a r g e  e x t e n t ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n - m a i c i n g , - a o h i v i t i e s  o f  a l l  S t a t e  
o f f i c i a l s ;  t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  r u l e s  o f  g e n e r a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o
it j
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i n d i v i d u a l  c a s e s ;  a r e  i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  i n  a f u n c t i o n a l  s e n s e .  
M a r t i n  S h a p i r o ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  h a s  p o i n t e d  o u t :
"The c o n g r u e n c e  o f  a d m i n i s t e r i n g  a n d  j u d g i n g  m us t  be  s p e c i a l l y
n o t e d ...........B o th  t h e  j u d g e  a n d  a d m i n i s t r a t o r  a p p l y  g e n e r a l
r u l e s  t o  p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n s  on  a  c a s e  by  c a s e  b a s i s .  Both  
t e n d  t o  r e l y  h e a v i l y  on  . . .  f i x e d  d e c i s i o n a l  p r o c e d u r e s ,  
w r i t t e n  r e c o r d s  a n d  l e g a l i s e d  d e f e n c e  o f  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n s .  
B o th  a r e  s u p p l e m e n t a r y  law  m a k e r s  e n g a g e d  i n  f i l l i n g  i n  t h e  
d e t a i l s  o f  m o re  g e n e r a l  r u l e s .  B oth  a r e  f r o n t - l i n e  s o c i a l  
c o n t r o l l e r s  f o r  more  d i s t a n t  g o v e r n i n g  a u t h o r i t i e s "
T h i s  ' c o n g r u e n c e '  c a n n o t  be  d i s p u t e d  i n  g e n e r a l  t e r m s :  t h e
f u n c t i o n s  o f  b o t h  t h e  c r i m i n a l  c o u r t  j u d g e  and  t h e  i m m i g r a t i o n  
o f f i c e r ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  c a n  be  v a l i d l y  d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  
' c o n c r é t i s a t i o n *  o f  l e g a l  norms  i n  i n d i v i d u a l  c a s e s .  However ,  
when one  e x a m i n e s  t h e  ' c o n c r é t i s a t i o n *  p r o c e s s  more c l o s e l y ,  i t  
becomes  a p p a r e n t  t h a t  t h i s  u n - d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  a p p r o a c h  i s  t o o  c r u d e  
and t h a t  s i g n i f i c a n t  c a t e g o r i e s  w i t h i n  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g ,  w h ich  
c o r r e s p o n d  t o  f u n c t i o n s  o f  a d j u d i c a t i o n  and  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  do 
e x i s t .
A d j u d i c a t i o n  an d  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  C o n t r a s t e d
P e r h a p s  o n e  o f  t h e  s i m p l e s t  s t a t e m e n t s  a b o u t  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  
b e t w e e n  a d j u d i c a t i o n  and  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  was g i v e n  by MJC V i l e ,  
when h e ,  "sum[med]  up t h e  p r i m a r y  f u n c t i o n s  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  a s  r u l e -  
m a k in g ,  a d i s c r e t i o n a r y  f u n c t i o n ,  r u l e - a p p l i c a t i o n ,  and  21
21.  " C o u r t s :  a C o m p a r a t i v e  a n d  P o l i t i c a l  A n a l y s i s "  1981
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C h i c a g o  P r e s s ,  20 ( e m p h a s i s  a d d e d ) .
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a u t h o r i t a t i v e  r u l e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' 1 • I f  we p u t  a s i d e  h i s  norm 
c r e a t i n g  f u n c t i o n s  o f  " r u l e - m a k i n g "  a n d  " a u t h o r i t a t i v e  r u l e -  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n "  ( t h e  f u n c t i o n ,  p a r  e x c e l l e n c e ,  o f  t h e  a p p e l l a t e  
c o u r t s )  we a r e  l e f t  w i t h  t h e  d e c i s i o n a l  f u n c t i o n s  o f  " r u l e -  
a p p l i c a t i o n "  an d  "a d i s c r e t i o n a r y  f u n c t i o n " ,  w h i c h ,  i n  t h i s  
a n a l y s i s ,  c o r r e s p o n d  r e s p e c t i v e l y  t o  a d j u d i c a t i o n  and
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  t / tu* W 4** cu *
In  h i s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  V i l e  c o r r e c t l y  i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  key 
d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  two f u n c t i o n s  a s  t h a t  o f  d e c i s i o n a l  
r e s t r a i n t . W hereas  a d j u d i c a t i o n  i m p l i e s  a c e r t a i n  r i g i d i t y  o f  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  m ak er  i n  a p p l y i n g  a r u l e ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a c c o r d s  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  m a k e r  a n  e l e m e n t  o f  ' d i s c r e t i o n '  o r  f r e e d o m  i n  h i s  t a s k .
But w ha t  do  we mean,  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  l e g a l  s y s t e m ,  when we t a l k  
a b o u t  d e c i s i o n a l  r e s t r a i n t ?  M o r e o v e r ,  w h a t  i s  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e tw e e n  t h e  r u l e s  o f  t h e  l e g a l  s y s t e m  a n d  d i s c r e t i o n ?
22
C l o s e d n e s s  a n d  P a s t - O r i e n t a t i o n  
a s  an  I n d e x  o f  D e c i s i o n a l  R i g i d i t y  2
22. " C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m  a n d  t h e  S e p a r a t i o n  o f  P o w e r s "  1967 ,  
O x f o r d ,  C l a r e n d o n  P r e s s ,  3 2 9 .  T h i s  p a p e r  e m D h a t i c a l l y  
e n d o r s e s  V i l e ' s  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t ,  " [ t ] h e r e  i s  n o t h i n g  s a c r e d ,  
o r  d i v i n e  a b o u t  t h e  t r i n i t y  o f  l e g i s l a t i v e ,  e x e c u t i v e ,  and  
j u d i c i a l  p o w e r s  i n  e a r l i e r  t h e o r y "  ( i b i d . ,  3 4 5 - 4 6 ) .  I n  h i s  
o p i n i o n ,  f o r m a l  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  g o v e r n m e n t a l  pow er  o f  
w h ic h  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  t r i —p a r t i t e  o n e  i s  m e r e l y  a n  e x a m p l e ,  
" i s  a  m a t t e r  o f  p r o c e d u r e s  w h ic h  a r e  f e l t  t o  be  n e c e s s a r y  t o  
m e e t  c u r r e n t  n e e d s "  ( i b i d ) .
m i l i
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I n  w h ic h  d e c i s i o n s  c a n  we e x p e c t  d e c i s i o n a l  r i g i d i t y  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  
d e c i s i o n a l  f l e x i b i l i t y ?  I t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  i n  o r d e r  t o  a n sw e r  
t h i s  q u e s t i o n  one  m u s t  e x a m i n e  t h e  r e l a t i v e  " c l o s e d n e s s "  o f  t h e  
s e t  o f  l e g a l  r u l e s  u n d e r  w h ic h  a p a r t i c u l a r  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  power  
i s  e x e r c i s e a b l e .
^Closed Q g ss  i s  d e f i n e d  by  F r e d e r i c k  S c h a u e r ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  a s ,  " t h e
c a p a c i t y  o f  a  s y s t e m  t o  d e c i d e  c a s e s  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n f i n e s  o f  t h a t  
23s y s t e m "  ; a  c a p a c i t y  d e r i v e d  f r o m  t h e  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  c l a r i t y  
and  p r e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  l a n g u a g e  o f  t h e  s y s t e m ' s  r u l e s .
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  a  c l o s e d  s y s t e m  i s  c l a s s i f i e d  a s  o n e ,  "whose  
o p e r a t i o n s  r e q u i r e  r e c o u r s e  o n l y  t o  t h e  no rm s  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  an d  t o  
a c c e p t e d  l i n g u i s t i c  a n d  o b s e r v a t i o n a l  s k i l l s " ^ .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  
due  t o  t h e  c l a r i t y  an d  p r e c i s i o n  o f  a  c l o s e d  l e g a l  s y s t e m ,  t h e  
norms f ro m  w h ic h  a  d e c i s i o n  m a k e r  may l e g i t i m a t e l y  d e r i v e  h i s  
c o n c l u s i o n s  a r e  e x c l u s i v e l y  l e g a l ;  a s  S c h a u e r  p u t s  i t ,
" [ P r e c i s e  l e g a l  r j u l e s  b l o c k  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  f u l l  a r r a y  o f  
r e a s o n s  t h a t  b e a r  upon  a p a r t i c u l a r  d e c i s i o n  i n  two w ay s .  
F i r s t ,  t h e y  e x c l u d e  f r o m  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  r e a s o n s  t h a t  m i g h t  h a v e  
b e e n  a v a i l a b l e  had  t h e  d e c i s i o n m a k e r  n o t  b e e n  c o n s t r a i n e d  by a 
r u l e .  S e c o n d ,  t h e  r u l e - i t s e l f  b e co m e s  a r e a s o n  f o r  a c t i o n ,  o r  
a r e a s o n  f o r  d e c i s i o n " “ .
I t  w i l l  be  c l e a r ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  ' c l o s e d  r e a s o n i n g *  i n  t h i s  s e n s e  
i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  i d e a l  t y p e  o f  ’ f o r m a l l y  r a t i o n a l *  d e c i s i o n -  2345
23 .  " F o r m a l i s m " , 97 Y a le  Z,J ( 1 9 8 8 ) ,  5 0 9 ,  5 3 5 - 5 3 6 .
24 .  i b i d . , 535 .
25. ibid., 537.
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m aking  i s o l a t e d  by Max Weber l a s t  c e n t u r y  . D e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  i n  
a c l o s e d  s y s t e m  i m p l i e s  f o r m a l  r a t i o n a l i t y .
A / s e c o n d  i n d ex o f  d e c i s i o n a l  r i g i d i t y ,  i t  i s  s u g g e s t e d ,  i s  t h e
o r i e n t a t i o n  t o  t h e  p a s t  o f  t h e  l e g a l  s y s t e m  u n d e r  w h ich
a d j u d i c a t i v e  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  m ade ,  o r ,  a s  D a n i e l  G i f f o r d  p u t s  i t ,
27t h e ,  " d e f e r e n c e  w h ic h  t h e  j u d g e  i s  e x p e c t e d  t o  show t h e  p a s t "
" P a s t  o r i e n t a t i o n "  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  p r e o c c u p a t i o n  o f  t h e  l e g a l  s y s t e m
w i t h  w ha t  h a s  gone  b e f o r e .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  i n  a
p a s t  o r i e n t e d  l e g a l  s y s t e m  i s  l e g i t i m a t e l y  c o n c e r n e d  o n l y  w i t h  t h e
28f a c t - s i t u a t i o n  w h ic h  e x i s t e d  p r i o r  t o  t h e  d e c i s i o n  . P a s t  
o r i e n t e d  r u l e s  r e q u i r e  d e c i s i o n  m a k e r s  t o  i g n o r e  p o t e n t i a l  f u t u r e  
c h a n g e  a n d  p r o h i b i t ,  a f o r t i o r i ,  s p e c u l a t i o n  by t h e  d e c i s i o n  maker 
a s  t o  t h e  e f f e c t s  w h ic h  h i s  d e c i s i o n  may h a v e  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  I t  
i s  c l e a r ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  s u c h  a  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  p e r s p e c t i v e  
c o n s t i t u t e s  b o t h  an  o b s t a c l e  t o  d e c i s i o n a l  f r e e d o m  an d  a n  i n d e x  o f  
d e c i s i o n a l  r i g i d i t y .  Of c o u r s e ,  c l o s e d n e s s  an d  p a s t  o r i e n t a t i o n  
a r e  i n t e r r e l a t e d  i n d i c e s  o f  d e c i s i o n a l  r i g i d i t y .  B e f o r e  t h e  
p r e c i s e  s t a n d a r d s  o f  a  c l o s e d  l e g a l  s y s t e m  c a n  b e  a p p l i e d  i n  a n  
i n d i v i d u a l  c a s e ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  m a k e r  m u s t  p o s s e s s  a  f a c t u a l  r e c o r d
26
l
26 . A b r i e f  b u t  u s e f u l  a c c o u n t  o f  W e b e r ' s  s o c i o l o g i c a l  a n a l y s i s  
o f  law  an d  l e g a l  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  c a n  be f o u n d  i n  Dav id  
T r u b e k ' s ,  "Max Weber o n  Law a n d  t h e  R i s e  o f  C a p i t a l i s m "  1972 
W ise  LR 7 2 0 .
27. " D e c i s i o n s ,  D e c i s i o n a l  R e f e r e n t s  a n d  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e
J u s t i c e " ,  37 Law a n d  C o n t e m p o r a r y  P r o b l e m s  £ 1 9 7 2 ) ,  3 ,  13 .  28
28 .  F o r  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  c o n n e c t i o n  b e tw e e n  
' a d j u d i c a t i v e  f a c t s '  a n d  p a s t  e v e n t s ,  s e e  B a r r y  B o y e r ' s  
a r t i c l e ,  " A l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  T r i a l  Type  H e a r i n g s  
f o r  R e s o l v i n g  Complex  S c i e n t i f i c ,  E co n o m ic  a n d  S o c i a l  
I s s u e s " ,  [1 9 7 2 ]  71 M ich  LR 1 1 1 ,  a t  p a g e s  1 1 4 - 1 5 .
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w h ich  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  d e t e r m i n a t e  t o  be  c a t e g o r i s e d  u n d e r  t h o s e  
s t a n d a r d s .  O n ly  t h a t  w h i c h  i s  c a p a b l e  o f  b e i n g  r e n d e r e d  c e r t a i n  
i n  t h i s  way, i . e .  t h e  f a c t s  o f  a p a s t  e v e n t ,  i s  a  f i t  s u b j e c t  f o r  
a d j u d i c a t i o n .
I n  v ie w  o f  i t s  c l o s e d ,  p a s t  o r i e n t e d  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  d e c i s i o n  by 
a d j u d i c a t i o n  c a n  d e a l  o n l y  w i t h ,  " c l a i m s  o f  r i g h t  o r  a c c u s a t i o n s  
o f  f a u l t "  w h i c h  p r e s e n t  f o r m a l  n o r m a t i v e  a n d  n a r r o w  f a c t u a l  
i s s u e s  f o r  r e s o l u t i o n .
O p e n n e s s  a n d  F u t u r e  O r i e n t a t i o n  
a s  an  I n d e x  o f  D e c i s i o n a l  F reedom
I f  t h e  c l o s e d n e s s  o f  a  l e g a l  s y s t e m  an d  i t s  o r i e n t a t i o n  t o  t h e  
p a s t  im p ly  a  f o r m a l l y  r a t i o n a l  m e th o d  o f  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g ,  u n d e r  
w h ich  c o n d i t i o n s  i s  d e c i s i o n a l  f r e e d o m  o r  d i s c r e t i o n  i m p l i c i t  
w i t h i n  t h e  l e g a l  o r d e r ?
S c h a u e r  i s  c l e a r  on  t h e  p o i n t :  s u c h  c o n d i t i o n s  e x i s t  i n  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  o p en  l e g a l  s y s t e m s .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  h im ,  o p e n  l e g a l  
s y s t e m s ,  w h ic h  he  d e f i n e s  a s  t h o s e  t h a t ,
" em p lo y  norms s u f f i c i e n t l y  i n d e t e r m i n a t e  t o  acco m m o d a te  much 
t h a t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  i n  t h e  w o r l d  a t  l a r g e ,  a n d  i n  d o i n g  s o  
s a c r i f i c e  t h e  o c c a s i o n a l  v i r t u e s  o f  c l o s e d n e s s .  S u c h  s y s t e m s  
a r e  m ore  open  e v e n  a t  t h e  e x p e n s e  o f  b e i n g  l e ^ g  p r e d i c t a b l e  
a n d  l e s s  c o n s t r a i n i n g  o f  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n m a k e r s "  2930
29 .  Lon L F u l l e r ,  "Forms an d  L i m i t s  o f  A d j u d i c a t i o n " ,  ( 1 9 7 8 )  92
H a r v a r d  Law R ev iew ,  3 5 3 ,  369 .
30. op. cit., supra., fn. 23, 536.
I
21
Open s y s t e m s ,  t h e n ,  a r e  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by t h e  ' i n d e t e r m i n a c y *  c r  
' v a g u e n e s s '  o r  ' i m p r e c i s i o n '  o f  t h e  norms w h ic h  t h e y  e m p l o y .  The 
t y p e  o f  r e a s o n i n g  w h ic h  t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  i n  c o n c r e t e  c a s e s  
r e q u i r e s  i s  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h a t  r e q u i r e d  by c l o s e d  s y s t e m s .  The 
norms upon  w h ic h  a d e c i s i o n  m aker  may l e g i t i m a t e l y  d ra w  a r e  n o t  
l i m i t e d  t o  t h o s e  o f  t h e  l e g a l  s y s t e m .  The ' o p e n  t e x t u r e '  o f  t h e  
law  w h ic h  h e  a p p l i e s  e n a b l e s  h im  t o  u t i l i z e  e x t r a - l e g a l  norms i n  
r e a c h i n g  h i s  d e c i s i o n .  To u s e ,  o n c e  a g a i n ,  t h e  W eb e r ia n  
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  we c o u l d  s a y  t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  m aker  o p e r a t i n g  i n  
an  o p e n  l e g a l  s y s t e m  i s  e x p e c t e d  t o  em p loy  ' s u b s t a n t i v e  
r a t i o n a l i t y ' .
S c h a u e r  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  a n o t h e r  way o f  d e s c r i b i n g  d e c i s i o n a l  f r eed o m  
o r  d i s c r e t i o n  i s  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  u s e  w h ic h  t h e  d e c i s i o n  m aker  may 
make o f  t h e  non l e g a l  no rm s  upon  w h ich  t h e  l e g a l  norms h e  a p p l i e s  
a r e  b a s e d  ( i . e .  t h e i r  p u r p o s e s  o r  g o a l s ) :
" [ G l i v i n g  some d e c i s i o n m a k e r  j u r i s d i c t i o n  t o  d e t e r m i n e  what t h e  
r u l e ' s  p u r p o s e  i s  ( a s  w e l l  a s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  t o  d e t e r m i n e  
w h e t h e r  some i t e m  f i t s  t h a t  p u r p o s e )  i n j e c t s  a  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
v a r i a n c e  [ i n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  a d e g r e e  o f  d i s c r e t i o n ]
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h a t  i n v o l v e d  i n  g i v i n g  a
d e c i s i o n m a k e r  j u r i s d i c t i o n  s o l e l y  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  some 
p a r t i c u l a r " ,  d o e s  o r  d o e s  n o t  f a l l  w i t h i n  a f o r m a l  c a t e g o r y  o f  
t h e  r u l e J .
^  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  and  i n  d i r e c t  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  
d e c i s i o n a l  r i g i d i t y ,  t h e  o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d e c i s i o n  
m ak in g  i s  e m p h a t i c a l l y  t o w a r d s  t h e  f u t u r e .  Y
I f  a n  o p e n  t e x t u r e d  l e g a l  s y s t e m  g i v e s  a  d e c i s i o n m a k e r  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o r  g o a l s  o f  t h e  s y s t e m ,  31
31. ibid., 540-541.
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t h e n  h i s ,  " a t t e n t i o n  i s  . . .  [ l o g i c a l l y ]  d i r e c t e d  t o w a r d  r e a c h i n g  a
32f u t u r e  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s "  . The d e c i s i o n  m aker  i s  n o t  r e q u i r e d
t o  c a t e g o r i s e  a  s e t  o f  f a c t s  i n  t e r m s  o f  a  n a r r o w l y  d ra w n  l e g a l
c a t e g o r y ,  b u t ,  i n s t e a d ,  i s  e n c o u r a g e d  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  f a c t u a l
m a t e r i a l  w h i c h  w i l l  e n s u r e  h i s  d e c i s i o n  b e s t  s e r v e s  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  
33t h e  s y s t e m  . A s s e s s i n g  how b e s t  t o  f u r t h e r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  t h e  
s y s t e m  i n e v i t a b l y  i n v o l v e s  s p e c u l a t i n g  a b o u t  f u t u r e  d e v e l o p m e n t  
a n d ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  f u t u r e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  i t s e l f .
C o n c l u s i o n 34
I t  was r e c e n t l y  o b s e r v e d  t h a t ,  " [ t ] r e a t m e n t s  o f  [ g o v e r n m e n t a l
pow er]  t e n d  t o  e r r  i n  a t  l e a s t  two w a y s :  by l o o k i n g  a t  p a r t i c u l a r
pow ers  w i t h o u t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  e s s e n t i a l  n a t u r e  o r  t h e i r
b r o a d e r  c o n t e x t ,  o r  by b e i n g  mere  e x h o r t a t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  p r e m i s s e d
35upon a s s u m p t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  h o m o g e n e i t y  o f  [ t h a t  p o w e r ] "  
H o p e f u l l y ,  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  h a s  p r o c e e d e d  f ro m  t h e  p r e m i s s  t h a t  3245
32 .  G i f f o r d ,  o p .  c i t . ,  s u p r a  f n  2 7 ,  1 4 .
33 .  T h e s e  s o r t  o f  f a c t s  b e l o n g  t o  t h e  c a t e g o r y  o f  ' l e g i s l a t i v e  
f a c t s ' ,  o r  " g e n e r a l  f a c t s  w h ic h  h e l p  t h e  . . .  [ d e c i s i o n  
m a k e r ] d e c i d e  q u e s t i o n s  o f  . . .  p o l i c y  a n d  d i s c r e t i o n " , 
K e n n e t h  C u lp  D a v i s ,  " A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  Law T r e a t i s e "  1 9 5 8 ,  USA, 
W est  P u b l i s h i n g  Co, V o l  1 ,  7 . 0 2 .
34 .  S e e  a l s o ,  t h e  G i f f o r d  t e x t  c i t e d  a t  f n  27 a b o v e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
p a g e s  1 3 -1 5  c o m p r i s i n g  a  u s e f u l  summary s e c t i o n  e n t i t l e d ,  
" J u d i c i a l  and  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  R e f e r e n t s  C o m p a r e d " ,  w h ich  
c o v e r s  m o s t  o f  t h e  sam e  p o i n t s .
35 .  R o b e r t  B a l d w i n  a n d  K e i t h  H a w k i n s ,  " D i s c r e t i o n a r y  J u s t i c e :  
D a v i s  R e c o n s i d e r e d "  [1 9 8 4 ]  P u b l i c  Law, 5 7 0 ,  599 ( e m p h a s i s  
a d d e d ) .
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d i s c r e t i o n  i s  b a s i c a l l y  h e t e r o g e n e o u s  a n d  t h a t ,  c o n s e q u e n t l y ,  we 
h a v e  s e e n  t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  m e a n i n g f u l l y  b e tw e e n  
two k i n d s  o f  l e g a l  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g .
F i r s t ,  a d j u d i c a t i o n  o r  r u l e - a p p l y i n g .  T h i s  i s  t h e  t y p e  o f  
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  i m p l i e d  by  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  r u l e s  o f  a 
c l o s e d  l e g a l  s y s t e m  t o  c o n c r e t e  c a s e s  a n d  i t  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by 
d e c i s i o n a l  r i g i d i t y .  I t  i s  a f o r m a l l y  r a t i o n a l  p r o c e d u r e ,  i n  
which  t h e  o n l y  l e g i t i m a t e  b a s e s  f o r  d e c i s i o n  a r e  t h e  r u l e s  o f  t h e  
s y s t e m  t h e m s e l v e s .  A d j u d i c a t i o n  i s  c a p a b l e  o f  r e c o g n i z i n g  o n l y  
t h o s e  f a c t s  w h ic h  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  d e t e r m i n a t e  t o  e n a b l e  
^  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  c l e a r  a n d  p r e c i s e  s t a n d a r d s  o f  t h e  s y s t e m ,  i . e .  
t h o s e  w h ic h  h a v e  o c c u r r e d .
S e c o n d ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o r  p o l i c y - a p p l y i n g .  T h i s  i s  t h e  t y p e  o f
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  i m p l i e d  b y  t h e  c o n c r é t i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  r u l e s  o f  an
o pen  l e g a l  s y s t e m  w h o se  norms e n c o u r a g e  f u t u r e  o r i e n t a t i o n .
T o g e t h e r ,  " [ t ] h e s e  tw o  f a c t o r s  -  t h e  o r i e n t a t i o n  t o w a r d  t h e  f u t u r e
an d  t h e  v a g u e n e s s  o f  t h e  t e r m s  t h e m s e l v e s  -  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  r o l e
w h ich  t h e  . . .  [ d e c i s i o n  m a k e r ]  i s  e x p e c t e d  t o  p l a y  i s  a n  a c t i v e  
36o n e ” ? o r ,  i n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  t h e r e  i s  a n  i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  d e c i s i o n a l  
f r e e d o m .  I t  i s  a  s u b s t a n t i v e l y  r a t i o n a l  p r o c e d u r e ,  i n  w h i c h  norms 
o u t s i d e  t h e  s y s t e m ,  e . g .  t h e  g o a l s  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  i t s e l f ,  a r e  
I  l e g i t i m a t e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  d e c i s i o n .  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i s  c a p a b l e  
o f  u t i l i z i n g  a l l  f a c t u a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  w h ic h  w i l l  e n s u r e  t h a t  i t  
e f f i c i e n t l y  s e r v e s  t h e s e  g o a l s .  36
36 .  G i f f o r d ,  o p .  c i t . ,  s u p r a  f n  2 7 ,  1 4 .
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We s h a l l  now p r o c e e d  t o  e x am in e  how t h i s  f u n c t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  
l e g a l  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  a p p l i e s  t o  t h e  p o w e r s  o f  t h e  Com m iss ion  
u n d e r  R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2  EEC.
The A p p l i c a t i o n  o f  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 3 )  EEC 
a s  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  /  P o l i c y  A p p l i c a t i o n
We h a v e  s e e n  a b o v e  t h a t  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  9 ( 1 )  o f  R e g u l a t i o n  17 /6 2  
EEC, t h e  C o m m is s io n  h a s  t h e  power  t o  d i s a p p l y  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f
^  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 1 )  EEC f r o m  i n d i v i d u a l  a g r e e m e n t s  o r  p r a c t i c e s  p u r s u a n t  
t o  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 3 )  EEC. I t  may do  s o  p r o v i d e d  i t  f i n d s  c e r t a i n  
c o n d i t i o n s  e n u m e r a t e d  i n  t h e  T r e a t y  s a t i s f i e d .  B r o a d l y  s t a t e d ,  
t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  l i s t e d  by A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 3 )  EEC r e l a t e  t o  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
o b j e c t i v e  o f  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  u n d e r  w h ic h  c o m p e t i t i o n  i s  
m a x im iz e d  w i t h o u t  p r e v e n t i n g  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f  a g r e e m e n t s  w h ic h ,  
a l t h o u g h  t h e y  r e s t r i c t  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  do s o  o n l y  i n  s o  f a r  a s  i t  i s  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  p r o d u c e  e c o n o m i c  o r  t e c h n i c a l  a d v a n c e  o f  b e n e f i t  t o  
a l l .  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 3 )  EEC p r o v i d e s  no o t h e r  e x p l i c i t  c r i t e r i a ,  
b e y o n d  t h o s e  b r o a d  o n e s  m e n t i o n e d ,  up o n  w h ic h  t o  b a s e  e x e m p t i o n  
d e c i s i o n s .
( J  I n t o  w h ic h  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  c a t e g o r y ,  t h e n ,  d o e s  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  
t h e  g e n e r a l  r u l e  o f  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 3 )  EEC t o  i n d i v i d u a l  c a s e s  f a l l ?
I t  i s  o b v i o u s  t h a t  t h e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  g r a n t i n g  a n  e x e m p t i o n  a r e  b o t h  
o p e n  t e x t u r e d  and  f u t u r e  o r i e n t e d .  F i r s t ,  t h e  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  s u ch  
f a c t o r s  a s  1 n e c e s s a r y *  r e s t r a i n t s  o f  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  ' e co n o m ic  
p r o g r e s s '  a n d  ' f a i r  s h a r e '  t o  c o n s u m e r s  a l l  c a l l  f o r  t h e  u s e  o f  
no rm s  o t h e r  t h a n  t h o s e  o f  t h e  T r e a t y  A r t i c l e .  T hey  a l l  l e a v e  t h e  
C o m m is s io n ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  m a k e r ,  w i t h  d e c i s i o n a l  f r e e d o m  o r  
d i s c r e t i o n  a s  t o  t h e  s u i t a b i l i t y  o f  a n  a g r e e m e n t  f o r  e x e m p t i o n .
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Second, in its fact finding before decision the Commission is
tacitly directed by the language of Article 85(3) EEC to engage in
speculation about future economic conditions and about the future
37effects of its decision in the light of changing circumstances
From this it seems reasonable to conclude that, in pursuing the 
policy objectives broadly stated by Article 85(3) EEC, the power 
of the Commission to grant exemptions from Article 85(1) EEC is an 
example of an administrative or policy applying function.
'^  The Application of Article 85(l)/86 EEC
as Adjudication / Rule Application
/
Article 9(2) of Regulation 17/62 provides that the Commission has 
power to apply the prohibitions of Articles 85(1) and 86 EEC to 
individual agreements or practices. Into which category of legal 
decision-making fall decisions finding, for instance, that several 
undertakings have secretly formed and operated a cartel whose 
object is the fixing of Aluminium prices in the Community, or 
finding that IBM has abused its dominant position in the EC micro­
computer market by changing the specifications of its products 
f without notifying its competitors?
37. This future orientation is underlined by the fact that 
decisions applying Article 85(3) EEC are made for a specific 
duration, after which they may be renewed with or without 
amendment or discontinued by the Commission, Article 8 of 
Regulation 17/62 EEC. In addition, Article 8 provides that 
the grant of exemption may involve the imposition of 
conditions or obligations of continuing future effect.
ii
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First, one can point out that the application of both Articles 
necessitates the collection of a fact dossier relating to the past 
and to the past alone. Articles 85(1)/86 EEC are prohibitions 
whose violation, from the point of view of their application, is a 
matter of historical fact. In the cartel example, the future 
competitive situation of the aluminium market and the likely 
positions in that market of the cartel members are not relevant 
decisional criteria.
Second, the language of both Article 85(1) and Article 86 EEC is
sufficiently precise, or has been rendered sufficiently precise by
38the authoritative rulings of the Court of Justice , to enable 
the Commission to rely exclusively upon the legal norms contained 
in those texts - as elaborated by the Court of Justice - in 
justifying its decisions to apply them.
It can be concluded, then, that the Commission's power to apply 
Articles 85(1)/86 EEC to individual undertakings is an 
adjudicative or rule applying function.
3  38
38. Note that the function of the Court of Justice in 
elaborating and interpreting these prohibitions is not a 
decision-making power within the meaning of this section. 
Rather it is an example of a distinct norm creating function 
which Vile calls "authoritative rule-interpretation", see 
text accompanying fn 22 supra.
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COMMISSION PRACTICE IN TAKING DECISIONS 
APPLYING ARTICLES 85(1) AND 86 EEC
39Introduction
From what we have seen of the legislative rules governing decision 
making procedure under Regulation 17/62 it would be logically 
possible to conclude that the Commission of the European 
Communities 'en séance plenière' could deal with most of the
1 stages of action itself, perhaps delegating one or two of its 17 
members to perform surprise investigations on the premises of 
unsuspecting undertakings. This is, of course, an absurd 
proposition and in reality the Commission rarely, if ever, sits 
together to take decisions under Regulation 17/62, even those 
which find infringement of Article 85(l)/86 EEC and impose 
substantial fines on undertakings. Indeed, such is the degree of 
specialisation found among the Members of the Commission that only 
one of their number, the Commissioner with special responsibility 
for Competition Policy, takes a significant role in decisionmaking 
in this area - exercising power on behalf of his colleagues.
Not only are the powers of the Commission in relation to the 
application of Articles 85<l)/86 EEC exercised more or less 
exclusively by a single Commissioner, but one must also be aware 
that this person represents only the tip of the bureaucracy which 39
39. The administrative structure of the Commission is set out, 
at base, in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission 
(Commission Decision 63/41 ESC, JO 1963, 181/63, as amended). 
Chapter II, "The Administration".
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performs most of the work preparatory to publication of the 
finished product', the decision. Directly responsible to the 
'Competition Commissioner' is the 'Directorate General for 
Competition' (usually referred to as DG IV) headed by a 'Director 
General' and consisting of some 140 Grade *A' officials^ (most 
trained lawyers or, to a lesser extent, economists), 20 or so of 
whom will be directly involved in each decision. In addition, the 
involvement of the Commission's Legal Service - directly 
responsible to the President of the Commission - brings at least 
one other Grade 'A* official into the picture for each decision 
taken.
The Typical Practice in Taking a Decision 
applying Article 85(l)/86 ESC
The Commission's practice in making 'infringement decisions' is
characterised by internal consultation and a series of internal
41checks involving much of the relevant bureaucracy
Allocation of the Case 401
40. These represent the officials who actually take part in 
making decisions, as opposed to the 140 or so who perform an 
administrative support role. Figures obtained from, Van Bael 
& Beilis, "Competition Law of the EEC" (1987), CCH Editions, 
para. 104.
41. The author obtained much of the information used in this 
section from contacts with DG IV in September of 1987. He 
also obtained much help from, Van Bael & Beilis, op. cit. 
supra, paras. 104 and 1005 to 1018.
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Investigatory activities begin either with the receipt and
registration by DG IV of a complaint of anti-competitive
behaviour, or by upon the initiative of any part of the
competition hierarchy, from Commissioner to DG IV official. The
next stage involves assignment of the case to a specialised unit,
or 'Directorate', within DG IV for investigation. There are
currently five Directorates within DG IV: Directorate A (headed by
an Assistant Director General), which is responsible for "General
Competition Policy and Coordination", and Directorates B, C, D
(each headed by a Director), which are each responsible for
t investigation and decision preparation and which are organised on. 45a market se^ ^ r  haaig . in fact, each case is assigned for 
investigation not simply to one of the three sectoral
Directorates, but to a 'Division' within the Directorate (there 
are nine spread among the three) consisting of maybe five to ten 
people.
Information Gathering
The next stage, involving the gathering of evidence of alleged or 
suspected anti-competitive behaviour, may take the form of letters 
J  sent to the undertakings involved prepared by the relevant 
Division and signed by the Director General of DG IV requesting 
information under Article 11 of Regulation 17/62 (his signature is 
endorsed internally by the 'Competition Commissioner'). 
Alternatively, evidence gathering may be accomplished by means of 42
42. Information obtained from "directory of the European 
Commission 1988".
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inspections undertaken by officials of the relevant Division 
authorised for that purpose and, if necessary, carrying a decision 
issued by the 'Competition Commissioner1 under Article 14(3), 
acting on the advice of the Director General.
The "Statement of Objections"
i
Once the Division investigating a case believes it as sufficient
evidence to proceed, it will seek a 'Go/No Go' from the Director
General (acting in consultation with the Competition
Commissioner). If the case is given the go-ahead, then the
Director General will, after consulting Directorate A and
obtaining the authorisation of the Commissioner, sign the
"statement of objections", prepared by the Division in
collaboration with the Legal Sevice, and notify it to the
undertakings. At this point most of the file of information held
43by DG IV on the case is opened to the undertakings and their 
views awaited for the time limit specified in the statement of 
objections44 .
)
43. The practice of giving "access to the file" was announced in 
the Twelfth Report on Competition Policy, point 34. Only 
documents containing the business secrets of other 
undertakings, internal Commission documents and information 
disclosed to the Commission subject to an obligation of 
confidentiality are not made available.
44. If there has been a complaint, then the complainant will be 
given access to the replies and observations submitted by the 
undertakings, although these might be issued in summary form. 
Thirteenth Report on Competition Policy, point 74(b).
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Oral Hearings
If the undertakings replying to a statement of objections request 
to be heard orally, then DG XV will organise such a hearing and 
cite them to attend at a specified date. Oral hearings are 
presently held in the Borschette building, in Brussels and usually 
last from a day with a single defendant, to a week for one with 
several defendants. They are presided over by the "Hearing 
Officer", an advisory official within DG IV, whose post was 
established in 198245.
The Hearing Officer, administratively part of DG IV, is not
involved in the work of investigation or of formulating decisions;
his sole task is to, "ensure that the hearing is properly
conducted" by balancing the "rights of the defence" with "the need
46for effective application of the competition rules" . He is 
fully responsible for the date, duration, location and conduct of 
the hearing and for the admission of new evidence. He also has 
authority to decide whether persons should be heard pursuant to 
Articles 3(3) and 7(2) of Regulation 99/63 EEC4 .^
J  His ultimate concern is to, "ensure that in the preparation of 
draft Commission decisions in competition cases due account is 
taken of all the relevant facts, whether favourable or
*  » 4567
45. See "Terms of Reference of the Hearing Officer", Thirteenth 
Report on Competition Policy, Annex.
46. ibid, Article 2(2).
47. ibid., Article 4.
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unfavourable to the parties concerned" . Ke does this in three
ways: first, by being responsible for preparing minutes containing
the essential content of statements made by persons heard and
49which they approve ; second, by reporting to the Director
General for Competition on the hearing and on the conclusions he
draws from it; and third, by making observations to the Director
General on the further progress of proceedings, which may relate
to, "the need for further information, the withdrawal of certain
50objections, or the formulation of further objections"
The Hearing Officer's terms of reference provide that, "lt]o
ensure his independence in the performance of his duties", the
Hearing Officer has the right of direct access to the competition 
51Commissioner , a right which consists in the discretion to by­
pass the Director General and refer his observations directly to 
the Commissioner at the time that the preliminary draft decision 
(see below) is submitted to the latter for reference to the 
Advisory Committee . If the competition Commissioner considers 
it appropriate, he may, at the request of the Hearing Officer, 
attach the final report of the latter to the draft decision 
submitted to the full Commission, "in order to ensure that when it
4 8
48. ibid., Article 2(1).
49. ibid., Article 4(4), mandated by Article 9(4) of Regulation 
99/63. Apparently, the Commission's practice is to release 
only a typed summary of statements, but not the tape 
recording of proceedings from which the summary was 
constructed.
50. ibid.. Article 5.
51. ibid.. Article 1(2).
52. ibid., Article 6.
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reaches a decision on an individual case it is fully apprised of
53all relevant information" . The Hearing Officer's report, even 
if attach to the draft decision, is not made public. The Court 
of Justice has ruled that the report of the Hearing Officer "does 
not constitute a decisive factor" in the application of Article 
85(1)/86 and, therefore, we can conclude that the participation of 
this officer in the decision-making process is, at best, indirect.
The "Preliminary Draft Decision"
The next stage of Commission procedure is the preparation of a
"preliminary draft decision" by the relevant Division supervised
by Directorate A. Directorate A's "special administrative unit
for the co-ordination of competition decisions" is, "called upon
to give a separate assessment of all individual cases" prepared by
55the other Directorates . However, it is important to note that 
this assessment is not made in isolation from those responsible 
for the preliminary draft. In reality, one can assume that,
"there is a continuing dialogue between the person who 
carries out the investigation [and prepares the preliminary 
draft] and the person who makes that [assessment] ... and 
that the latter will go back to the investigator and perhaps 534
53. ibid., Article 7.
54. Case 212/85, 1ICI v. Commission' [1987] 2 CMLR 500,
paragraph 7 of the order of the Court.
55. Statement of Re-organisation in 14th Report on Competition
Policy (1985), para. 45.
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ask for further details and further clarification"5 .^
The preliminary draft is, then, submitted to the Director General
for approval and, if he approves, it will continue to the
57"Cabinet" of the competition Commissioner and to the 
Commission's own team of professional lawyers - the Legal Service. 
In the Legal Service, the preliminary draft will become the 
’possession’ of a "conseiller juridique", who becomes exclusively 
responsible for its treatment by the Legal Service. There then 
follows a series of exchanges between Legal Service, principally, 
and DG IV. When both are in agreement and the Commissioner has 
given the go-ahead the preliminary draft can be submitted to the 
Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee, in consultation with 
DG IV, issues an opinion on the preliminary draft which is not 
made public. The opinion of the Advisory Committee is restricted 
to the merits of the preliminary draft as presented to it; its 
role is not to provide new facts or arguments for its adoption . 5678
56. House of Lords, Session 1983-84, Select Committee on the 
European Communities, 18th Report, "Commission’s Powers of 
Investigation and Inspection", Minutes of Evidence, pp 98-99 
(per Mr P. Egerton-Vernon of the Joint Working Party of the 
Law Society and the Bar).
57. His/her own team of support staff, sometimes experts in his 
field of responsibility, usually from his/her own Member 
State.
58. In the ’Pioneer’ case, the Court of Justice ruled implicitly 
that it would be improper for the Commission to base any part 
of its decision upon facts or arguments presented to it, in 
secret, by the Advisory Committee, Joined Cases 100-103/80, 
’Musique Diffusion Française et al v. Commission’ [1983] ECR 
1825, para. 36 of judgment.
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The "Draft Decision" and the "Written Procedure"
The penultimate stage involves the formulation of a "draft 
decision" (to which the opinion of the Advisory Committee is 
attached) in the light of these exchanges, which is passed to the 
competition Commissioner. If he approves the draft, he will 
circulate copies of it to his colleagues using the so-called 
"written procedure" of decision making and will make the file 
of the case available for their inspection. If none of the other 
Commissioners raise any objections within a specified time limit, 
usually a few days, the draft is taken to be adopted6**. If an 
objection is made, the draft may only be approved at a plenary 
meeting of the college of Commissioners59 601.
Publication
The decision is finally notified by telex to the relevant 
undertakings and the Member States; it is announced by press 
release from the Cabinet; any complainant is duly notified; and 
the decision is published in the Official Journal of the 
Communities.
59. Established by the Commission's Rules of Procedure 
(Commission Decision 63/41 EEC, JO 1963, 181/63 as amended), 
Article 11.
60. ibid., Article 11(4).
61. ibid., Article 11(3).
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THE STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
ADJUDICATION AND ADMINISTRATION
Introduction
This section takes the functional analysis of decision-making 
developed above, which distinguishes adjudication and 
administration, and examines what structural consequences, if any, 
are implied by those functions. It concludes that the two 
functions of adjudication and administration, in so far as they 
imply the pursuit of two different groups of political values, 
themselves imply the use of distinct decisional structures.
The Values Pursued by Adjudication 
and Administration
The Value/Function Relationship
>
How does one respond to the person who asks, quite legitimately, 
which mode the State ought logically to choose in applying a 
general legal norm in individual cases. According to Schauer, 
"to answer this question we must ask what the legal system, in 
whole or in part, is supposed to do, for only when we answer that 
question can we determine what kinds of tools it needs to
1I
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6 2accomplish that task" . In other words, the choice of 
decision-making function depends upon the value or values which 
government attaches to that decisional mode in the circumstances. 
Powers of adjudication or powers of administration are selected by 
the legislator as modes of legal decision-making according to 
their perceived political appropriateness. Moreover, it is 
submitted that this choice is determined by the language and terms 
of the legislative text itself.
In the granting of legal decision-making powers, the values whose
 ^ relative political appropriateness is in issue are split basically
into two groups: on one hand, are the values of stability and
predictability; on the other, are the values of efficiency and
flexibility. Of course, we should not allow ourselves to forget
that, while creating decision-making jurisdiction is, at one
level, about stability v efficiency and predictability v
flexibility, "[m]ore fundamentally, it is about power and its
allocation" . Without doubt, the creation of different
decision-making jurisdictions, "implicates profound questions of
just who in any given domain may legitimately make certain 
64decisions" . A decision maker ’required' to act efficiently 
and permitted to take a flexible approach, wields significantly 
more power than one whose role is to stabilize and whose decisions 
| are meant to be predictable. 62*4
62. op. cit., supra fn 23, 547.
53. ibid., 543.
64. ibid., 541.
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We shall now proceed to consider the extent to which the priority 
which a legislative scheme places on one group of these values 
necessarily » implies choice of either the administrative or 
adjudicative functions?
t
Efficiency, Flexibility and Administration
We have seen already that open-textured legal provisions which 
j exhibit future orientation are the sort of rule systems whose 
application implies 'decisional freedom', 'discretion', or, in 
other words, administrative decision making. Administrative 
decision making is characterised by the ability of the decision 
maker to make use of and reason from non-legal norms which bear 
relevance to the policies or goals of the legal rules he is 
applying. We must now ask, (a), which values are open legal 
systems pursuing in instituting this sort of decision-making and,
(b), whose values are they?
It is plain that a first value furthered by giving a decision 
maker jurisdiction with regard to the purposes of the legal system 
is the public value of or public interest in efficiency. In 
) other words, the interest of society in ensuring that decisions 
make the best possible use of the resources available in the 
circumstances. To take a good administrative decision is to
deliver a result which, given the constraints of time and 
resources, most accurately serves the policy of the relevant legal 
system. In the words of one english judge, "(gjood ...
administration requires proper consideration of the public
interest" (or, in other words, the goals of the legal scheme)
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while being, "concerned with speed of decision" . The ability 
of the administrative decision maker to make use of any social, 
scientific or political considerations which he considers relevant 
is a means of making the result of his decision more accurate and, 
therefore, to make him a more efficient actor.
A second value served by discretionary decision-making is the
principally private value of or private interest in flexibility,
or variability. In other words, the interest of the individual in
obtaining a decision which takes into account his special needs or
^ circumstances. If it is adequately to respond to the manifold ^
needs and conditions of individuals, administration must operate
flexibly. A decision maker must, therefore, be able continually
to adapt his activities in the light of changing social,
scientific or political circumstances present in the cases before
him: in other words, "[gjood ... administration is concerned with
6 6substance rather than form" . Using other terms, one can also
define a system which enables a decision maker to be flexible as
one which, to repeat a phrase used earlier, "injects a
67[substantial] possibility of variance" , into decisional 
outcome.
< )
)  657
65
65. R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex parte Distillers,
[1986] 2 All ER, 257, 266 (per Sir John Donaldson MR).
66. ibid.
67. Schauer, op. cit., supra fn 23, 540-41.
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Stability, Predictability and Adjudication 6 8
Previously we have explored the proposition that the application 
of the rules of closed legal systems which are oriented to the 
past necessarily implies 'decisional restraint', or adjudicative 
decision-making. Adjudication is characterised by the 
impermissibility of the use of decisional referents other than 
those of the legal system itself in applying its rules. Which, 
then, are the particular values pursued by the establishment of 
^ adjudicative systems and, again, whose interests are they?
Stability is the principal public value to be, "fostered by
69truncating the decisionmaking authority" . Or, in other words, 
limiting the decisional jurisdiction furthers society's interest 
in continuous adherence to standards, in conservatism in 
governmental action. Stability is, if anything, the opposite of 
that of efficiency which we examined above. Indeed, described in 
negative terms, the pursuit of stability could legitimately be 
described as the pursuit of "sub-optimization" or inefficiency. 
The adjudicator is deprived of access to non legal norms by the 
system's clearly and precisely worded rules, in order that the
decisions which he reaches are not based upon constantly varying
J factors. Instead, the ultimate bases of his decisions are 
formally limited and essentially immutable. In denying the
decision maker jurisdiction with regard to the goals of the
68. On the way in which 
foster the values 
generally, Schauer, 69
69. ibid., 542,
systems implying 
of stability and 
op. cit., supra fn
decisional restraint 
predictability, see
23., 539-42.
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system, the closed legal system seeks to restrict substantially
the range of possible decisional outcomes in the cases which come
before him and, "give up some of the possibility of improvement
[optimum outcome] in exchange for guarding against some of the
70possibility of disaster" inherent in the pursuit of efficiency. 
Possessing fewer normative ‘tools' than the administrator to 
distinguish between individual cases, in the long run the 
adjudicator is institutionally inclined to stability.
While stability is the principal public value pursued by creating 
adjudicative jurisdiction, there is a second, private, value which 
it serves - predictability. The function of adjudicative decision 
making serves the interest of individuals subject to government 
regulation in being able to plan their future activities with 
certainty. In order to plan ahead with certainty, affected 
individuals need to be able to predict the outcome of potential 
legal decisions. Decision-making which utilizes extra-legal norms 
cannot deliver this predictability; only decision-making which 
utilizes exclusively legal norms (in the context of a closed legal 
system consisting of clear and precise standards) can guarantee a 
large degree of predictability or consistency of outcome to 
affected individuals.
)
Justice and its Functional Implications 70
70. ibid., 542.
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We have examined, on one level, the values pursued by legal 
systems which imply one or other functional type of decision­
making. It is important at this point, however, to discuss a 
public value whose pursuit may be involved in either closed or 
open legal systems - that of justice. Justice, however, has two 
‘faces', in the sense that the concept of "justice" can only be 
conceived of in terms of two separate and mutually opposed
interests: that, on one hand, in social or 'activist' justice and
71that, on the other, in formal or 'reactive* justice
- The public interest in social justice can be defined as that of 
securing some degree of equality or equal treatment for the 
members of the community in a substantive as opposed to a 
procedural sense. This interest has historically involved the 
spontaneous legislative intervention of the State in social or 
economic life in order to undertake the (redistribution or 
(re)allocation of resources required to achieve the substantive 
equality sought. One can contrast the public interest in social 
justice with the public interest in formal justice. This 
interest reflects society's opposite desire to ignore the material 
inequalities of economic or social actors and treat them - in the 
official procedures to which they are subjected - as equal, or 
indistinguishable. The public interest in formal justice has
J historically required the State to intervene on a case by case 71
71. For a full discussion of the two forms of the 'justice' 
value see, Mirjan R Damaska "The Faces of Justice and State 
Authority: A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process", 1986 
Yale, especially pages 71 to 94, which discuss the 
relationship between the type of State {'reactive' or 
'activist') and the ends of the legal process ('conflict 
solving' or 'policy implementing').
‘1------------  -----------------------------------------------------------------------  ^
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basis, only in so far as it is called upon to do so by parties in 
dispute.
It will be noted that governments attempting legally to achieve 
social justice in a certain field will be best served by an open 
textured legal system whose implicit administrative method of 
application allows material inequality and resource disparity to 
be readily ascertained and rectified by decision makers. In 
contrast, it will be obvious that a government uninterested in 
resolving material inequality or resource disparity is likely to 
* be best served by a closed legal system whose implicit
adjudicative method of application closes the decision maker's 
eyes to anything but the formally defined position of affected 
individuals.
Perhaps the most important reason for introducing the dual
concepts of social and formal justice at this stage of the
discussion is to point out that while, sometimes, one of these
interests alone can be served by a legal scheme, they are more 
often present together in the same legislative programme. 
Implementing a governmental policy of maintaining a healthy
working environment, or preserving undistorted economic
competition in the market certainly requires the creation of a 
y  legislative scheme using open textured legal norms which can be 
applied administratively, but, in certain respects where there is 
a desire to serve the public interest in formal justice, it can 
also include the insertion into that scheme of closed legal norms, 
whose application implies adjudication.
Summary
i J I J
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We have seen in this part how the creation of either adjudicative'' 
or administrative jurisdiction reflects, at the most fundamental 
level, a concern with the legitimate exercise of political power. 
On a second level, the choice between the two relates to the 
priority placed by the legislator on decisional stability or \ 
efficiency and on decisional predictability or flexibility. On a 
third level, the choosing one or other involves a choice between ) 
achieving results which are either substantively or 
formally just.
merely I
) The Structural Implications of Adjudicative 
and Administrative Functions
The Value-Function/Structure Relationship
Decisional 'structure' is used here in to describe the legally 
constituted organ - the personnel, their procedures - which 
actually exercises a certain decision-making function. Structural 
implications refer to the sort of decisional structure (in terms 
of its composition, organisation, procedure) logically suggested 
) by a particular value-function combination. In this part we 
shall see that the structural implications of adjudication can be 
summed up in the term, 'policy insulation1 or impartiality, while 
those implied by administration can be characterised as, 'policy 
orientation 1.
Adjudication and Policy Insulation
<í
1
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To recall what we have previously established, adjudicative
decision-making pursues the values of limited power, formal
justice, stability and predictability. Its use is implied by
closed legal orders containing clear and precisely worded norms
with past orientation whose application necessitates formulation
72o f ,  " c l a i m s  o f  [ l e g a l ]  r i g h t  o r  a c c u s a t i o n s  o f  [ l e g a l ]  f a u l t "
What structural guarantees logically underpin these sorts of 
institutional commitments?
/
Adjudication is institutionally committed to decision by formally
rational deduction: as Fuller put it, "a formal definition of
rights and wrongs is a nearly inevitable product of the
73adjudicative process" , or to use his classic formulation,
"the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the 
fact that it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of 
participation in the decision, that of presenting proofs and 
[formally] reasoned arguments in his favour"
Behind this proposition there logically stands the assumption that 
the decision reached is rationally related, in a formal sense, to 
the proofs and arguments presented by the affected parties. 
Second, and implicit in the assumption of formal rationality, is 
the assumption that the decision-maker is himself receptive only 
to formally rational argument - that he decides without regard to 
non legal / policy norms: in short, that r he acts w i Hi
impartiality. 7234
72. Fuller, op. cit., fn 29 supra, 369.
73. ibid., 370.
74. ibid., 364.
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Impartiality, as a logical pre-requisite of adjudication, implies 
the possession of certain structural and procedural 
characteristics by the adjudicator. In the context of the 
adjudication of an accusation of fault, for instance, impartiality 
implies that the adjudicator ought to be a person, or group of 
persons, independent of both accuser and accused, firstly, in a 
physical sense (being a person distinct from either the accuser or 
accused) and, secondly, in an organisational sense (being free 
from the control or undue influence of either side). In other 
words, the decisional structure implied by the adjudicative 
function is a triadic one. The adjudication of an accusation of 
legal fault logically implies, first, a legal rule, an accuser 
(A), an accused (B), whom A accuses of violating the rule and an 
adjudicator (C) to decide whether, given legal rule and the facts 
of the case, B has violated the rule. C must obviously be 
independent of B, the accused, who has a clear interest in the 
outcome of the case. Equally, C must be independent of A, the 
accuser, whose policy interest in the outcome of the case, though 
opposite to B's, is also clear.
The primary interest of this paper is the A-C, accuser- 
ad judicator^ combination. In Fuller's opinion, the damage caused 
to adjudicative integrity by this combination is^inevitable, since
"it is generally impossible to keep even the bare initiation of 
proceedings untainted by preconceptions about what happened 
and what its consequences should be... [which, in compromising 
the impartiality of the adjudicator] impair... the integrity 
of adjudication by reducing the effectiveness of the7£affected 
party's] participation^through proofs and arguments" 75
75. ibid., page 387.
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What do we really mean, however, when we talk of a triadic
adjudicative structure? Do we mean, among other things, that the 
agency or organisation to which the adjudicator belongs is, in no 
way, structurally connected with the agency or organisation to 
which the accuser belongs? Not necessarily. The creation of 
structural guarantees to ensure that the adjudicator is
independent of the accuser or prosecutor can logically operate 
within one and the same agency or organisation - provided that the 
two sets of role players are insulated sufficiently well from each 
other. We shall examine some of the methods available to achieve
- this insulation later in the paper"^.
)
Administration and Policy-Orientation
We have previously established that administrative decision-making 
pursues the values of governmental activism, social justice,
efficiency and flexibility. Its use is implicit in open textured 
legal systems made up of generally and vaguely worded norms of
future orientation whose application requires the making of value 
judgments based on non legal norms which inform their purposes or 
goals. What can we say about the sort of decisional structures 
J implied, or, rather, not implied, by this type of decision-making? 
Given that administrative decision-making is not bound to a 
formally rational process of reasoning, given that the 
administrator is required to be responsive to non legal arguments 
those specifically not framed as formal claims of right or 
accusations of fault - ought his impartiality be implied? 76
7 6 .  See C h a p t e r  9 s u p r a .
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In one sense, impartiality on his part is an implicit pre­
requisite of his function: he must be receptive only to rational 
arguments based on norms relevant to the purposes or goals of the 
legal system with which he is working. In other words, he must 
not misuse his decisional jurisdiction by exercising it for policy 
purposes other than those for which it was granted. In this 
sense, the administrative decision maker is required to be 
impartial by ignoring factors, such as his personal relationship 
to the affected parties, which are not rational criteria for 
decision. However, we can clearly  ^ contrast this type of 
impartiality with that required of the adjudicative decision 
maker. Whereas the adjudicator is required to be receptive only 
to formally rational argument, the administrator is required to be 
open also to that which is substantively rational. In the former 
case, impartiality suggests insulation from policy argumentation 
'per se', while, in the latter case, it suggests insulation only  ^
from irrelevant policy argument. To put it another way, the
administrative decision maker must orient himself towards the 
policy of the legal rule he applies instead of being obliged to 
insulate himself from it. The administrative implementation of 
legislative goals by a policy oriented decision maker clearly does 
not suggest the same sort of impartiality that is implied by 
adjudication. In that case, is there any logical need for a
triadic decisional structure in administration?
The administrative application of legal policy implies, first, a 
policy rule, an agency (A) which seeks to apply that rule, an 
individual (B) in whose case the rule is to be applied and a 
decision maker (C) to decide whether, given the policy and the 
facts, it is appropriate to apply the rule in B's case. 
Obviously, as with adjudication, the B-C combination of decision 
maker and affected individual is illicit. However, the A-C 
combination which, in the adjudication example, is illegitimate,
C
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i s  no t  l o g i c a l l y  e x c l u d e d  h e r e  a s  a f e a t u r e  o f  d e c i s i o n a l  
s t r u c t u r e .  The  n e c e s s a r y  s h a r i n g  o f  i n t e r e s t s  by b o t h  A and C 
removes t h e  l o g i c  o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n a l  t r i a d  and  s u g g e s t s  t h e  u s e  o f  
a c o m p l e t e l y  d i f f e r e n t  s e t  o f  s t r u c t u r a l  o p t i o n s .
Summary
In  t h i s  p a r t  we h a v e  l o o k e d  a t  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  
two d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  f u n c t i o n s .  We h a v e  d i s c o v e r e d ,  op o n e  han d ,  /) 
t h a t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a d j u d i c a t i o n ,  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  commitment  t o  
fo rm a l  r a t i o n a l i t y  a n d ,  t h e r e b y ,  t o  p o l i c y  i n s u l a t i o n  l o g i c a l l y  
imply a f u n d a m e n t a l l y  t r i a d i c  d e c i s i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  which 
s e p a r a t e s  t h e  r o l e s  o f  a c c u s i n g  a n d  j u d g i n g .  On t h e  o t h e r  h and ,  
we have  come t o  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  w i t h  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  t h e  
commitment t o  s u b s t a n t i v e  r a t i o n a l i t y  a n d ,  t h e r e b y ,  t o  p o l i c y  
o r i e n t a t i o n  i m p l y  a d e c i s i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e . o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  t r i a d .
R e g u l a t o r y  M i s - m a t c h :  A l l o c a t i n g  D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g  
F u n c t i o n s  t o  I n a p p r o p r i a t e  S t r u c t u r e s
I n t r o d u c t i o n
I n  t h e  p a r t s  o f  t h e  s e c t i o n  a b o v e  we h a v e  e x a m i n e d  how t h e  two 
d i f f e r e n t  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  f u n c t i o n s  l o g i c a l l y  im p l y  t h e  p u r s u i t  o f  
two s e p a r a t e  g r o u p s  o f  p u b l i c  o r  p r i v a t e  i n t e r e s t s  o r  v a l u e s  and  
how t h e i r  e x e r c i s e  e i t h e r  does  o r  d o e s  n o t  i m p l y  t h e  u s e  o f  a 
t r i a d i c  d e c i s i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e .  Of c o u r s e ,  t h i s  i s  a n o r m a t i v e  
p r o p o s i t i o n  -  i t  d o e s  n o t  an d  c a n n o t  d e s c r i b e  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f
rnsB B m m m m m
f u n c t i o n s  w h i c h  t a k e s  p l a c e  i n  t h e  ' r e a l  w o r ld * .  S o c i e t y ' s ,
" c o n s c i o u s  a n d  d e l i b e r a t e  a t t e m p t [ s ]  t o  a r t i c u l a t e  s t r u c t u r e  and
f u n c t i o n  i n  a  way w h i c h  w o u ld  r e f l e c t  c e r t a i n  v a l u e s  i n  t h e  
. 77o p e r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r s  d e m an d e d "  n e e d  n o t  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  scheme 
we have e s t a b l i s h e d .  H ow ever ,  t h e  a r g u m e n t s  we h a v e  c o n s t r u c t e d  
a b o u t  t h e  i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  v a l u e ,  f u n c t i o n  and s t r u c t u r e  were  
nev e r  m ean t  f o r  t h a t  p u r p o s e ,  i n s t e a d  t h e y  s e r v e  a s  a p o w e r f u l  
t o o l  f o r  c r i t i c i s i n g  ' r e a l  w o r l d '  a l l o c a t i o n s  f rom  a sound 
t h e o r e t i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e .
^  ' |fl vt
T h e o r e t i c a l  c r i t i c i s m  i s  v a l i d  a s  an  end i n  i t s e l f ,  o f  c o u r s e , ^ b u t  
i t  w i l l  u l t i m a t e l y  b e  u s e d  i n  t h i s  p a p e r  a s  a  means o f  e x p l a i n i n g  
t he mal f u n c - t i o n o f  a  r e a l  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  s y s t em { a d j u d i c a t i o n  o f  
c a s e s  u n d e r  A r t i c l e s  8 5 { l ) / 8 6  EEC), o f  e v a l u a t i n g  t h e  p r o s p e c t s  o f  
s u c c e s s  o f  c u r r e n t  r e f o r m s  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  ( c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  new 
C o u r t  o f  F i r s t  I n s t a n c e )  a n d  o f  s u g g e s t i n g  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  i n  which 
r e f o r m  o f  t h a t  s y s t e m  p e r h a p s  o u g h t  t o  b e  h e a d i n g  ( d i v i s i o n  o f  
powers  w i t h i n  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ) .
M ea n w h i le ,  we s h a l l  end  t h i s  s e c t i o n  by d e m o n s t r a t i n g  t h e  
p r a c t i c a l  v a l u e  o f  o u r  a r g u m e n t s  by e x a m i n i n g  a n o t h e r  r e a l  l i f e  
exam ple  o f  r e g u l a t o r y  m i s m a t c h .
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and  Use o f  t h e  T r i a d
The i n a p p r o p r i a t e  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  f u n c t i o n  and 
t r i a d i c  s t r u c t u r e  i s  p r o b a b l y  t h e  m os t  f r e q u e n t  e x a m p l e  o f  7
7 7 .  V i l e ,  o p .  c i t . ,  s u p r a  f n  17 ,  3 2 9 .
I
51
r e g u l a t o r y  r a i s - m a t c h *  I n  t h e s e  c a s e s ,  t h e  t r i a d i c  s t r u c t u r e  in
q u e s t i o n  n o r m a l l y  t a k e s  t h e  f o r m  o f  a  c o u r t  o r  c o u r t - l i k e  body,
which e i t h e r  e x i s t s  a l r e a d y ,  o r  w h ich  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  s p e c i a l l y .
Damaska d i s c u s s e s  t h i s  i s s u e  when he t a l k s  o f  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of
im p le m e n t in g  ' a c t i v i s t '  S t a t e  p o l i c i e s  v i a  t h e  c o u r t - l i k e
s t r u c t u r e s  o f  ' r e a c t i v e '  j u s t i c e  and  o f  t h e  d i s s o n a n c e  o r  t e n s i o n
78which s u c h  m i s m a t c h  c a u s e  . The a t t e m p t  o f  l e g i s l a t o r s  t o  
pursue  t h e  g o a l  o f  s o c i a l  j u s t i c e  v i a  t r i a d i c  s t r u c t u r e s  l i k e  
c o u r t s  i s  s y m p t o m a t i c  o f  a d e s i r e  t o  a d m i n i s t e r  p o l i c y  
e f f i c i e n t l y ,  w h i l s t  c o n s t r a i n e d  by a  b e l i e f  t h a t  somehow ' j u s t i c e *  
w i l l  n o t  b e  s e e n  t o  be  d o n e  t o  a f f e c t e d  i n d i v i d u a l s  u n l e s s  t h e  
s t r u c t u r e  e n t r u s t e d  w i t h  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i s  p o l i c y - i n s u l a t e d  or 
i m p a r t i a l  -  o r ,  i n  o t h e r  w o rd s ,  t a k e s  t h e  fo rm  o f  a  c o u r t .  
These  a l l o c a t i o n s  i g n o r e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  a s  D e l f i n o  o b s e r v e s :
" [ c ] o u r t s  a r e  i l l  e q u i p p e d  t o  c a r r y  o u t  -  o r  even  f o s t e r  -  
r e g u l a t i o n  . .  . The j u d i c i a l  p r o c e s s  i s  by i t s  v e r y  n a t u r e  
« s t a t i c  o r i e n t e d » .  The c o u r t  n e e d s  t o  lo o k  a t  f a c t u a l  
s i t u a t i o n s  a s  f a c t s  t h a t  a r e  w e l l  f i x e d  i n  t i m e  an d  p l a c e .
The n e e d  t o  s o l v e  a n  a c t u a l  d i s p u t e ,  t h a t  i s ,  on e  s e t  o f  f a c t s  
and  no  o t h e r s , m akes  t h e  c o u r t  r e c o i l  f rom c o n s i d e r i n g  an 
e v o l v i n g  r e a l i t y .  T he  j u d i c i a l  s y s t e m  n e e d s  « f a c t s » ,  n o t  
« p r o c e s s e s » "
The r i s k  i n c u r r e d  i n  c o n s t r u c t i n g  a l e g a l  s y s t e m  w h ic h  a t t e m p t s  t o  ^
combine  a  f u n c t i o n  s e r v i n g  t h e  v a l u e s  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  and 
f l e x i b i l i t y  w i t h  a s t r u c t u r e  which  s e r v e s  t h e  o p p o s i n g  v a l u e s  o f  
s t a b i l i t y  an d  p r e d i c t a b i l i t y ,  i s  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  e n d ,  t h e  s y s t e m  
s u c c e e d s  i n  s e r v i n g  n e i t h e r .  789
7 8 .  o p .  c i t . ,  s u p r a  f n  7 1 ,  9 2 - 9 3 .
7 9 .  M a u r i z i o  M. D e l f i n o ,  " E n f o r c e m e n t  D i s c r e t i o n  a n d  A m e r ic a n  
A n t i t r u s t :  R e g u l a t i o n  t h r o u g h  P r o s e c u t i o n "  1 9 8 4 ,  E d i z i o n i  La 
p i r a m i d e ,  Roma, 1 3 3 - 3 4 .
(
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The R e s t r i c t i v e  P r a c t i c e s  C o u r t  -  O v e rv ie w
An e x c e l l e n t  e x a m p l e  o f  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n / t r i a d  m i s m a tc h  an d  t h e  
p ro b le m s  w h ic h  i t  c a u s e s  c a n  be fo u n d  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m ' s ,
" R e s t r i c t i v e  T r a d e  P r a c t i c e s  C o u r t "  (RPC), which  was e s t a b l i s h e d
80 81 i n  1956 . T h i s  i s  a f o r m a l l y  c o n s t i t u t e d  c o u r t  o f  law ,
82s t a f f e d  by j u d g e s  o f  t h e  r e g u l a r  c o u r t  s y s t e m  an d  a s s i s t e d  i n
83i t s  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  by  l a y  members  . I t s  f u n c t i o n ,  u n d e r  t h e
84R e s t r i c t i v e  T r a d e  P r a c t i c e s  Ac t  1976 , i s ,  b r o a d l y  s p e a k i n g ,  t o
d e c i d e  w h e t h e r  r e s t r i c t i v e  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t s  r e f e r r e d  t o  i t  by  t h e
80 .  R e s t r i c t i v e  T r a d e  P r a c t i c e s  Act 1956 ,  c .  68 ,  s e c t i o n  2 .
81 .  R e s t r i c t i v e  P r a c t i c e s  C o u r t  Ac t  1 9 7 6 ,  c .  33 ( h e r e a f t e r ,  
RPCA), s e c t i o n  1 ( 1 ) .
8 2 .  The RPC c o n s i s t s  o f  f i v e  " n o m i n a t e d  j u d g e s "  (RPCA, s l ( 2 ) ( a ) )  
o f  w h ic h  t h r e e  a r e  H ig h  C o u r t  j u d g e s  n o m i n a t e d  t o  t h e  C o u r t  
by t h e  L o r d  C h a n c e l l o r ;  one  i s  a j u d g e  o f  t h e  C o u r t  o f  
S e s s i o n  n o m i n a t e d  by t h e  L ord  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h a t  C o u r t ;  and  
one  i s  a j u d g e  o f  t h e  Supreme C o u r t  o f  N o r t h e r n  I r e l a n d  
n o m i n a t e d  by t h e  L o r d  C h i e f  J u s t i c e  o f  N o r t h e r n  I r e l a n d
)  (RPCA, s .  2 ) .
8 3 .  The C o u r t  c o n s i s t s  o f ,  " n o t  more t h a n  t e n  a p p o i n t e d  members"
(RPCA, s .  1 ( 2 ) ( b ) )  a p p o i n t e d  by t h e  s o v e r e i g n  f r o m  t h o s e  
whom t h e  Lord  C h a n c e l l o r  reccommends  a s  a p p e a r i n g  t o  him t o  
be q u a l i f i e d  by v i r t u e  o f  t h e i r ,  " k n o w le d g e  o f  o r  e x p e r i e n c e  
i n  i n d u s t r y ,  commerce  o r  p u b l i c  a f f a i r s "  (RPCA, s .  3 ( 1 ) ) .  
F o r  t h e  h e a r i n g  o f  p r o c e e d i n g s ,  a minimum o f  t h r e e  C o u r t  
m e m b e rs ,  o f  whom o n e  m us t  be a j u d g e ,  a r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  s i t  
(RPCA, s .  7 ( 1 ) ) .  The o p i n i o n  o f  t h e  j u d g e  o r  j u d g e s
s i t t i n g  i n  any  c a s e  o n  p o i n t s  o f  l a w  p r e v a i l s  o v e r  t h a t  o f  
t h e i r  l a y  c o l l e a g u e s  (RPCA, s .  7 ( 2 ) ) .  84
8 4 .  c .  34 ,  c o n s o l i d a t i n g  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  A c t  o f  1956 ,  
c i t e d  a t  f n  18 s u p r a ,  a n d  t h e  R e s t r i c t i v e  T r a d e  P r a c t i c e s  Act 
1 9 6 8 ,  c .  66 .
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85D i r e c t o r  G e n e r a l  o f  F a i r  T r a d i n g  a r e  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t ,  o r
86a r e  a g a i n s t  t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  . The  D i r e c t o r  G e n e r a l  i s
o b l i g e d  t o  c o m p i l e  a n d  m a i n t a i n  a  r e g i s t e r  o f  a g r e e m e n t s  s u b j e c t
to  r e g i s t r a t i o n  u n d e r  t h e  RFA and  t h e n  t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  C o u r t  a l l
87a g r e e m e n t s  c o n t a i n e d  on t h a t  r e g i s t e r  . The RPC p e r f o r m s  i t s  
p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  e v a l u a t i o n  by  u t i l i z i n g  a  number o f  s o - c a l l e d  
' g a t e w a y s '  l i s t e d  i n  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  c o n t a i n i n g  a number o f  s o c i o ­
economic  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  a n y  o n e  o f  w h ich  t h e  C o u r t  m u s t  f i n d  
s a t i s f i e d  b e f o r e  i t  w i l l  s a n c t i o n  an  a g r e e m e n t  . I n  a d d i t i o n ,  8567
85 .  The O f f i c e  o f  F a i r  T r a d i n g  i s  a  g o v e rn m e n t  agency  
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  an d  s u p p r e s s i o n  o f  u n f a i r  
t r a d e  p r a c t i c e s  a n d  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  consumer  w e l f a r e  i n  
t h e  U n i t e d  Kingdom w h i c h  was e s t a b l i s h e d  u n d e r  t h e  F a i r  
T r a d i n g  A c t  1 9 7 3 ,  c ,  4 1 .  The D i r e c t o r  G e n e r a l  o f  F a i r  
T r a d i n g  i s  h e a d  o f  t h i s  a g e n c y .
86 .  The C o u r t ' s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i s  s e t  o u t  i n  s .  1{3)  o f  t h e  RPA. 
R e s t r i c t i o n s  w h ic h  a r e  f o u n d  by t h e  C o u r t  t o  be c o n t r a r y  t o  
t h e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  a r e  v o i d  (RPA, s .  2 ( 1 ) ) .
87 .  RPA, s .  l ( 2 ) ( a ) , ( b ) .  A g r e e m e n t s  s u b j e c t  t o  r e g i s t r a t i o n  
a r e  d e f i n e d  by s e c t i o n  6 o f  t h e  RPA a c c o r d i n g  t o  an 
e x h a u s t i v e  l i s t  o f  c r i t e r i a  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  fo rm  w h ic h  t h e y  
t a k e .
8 8 .  RPA, s .  1 0 ( 1 ) .  Under  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n ,  r e s t r i c t i o n s  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  g o o d s  a g r e e m e n t s  a r e  j u s t i f i e d  i f  t h e  C o u r t  i s  
s a t i s f i e d ,  i n t e r  a l i a ,  t h a t  t h e i r  r e m o v a l  w o u ld ,  " d e n y  t o  
t h e  p u b l i c  a s  p u r c h a s e r s ,  c o n s u m e r s  o r  u s e r s  o f  a n y  goods  
o t h e r  s p e c i f i c  a n d  s u b s t a n t i a l  b e n e f i t s  e n j o y e d  o r  l i k e l y  t o  
be e n j o y e d  by them "  ( s .  1 0 ( 1 ) ( b ) ) ;  o r  t h a t  t h e i r  r e m o v a l  
w o u l d ,  " h a v e  a s e r i o u s  a n d  p e r s i s t e n t  a d v e r s e  e f f e c t  o n  t h e  
g e n e r a l  l e v e l  o f  u n e m p lo y m e n t  i n  an  a r e a "  ( s .  1 0 ( 1 ) ( e ) ) ;  o r  
t h a t  i t  w o u l d ,  " b e  l i k e l y  t o  c a u s e  a r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  volume 
o r  e a r n i n g s  o f  t h e  e x p o r t  b u s i n e s s  . . .  o f  t h e  [ r e l e v a n t ]  
t r a d e  o r  i n d u s t r y "  ( s .  1 0 ( 1 ) ( f ) ) .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  C o u r t  
m u s t  a l s o  be  s a t i s f i e d  u n d e r  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  " t a i l p i e c e "  o f  s .
(Footnote continues on next page)
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t h e  C o u r t  m ay ,  a t  a n y  t i m e ,  d i s c h a r g e  a  p r e v i o u s  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t
d e c l a r a t i o n  i t  h a s  made a n d  s u b s t i t u t e  i t  w i t h  a n o t h e r  i f
r e q u e s t e d  t o  do  s o  by  t h e  D i r e c t o r  G e n e r a l  o r  by  an  a f f e c t e d  
90p a r t y  . A p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  s u c h  v a r i a t i o n  may o n l y  be made w i t h
th e  C o u r t ' s  l e a v e  a n d ,  t h e n ,  may o n l y  b e  g r a n t e d ,  "upon  p r im a
f a c i e  e v i d e n c e  o f  a  m a t e r i a l  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t
91c i r c u m s t a n c e s "  . The  R P C 's  power  i s  n o t  o n l y  d e c l a r a t o r y ,  
however ;  i t  may a l s o  i s s u e  " i n j u n c t i o n s "  o r  r e s t r a i n i n g  o r d e r s  
which f o r b i d  p a r t i e s  f r o m  i l l e g a l l y  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  e n f o r c e
a g r e e m e n t s  t h a t  i t  h a s  d e c l a r e d  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  p u b l i c
. 92i n t e r e s t  .
We can  s e e  f r o m  t h i s  o v e r v i e w  t h a t  t h e  RPA empowers a  t r i a d i c  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  a  c l a s s i c  s o r t ,  t h e  RPC, t o  p e r f o r m  a  c l e a r l y  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  f u n c t i o n  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  r e g u l a t i o n  o f
r e s t r i c t i v e  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t s .  On t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  t h e  RPC 's  fo r m a l  
c o u r t  s t a t u s ,  i t s  j u d i c i a l  p e r s o n n e l  and  i t s  a d v e r s a r i a l
! 1' ■ *8901
( F o o t n o t e  c o n t i n u e d  f r o m  p r e v i o u s  p a g e )
1 0 ( 1 )  t h a t  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n ,  " i s  n o t  u n r e a s o n a b l e  h a v i n g  
r e g a r d  t o  t h e  b a l a n c e  b e t w e e n  [ t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  made o u t ]  
and  a n y  d e t r i m e n t  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  o r  t o  ( p u r c h a s e r s ,  
c o n s u m e r s ,  u s e r s  o r  c o m p e t i t o r s )  . . .  r e s u l t i n g  o r  l i k e l y  t o  
r e s u l t  f r o m  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n " .
8 9 .  RPA, s .  4 ( 1 ) .
9 0 .  RPA, s .  4 ( 3 ) .
9 1 .  RPA, s .  4 ( 4 ) .
9 2 .  RPA, s .  2 ( 2 ) .  B r e a c h  
c o n s t i t u t e s  c o n t e m p t  o f  
r e s p o n s i b l e  t o  t h e  r i s k  
d i s c r e t i o n ,  o f  f i n e s  
9 ( 3 ) , ( 4 ) ) .
o f  an  i n j u n c t i o n  i s s u e d  by t h e  RPC 
c o u r t  a n d  a s  s u c h  e x p o s e s  t h o s e  
o f  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n ,  a t  t h e  RPC's  
a n d / o r  p r i s o n  s e n t e n c e s  (RPCA, s .
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p r o c e d u r e s  c l e a r l y  d e m o n s t r a t e  i t s  t r i a d i c  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g
s t r u c t u r e .  The o p e n  t e x t u r e d  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  ' g a t e w a y s '  and
93' t a i l p i e c e '  o f  t h e  RPA an d  t h e  wide  power  o f
v a r i a t i o n / s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  j u d g m e n t s  i t  g r a n t s  t o  t h e  C o u r t  p o i n t  
o u t ,  i n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  n a t u r e  o f  i t s  f u n c t i o n .
The RPC -  P r e d i c t e d  D i f f i c u l t i e s
In  t h e i r  s e m i n a l  work on  t h e  RPC, p u b l i s h e d  o n l y  n i n e  y e a r s  a f t e r  
i t s  e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,  Yamey a n d  S t e v e n s  e x p r e s s e d  s e r i o u s  d o u b t s
a b o u t  t h e  c h o i c e  o f  a  j u d i c i a l  body t o  p e r f o r m  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f
. 94 . . .economic  p r e d i c t i o n  . I n  t h e i r  o p i n i o n ,  " t h e  i n s u f f i c i e n t l y
p r e c i s e  c r i t e r i a  p r o v i d e d  by  t h e  g a t e w a y s  a n d  t h e  i n v i t a t i o n  i n
t h e  t a i l p i e c e  t o  b a l a n c e  c o n f l i c t i n g  p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e s  m e a n t  t h a t
t h e  j u d i c i a l  p r o c e s s  was  b e i n g  i n v o k e d  t o  d e a l  w i t h  i s s u e s  which
95i t  was i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  i l l - e q u i p p e d  t o  h a n d l e "  ; o r  w h i c h ,  m  
o t h e r  w o r d s ,  w e r e  n o t ,  " p e c u l i a r l y  s u i t e d  t o  t h e  j u d i c i a l  p r o c e s s  
o r  c a u s a l l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  p e c u l i a r i t i e s  o f  l e g a l  l o g i c  o r  l e g a l  
r e l e v a n c e "  . "The a d v e r s a r y  p r o c e d u r e  a s  e m b o d ie d  i n  t h e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  j u d i c i a l  p r o c e s s " ,  t h e y  c o n t e n d ,  " c o u l d  s c a r c e l y  be a 9345
9 3 .  See f n  88 s u p r a .
9 4 .  B. Yamey a n d  R. S t e v e n s ,  "The R e s t r i c t i v e  P r a c t i c e s  C o u r t "  
1 9 6 5 ,  W eiden  & N i c h o l s o n ,  London .
9 5 .  i b i d . ,  4 8 .
9 6 . i b i d . , 1 4 0 - 4 1 .
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. 97l e s s  c o n v e n i e n t  m e th o d  o f  h a n d l i n g  n a k e d  i s s u e s  o f  p o l i c y "  .
The m os t  s e r i o u s  e r r o r  w h i c h  t h e y  a c c u s e  P a r l i a m e n t  o f  c o m m i t t i n g  
in  1956 was t h e  c o n f u s i o n  o f  t h e  f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  a c a s e  by c a s e  
a p p ro a ch  w i t h  t h e  j u d i c i a l  'modus o p e r a n d i ' .  They p o i n t  o u t  
t h a t ,  w h i l e  c o u r t s  do i n v e s t i g a t e  s i t u a t i o n s  on  a c a s e  by c a s e  
b a s i s ,  " t h e y  a r e  i n v e s t i g a t e d  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  l e g a l  s t a n d a r d s  
which,  i n  t h e  s p e c t r u m  o f  d e c i s i o n m a k i n g ,  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  
i n f l e x i b l e " . " t l ] t  i s  n o t  n o r m a l l y  a s s u m e d " ,  t h e y  c o n t i n u e ,
" t h a t  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  s u c h  i n d i v i d u a l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  t h e  j u d g e s  
w i l l  h a v e  t o  c h o o s e  b e t w e e n  c o n f l i c t i n g  e c o n o m i c  p r e d i c t i o n s  and 
make v a l u e  j u d g m e n t s  i n v o l v i n g  . . .  c o m p e t i n g  p o l i c y  
o b j e c t i v e s "  . barney a n d  S t e v e n s  c o n c l u d e  on an  om in o u s  n o t e  by 
o b s e r v i n g  t h a t ,  " [ t ] h e  d i s g u i s i n g  o f  e co n o m ic  p o l i c y  i s s u e s  a s  
j u d i c i a l  o n e s ,  when t h e y  h a v e  c u s t o m a r i l y  b e e n  s e t t l e d  a s  
p o l i t i c a l  i s s u e s ,  may w e l l  p r o v e  t o  h a v e  ben a n  u n f o r t u n a t e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e v e l o p m e n t " 1 0 0 .
The RPC -  S y s t e m  Breakdown
In  t h e  f i r s t  y e a r s  o f  i t s  o p e r a t i o n  t h e  a t t e m p t s  o f  t h e  RPC t o  
J  r e c o n c i l e  f u n c t i o n  t o  i t s  p r o c e d u r e  r e s u l t e d  i n  a s e r i e s  o f  978
9 7 .  i b i d . ,  1 4 4 .
9 8 .  i b i d . ,  140 ( e m p h a s i s  a d d e d ) .
99 .  i b i d .
• I10 0 .  i b i d 1 5 3 .
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judgments strictly construing the 'gateways' and making 
justification of agreements restricting competition virtually 
impossible*"0 *■. The Court was deliberately eschewing the
discretion it had been required to exercise by a process of auto­
limitation? by fixing the content of the legislation in order that 
it could be applied by formal deduction. The effects of this 
strict approach on industry were dramatic - large numbers of 
agreements in affected industries were abandoned before they could 
be referred to the RPC . It was feared for a time that the
flexibility sought by the legislator would be smothered by 
judicial concern to construct ’justiciable' rules. Eventually, 
though, later cases began to reflect a more pragmatic or lenient 
approach to justification and suggested that the Court was trying
actually to interpret and apply the 'gateways' and 'tailpiece' as
103they were intended to be used , This revised attitude of the
Court was generally welcomed by business and government.
However, this new approach brought problems of its own. To begin 
with, despite the RPC's willingness to enter the policy arena, its 
trial-type procedures rendered applications for evaluation both 1023
101. See, e.g., "Re Chemists Federation Agreement", 1958 LR 1 RP
75, "Re Blanket Manufacturers Agreement", 1959 LR 1 RP 271 
and "Re Yarn-Spinners Agreement", 1959 LR 1 RP, 118,
especially 188-89.
102. See Stevens and Yamey, op. cit. supra fn 89, chapter 6. 
Indeed, the threat to employment posed by abandonment of 
agreements following the 'Yarn Spinning' decision (cited 
above) prompted the swift enactment of the Cotton Industry 
Act of 1959, which effectively reversed the judgment.
103. See, e.g., "Re Black Bolt and Nut Association’s Agreement", 
1960 LR 2 RP 50, "Re Net Book Agreement 1957", 1962 LR 3 RP
246.
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burdensome and costly . In addition, the RPC's abandonment of 
a formalistic approach meant that, "the predictability [and 
political consistency] of decisions had been reduced" in two 
related ways: firstly, the RPC's policy-insulated status
prevented it from undertaking, "systematic investigation designed 
to test the value of existing theories and to provoke the 
formulation of new theories and policies"104 506 107; secondly, the 
structural insulation of the RPC's members meant that the exerting 
of political 'pressure' or 'influence* upon them had to be an 
indirect and, therefore, highly uncertain process. In the eyes of 
the business community, therefore, the credibility of the RPC as 
an efficent administrative agency has been fatally undermined. 
In consequence, the number of agreements which parties have sought 
to defend before the Court on public interest grounds has 
gradually fallen to zero since the 1960's - as the recent Green 
Paper announcing the RPA's imminent repeal observes:
"the Court is now little used except for undefended cases. 
Its primary function is to hear arguments and make public 
interest judgments on agreements yet it is hardly ever called 
into action for this purpose" 104567
104
)
104. Department of Trade and Industry, "Review of Restrictive 
Trade Practices Policy: A Consultative Document", March 1988, 
Cm. 331, Annex C, para. 26.
105. B. Yamey, "The Judicial Control of Cartels: The Restrictive 
Practices Court", in A. Jacquemin and G. Schrans (eds), 
"Actes du Colloque sur la Magistrature Economique" 1976, 
Leuven Oyez, IV.1-14.
106. Stevens and Yamey, op. cit. fn 94 supra, 147.
107. Cmd. 331, "Review of Restrictive Trade Practices Policy", 
Department of Trade and Industry, March 1988.
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Instead, evaluations concerning the beneficial nature of
restrictive agreements are now largely conducted in the context of
negotiations between the parties and the Office of Fair 
108Trading . The object of these negotiations is the removal of
all restrictions which the OFT considers objectionable. If the
OFT is dissatisfied with the outcome of negotiations, they
conclude with an undefended reference to the RPC resulting in the
prohibition of the relevant agreement. If, alternatively, the
Director General considers all significant restrictions have been
109removed, then the proceedings will be suspended
The legislative transfer of the RPC's economic prediction function 
to a non triadic, administrative agency - specifically, to the 
Director General of Fair Trading - was suggested as long ago as 
1979 by the so called 'Liesner Report', "with a view both to 
greater flexibility and, in particular, to allowing beneficial 
agreements"11^. It is submitted, however, that the increased use 
of negotiation by the OFT has already circumvented much of the 
need for transfer, although the imminent repeal of the 1976 Act, 
abolition of the RPC and formal establishment of an appropriately 
non-judicial system for the supervision of restrictive trade
)  1089
108. According to the 1988 Green Paper, this procedure, "now 
dominates the whole process", op. cit. supra , para. 22.
109. RPA, s21(2), which provides that the Director General may, 
with the consent of the Secretary of State, refrain from 
referring an agreement which he believes to contain no 
significant restrictions.
110. Green Paper on Restrictive Trade Practices Policy, March 
1979, Cmnd. 7512, para. 1.9.til). N.B. the proposal made 
clear that the Director General's jurisdiction would be 
concurrent with that of the RPC.
rif
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agreements*** is surely welcome from the point of view of legal 
certainty.
The RPC - Conclusion
The example of the Restrictive Practices Court was chosen in order
to demonstrate the critical use to which our theory can be put.
It has shown how the inappropriate matching of triadic structure
with administrative function can result in a loss of credibility
or confidence leading to system breakdown. We predicted that the
'policy insulation* of an agency required to take administrative
decisions would mean, as Pops says, that "the agency becomes less
responsive to the political demands of interest groups"? that
"[pjolicy is more disjointed"? that, because of insulation,
"political pressures are exerted more often in an indirect [and
therefore, unaccountable] manner"? and ultimately, that "the
agency's ability to build the [direct, political] constituency it
1 1 2needs to survive and prosper will be impaired" . The downfall 
of the RPC has, it is submitted, vindicated us in our belief.
)  12
111. 1988 Green Paper, op. cit. supra fn 107, paras. 6.14 to 
6.17.
112. Gerald M. Pops, "The Judicialisation of Federal
Administrative Law Judges: Implications for Policymaking"
1979, 81 West Virginia Law Review, 169, 204.
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THE INAPPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF AM ADJUDICATIVE 
FUNCTION TO THE EC COMMISSION
Introduction
Just as regulatory mismatch is possible by combining an 
administrative function with a triadic structure, so it is 
* possible by combining an adjudicative function and a structure 
which does not possess triadic characteristics.
It will be apparent that, in terms of the values they pursue, 
there is a necessary tension between the function of adjudication 
and a non triadic decision-making structure. In creating tightly 
defined or definable text, the legislator seeks to provide a 
stable datum of legal norms which will render case by case 
outcomes relatively stable and and able to be predicted accurately 
by affected individuals. By contrast, in selecting a non triadic 
agency to perform adjudications under the statutary text, the 
legislator seeks simultaneously to ensure that the powers created 
will be used energetically and with the goals standing behind the 
J text in mind. However, if an agency is required by statutary 
language, on one hand, to perform a formally rational decision­
making task but is encouraged, by its composition and internal 
structure on the other, to adopt a policy oriented approach to 
applying the law, then it is inevitable that the legislator has 
created a system with an in-built value conflict. More important, 
it is submitted that, as with the case of the administration-triad 
mismatch, the presence of this value conflict will be inevitably 
reflected in the unsatisfactory operation of the system. It is 
submitted that a value conflict of this order is present within
Ii
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the present system for the adjudication of cases by the EC 
Commission under Articles 85(l)/86 EEC.
This section is designed to discuss the appropriateness of the 
Commission's decision-making structure, given its adjudicatory 
function vis à vis infringement of Articles 85(1)/86 EEC. In it, 
we shall enquire, first, in what ways the independent status of 
the Commission makes it structurally committed to performing 
adjudications triadically; second, to what degree the Commission's 
internal decision-making structure contributes to triadic 
adjudication of such cases; and, finally, to what extent the Court 
of Justice has sought to impose upon the Commission the sort of 
constitutional restrictions on structure that would oblige it to 
adjudicate these cases in a triadic manner.
Policy Insulation and the Independent Status 
of the College of Commissioners
The European Commission consists, at base, of 17 individuals 
appointed by common accord of the Governments of the Member States 
for renewable terms of four years . The Commission is encharged 
by Article L55 EEC, "to ensure the proper functioning and 
development of the common market" and it is clear from other 
provisions relating to the duties of the Members of the Commission 
that in performing this task they are not to be subject to outside 
influence or pressures. Indeed the standard of impartiality and 13
113. Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission 
of the European Communities of 8th April 1965 (hereafter 
"Merger Treaty"), Articles 10 and 11,
í
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independence required of and secured to Members of the Commission 
is comparable, if not similar, to that relating to the Members of
that other collegiate body of the Community, the Court of Justice.
Specifically, Members of both institutions are selected from those
114"whose independence is beyond doubt” ; they are both obliged to
115act with complete independence ; and both may only be removed 
from office on grounds of misbehaviour and then only by 
impeachment by the Court of Justice, rather than at the whim of 
the Member States11*’.
The security of tenure granted to the Members of the Commission
and Judges of the European Court by the Treaty and their *156
109. Commission, Merger Treaty, Article 10(1); Court, Art 167 
EEC.
115. Commission, Merger Treaty, Article 10(2); Court, Court 
Statute, Article 4.
116. Commission, Merger Treaty, Article 13 (compulsory retirement 
by decision of the Court, on a reference by either Council or 
Commission, on grounds that he, "no longer fulfills the 
conditions required for the performance of his duties or if 
he has been guilty of serious misconduct"); Court, Article 6 
of Court Statute (deprivation of office if, in unanimous 
opinion of Court, "he no longer fulfills the requisite 
conditions or meets the obligations arising from his 
office”).
Cf. Art 144 EEC, which requires the resignation of Commission 
as a body if censured by vote of the European Parliament. It 
is submitted that this limit to the lifespan of the 
Commission is neither intended nor capable of being exercised 
as a judgment on the personal performance of a Member of the 
Commission or a means of exerting pressure on him. In this 
respect, therfore, Article 144 EEC does not materially 
diminish the security of tenure of Commissioners as compared 
with Judges of the Court of Justice.
tii: l
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corresponding duty to act independently of governmental and non­
governmental pressure are designed to ensure that the criteria 
which they employ in taking decisions are entirely professional, 
or, rather, entirely "relevant” ones. Relevant decisional 
criteria can be defined as all those referents for decision making
which can be objectively justified as bearing a rational relation
117to the subject matter of the decision . Irrelevant decisional 
criteria can be defined as the residuum, or, perhaps as the 
indices of arbitrary action . The structural measures used to 
ensure that these bodies' decisions are rationally related to the 
subject matter in question can also be described, of course, as 
guarantees of their impartiality.
However, are the decisional referents which are 'relevant' for 
Commission decision making identical to those of the Court of 
Justice? In what ways are they similar, or different? In both 
cases, it is clear that decisional referents of the same order, 
for example, as the family relationship of an interested party to 
the decision maker, cannot constitute relevant criteria. Both 
Commissioners and Judges are required to treat like cases alike in 
the sense that they may not make distinctions between individuals 
in respect of differences are not recognised as material by the 
law.
However, it is equally obvious that while Members of the 
Commission are often required to base their decisions on criteria 
of political expediency, such criteria will always represent 178
117. See D.J. Gifford, op. cit. supra fn 27.
118. ibid., section IV. A., "'Arbitary* Administrative Action as 
the Use of Impermissible Referents”.
Tf
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irrelevant bases for judgments of the Court of Justice, The 
constitutional balance of powers in the Community requires that 
the Court of Justice (the judicial body required by Article 164 
EEC to ensure that "the law is observed" in the Community order) 
should be functionally bound to decide issues of law brought 
before it in a formally rational manner. In other words, the
Court of Justice is constitutionally bound to perform an
exclusively adjudicatory role. In performing this function, the 
Court may only legitimately have regard to relevant formal legal 
and evidential criteria: it must behave with formally rational 
impartiality, or, in to use our own phrase, it must exhibit 
'policy insulation'. On the other hand, the Commission is often 
required to act in a substantively rational way. To put it 
differently, the Commission may be required to use substantive 
legislative policy in a predictive fashion and regulate future 
behaviour. In performing this function, the Commission may quite 
legitimately base its decision on relevant informal policy and 
factual criteria: it must behave with substantively rational
impartiality, or, as we would put it, be 'policy oriented*.
Vx.
However, in applying the prohibitions of Articles 85(1) and 86 EEC1 
to undertakings, we have seen that the Commission is performing 
not a policy applying (administrative) function, but a legal rule 
$ applying function; in other words, it adjudicates. Therefore, it 
is appropriate for it, like the Court of Justice or any other 
court, to employ only formally rational decisional referents. 
Whilst the College's independence from external political pressure 
will guarantee its substantively rational impartiality, or policy 
orientation, it cannot guarantee that it will exhibit the formally 
rational impartiality or policy-insulation appropriate to 
adjudication. Only a triadic decision-making structure can do 
that. Does such a structure exist with regard to the making of
infringement decisions?
rO X v. y  U o
I  [ J I J ,
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Policy-Insulation and the Division of 
Labour within the Commission
Article 155 of the Treaty of Rome provides that, "[i]n order to 
ensure the proper functioning and development of the common 
market, the Commission shall [inter alia] ... exercise the powers 
conferred upon it by the Council for the implementation of the 
rules laid down by the latter'*. The measures adopted by the 
Council under Article 87 EEC (notably Regulations 17/62 and 19/65 
EEC) confer just such powers, of course. In exercising these 
powers the Commission is required by Article 17 of the Merger 
Treaty of 1965 to the principle of collegiality. Article 17
provides that,
11
"[t]he Commission shall act.ljy majority of the number of members 
provided for in Article lO1
A meeting of the Commission shall be valid only if the number 
of members laid down in its rules of procedure is present"
Furthermore, the Commission's Rules of Procedure adopted pursuant
to Article 16 of that Treaty emphasise the paramouncy of
1 2 0collegiate responsibility . However, in qualification of this 
principle, these Rules also provide that "Subject to the principle 
of collegiate responsibility being respected in full". Members of 
the Commission (and its officials, if "indispensible" for the 1920
119. Article 10 of the Merger Treaty, which currently provides 
that, "[t]he Commission shall consist of seventeen members".
120. Commission's Provisional Rules of Procedure (Commission
Decision 67/426 Euratom, ECSC, EEC, OJ 1967, L 147/1, Article 
1: referring to Commission Decision 63/41 EEC, OJ 1963,
181/63).
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proper fulfillment of the Commission's duties) may be granted the
power to take "clearly defined measures of management and 
1 2 1administration" . Several powers relating to the taking of 
decisions applying Articles 85(l)/86 EEC have been the subject of 
such delegations.
Although it is true that these delegations were carried out in 
order to relieve the Members of the Commission of an impossibly 
heavy work burden, it is submitted that, from the point of view of 
the decisional triad, these delegations have contributed to the 
\ construction of an appropriate adjudicatory structure. Triadic
decision-making requires, if we recall, that the adjudicator ought 
to be a person, or group of persons, independent of both accuser 
and accused, firstly, in a physical sense (being a person distinct 
from either the accuser or accused) and, secondly, in an 
organisational sense (being free from the control or undue 
influence of either side). By delegating the accusatory elements 
of the adjudicatory process to people distinct from the college 
and retaining the decision-making element within the college, the 
Commission begins to resemble a triadic decision maker. In what 
ways has it achieved this?
0 Both of the specific powers of the Commission under Council 
Regulation 17/62 of ordering investigation into and initiating 
proceedings against the infringement of Articles 85(l)/86 EEC have 
been the subject of delegation. In addition the duty of the 
Commission to hear addressees of Article 85(1)/86 EEC decisions 12
121. Commission Decision 75/461 Euratom, ECSC, EEC, OJ 1975, L 
199/43, replacing Art 27 of Rules of Procedure of 1967 cited 
above.
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imposed by Regulation 17/62 has also been the subject of 
delegation. First, the powers of requesting/obtaining
information from undertakings provided in Articles 11 and 14 of 
Regulation 17 are exercised by the Member of the Commission 
responsible for Competition Policy on behalf of the college of 
Commissioners. Second, the power to initiate proceedings (on 
complaint, notification, or 'ex officio') by service of a
statement of objections is also exercised by the 'Competition
. . 1 2 2  Commissioner' on his brethren's behalf . Third, as we have
seen already that the Commission has, by Article 9 of Regulation
99/63, delegated the duty to hear those who are the subjects of
 ^ infringement proceedings to, "the persons appointed by the
Commission for that purpose". We have seen that none of the
Members of the Commission as a college or individually preside at
hearings and that instead the person appointed to undertake this
responsibility is a member of DG IV reporting directly to the
123Competition Commissioner! the "Hearing Officer"
It is submitted that all of these delegated powers represent 
measures taken in the 'accusatory* phase of the making of an 
infringement decision. The power to initiate proceedings against 
undertakings, the power to investigate the activities of suspected 
undertakings and the power to collect and synthesise the fact 
f dossier of the case each correspond to powers of inquiry or, to 
use the french legal term, "instruction" which logically precede 123
122. However, we have seen that whilst the authority to exercise 
these powers is that of the Commisioner, his immediate 
subordinate, the Director General of the Directorate General 
for Competition Policy (DGIV), may, with his prior approval, 
sign relevant documents on his behalf.
123. s e e  t e x t  accompanying fn  45 to  54 s u p r a .
V 1
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and, in a triad, ought to be functionally and structurally 
distinct from those of decision. In ensuring that the 
Competition hierarchy exercises a prosecutorial role while the 
college of Commissioners performs a decisional role, these 
delegations have produced an organisational separation of powers 
which could make triadic decision-making possible.
The Effect of the “Written Procedure” on the 
Commission’s Triadic Decision-Making Structure
Introduction
In this part we shall examine the role played by active collegiate 
debate and criticism in sustaining the triadic structure which is 
made possible by the division of labour within the Commission. 
By delegating prosecutorial power to the Competition hierarchy the 
college becomes capable of acting as an adjudicator. However, it 
0  will be seen that, unless the members of the college play a 
sufficiently active role in taking definitive decisions, this 
adjudicatory role is in danger of becoming illusory.
The Role of Active Collegiate Debate in 
Sustaining Triadic Behaviour
If we approach the principle of collegiate decision-making as a 
principle encouraging interactive action then it becomes possible
ij
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to see how it could help guarantee rationality in Commission 
decision-making. Daniel Gifford, in his ground breaking analysis 
of administrative decision making * , observed how "human 
interaction" could have significant effects on agency action. He 
identifies both dynamic and stabilizing aspects of interactive 
decision-making. Interaction has a dynamic effect, "when a ... 
participant in a decisional process ... alters his approach as a 
result of his contact with another person". This may occur,
"when a decision-maker's contact with another person brings him 
new information or acquaints him with new ways of perceiving the
matter before him or makes him aware of criticism of his own
/  1 2 5position to which he had previously not been exposed"
Interaction has a stabilizing effect in so far as the decision
maker, "is exposed to pressure to justify departures from his own
prior practice not only to himself but, since his earlier
decisions have been seen by other officials who will observe his
present decisions, to other officials as well". In particular,
he, "must explain his justification in the light of the decisional
126referents used by him in his earlier decisions"
What, then, can we say of the effects upon Commission decision 
making of the interaction which is encouraged by the principle of 
collegiality? Given that the responsibilities of each of the 
^ sixteen members of the Commission not involved in competition 
policy are highly specialised and diverse, the extent to which 
they could subject proposed applications of Article 85(3) EEC to 12456
124. op. cit. supra fn 27.
125. ibid., 22.
126. i b i d . ,  page  25.
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critical scrutiny in terms of the policy referents upon which they
127were based is doubtful . However, this same degree of 
specialisation renders them singularly qualified to scrutinize 
critically the fact evaluation upon which decisions applying 
Articles 85(1)/86 EEC are based. In this regard, the other 
members of the college represent disinterested parties who, not 
having participated in any prior proceedings relating to the 
investigation of the undertakings involved, are free from possible 
pre-conceptions concerning the case at hand and can concern 
themselves only with the historic facts presented to them and the 
legal arguments made. Since it makes decision more open, the
■'/ collegiate evaluation of infringement cases could, it is 
submitted, make the participation of affected undertakings via 
presentation of proofs more meaningful than otherwise.
In summary, then, we can say that the meaningful participation of 
the college of Commissioners in the taking of a definitive 
infringement decision is a means of guaranteeing the policy 
insulated nature of the fact evaluations upon which it is based. 
Of course, it cannot be denied that the presence, in collegiate 
debate, of the Competition Commissioner is a threat to the 
integrity of its disinterested status; however, assuming that his 
sixteen colleagues demonstrate some independence of spirit, this
0  threat need only be minimal. 127
127. The sort of critical scrutiny required to improve what 
Gifford calls the "objective rationality" (efficiency) of 
such decisions is more likely to come from the experts within 
the competition policy hierarchy itself, or from specialist 
external bodies or interest groups. See Gifford on this 
point, ibid., 29 to 33.
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The "Written Procedure” as a Threat to Collegiality
The delegation of prosecutorial powers by the college to the 
Competition hierarchy and the reservation to the college of 
adjudicatory jurisdiction make triadic decision-making possible, 
provided the role of the college is a sufficiently active one. 
Unfortunately, although the active participation of each Member of 
the Commission in the final act of adjudication is possible, it is 
not realistically feasible.
 ^ We have seen in a previous section that the power of the 
Commission under Articles 3 and 15 of Regulation 17 to order 
undertakings to terminate infringements of Articles 85(l)/86 EEC 
is formally exercised by the Commission as a whole. However, due 
to the impracticality of requiring the college to meet in full 
session to reach a decision in every case, this power is exercised 
using the so called 'written procedure*. To recall what we have 
said earlier, in the 'written procedure* in this instance, the 
Competition Commissioner prepares a draft decision which he 
forwards, with the principal details of the case, to his 
colleagues. If, in the space of a certain time limit {usually a 
few days), none of them have communicated any objection to the 
r| adoption of the decision to him in writing, then the decision is 
adopted. If objections are timeously made, then adoption of the 
decision is referred to the college.
Clearly, the use of the written procedure does not constitute a 
'de jure' or formal delegation of decision making power to a 
single Commissioner. However, it will be equally apparent that, 
given the highly specialised nature of the tasks allotted to 
individual Members of the Commission and the burdensome nature of 
those responsibilities, the scant scrutiny to which they can
I
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subject a draft decision circulated by the Competition
Commissioner permits him to exercise 'de facto' delegated power in
this regard. Whereas alternatively, the active participation or
interaction of the Members of the Commission in final adjudication
was merely difficult, the use of the "written procedure" ensures
that is impossible and that, "the decision is normally in practice
solely that of DG IV and the Commissioner responsible for 
„128
competition”
Opportunities for Triadic Behaviour by Dividing 
Roles within the Competition Hierarchy
Introduction
It has been shown that it might have been possible to achieve 
triadic decision-making in infringement cases by dividing 
roles between the college of Commissioners and the competition 
hierarchy headed by the Competition Commissioner. However, as we 
have seen, this division of labour has gone beyond what is needed 
to separate prosecutorial roles from adjudicatory roles. The 
"written procedure" has taken the Commission full circle, so to 
speak, with the effective arrogation of both sorts of powers to 
the competition hierarchy. There may still be opportunities, 
however, for triadic behaviour within that hierarchy itself. 128
128. Written Submission of the 'Unione des Industries de la 
Communauté Européenne', House of Lords Select Committee on 
the European Communities, Session 1981-82, 8th Report, 
"Competition Practice", page 67.
Ti
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Writing in 1983, Maurizio Delfino, quoting Commission sources, 
described how the internal procedure for the preparation of 
infringement decisions provided guarantees of separated power. He 
observed that:
"the present internal organisation of the Commission, with the 
inspectorate and the directorate who prepare the decision 
separate from each other, with a separate policy department of 
DG IV and the Legal Service each giving a separate opinion on 
the case and with the decision, finally, having to be reviewed 
with a critical eye by the politically responsible
Commissioner ..., contains enough checks and balances to 
prevent a misguided rapporteur ... sentencing innocent
undertaking as prosecutor, judge and executioner"
This part shall examine the accuracy of Delfino's observations and
assess whether the 'checks and balances" he ascribes to internal
, 130procedure actually does exist
Separation of Roles in the Relationship between 
the Competition Commissioner and his Subordinates
The Commissioner with responsibility for Competition Policy heads 
a bureaucracy whose operations were described earlier in this 
paper. He acts in close liason with his immediate subordinate, 
the Director General for Competition Policy. Are their aspects 12930
129. "Enforcement Discretion in Anti-trust - A Comparative 
Analysis of the EEC and US Systems", PhD. Thesis, Stanford, 
USA, 1983, Vol. 2, 206.
130. Part of the Delfino passage quoted above, which mentioned 
the procedural guarantee which scrutiny, "by the Commission 
as a whole" provided, has been deleted since we have already 
discussed the role of the college of Commissioners and how 
it has been undermined through use of the "written 
procedure".
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------^
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of the relationship which the Commissioner enjoys with his 
bureaucracy which indicate a division of prosecutorial and
adjudicatory roles?
It seems clear from the start that the Commissioner is directly
and actively involved in the prosecutorial side of infringement
proceedings as well as the adjudicatory aspect. We have seen
that, in a legal sense, he is directly responsible both for the
investigation of undertakings under suspicion and for the
commencement of action against them. In terms of practice, he
plays an active role in the performance of these duties - although
the Director General's has "power to sign" inspection decisions
and statements of objections, this authority is continually
131renewed by personal approval of the Commissioner . From this we 
could certainly deduce that there was a mixing of prosecutorial 
and adjudicatory roles and that, by engaging in prosecutorial 
decision-making, the Commissioner's position as an impartial 
adjudicator was compromised.
One could, of course, object to this deduction on the ground that
it is only formally correct to say that the Commissioner is
actively and directly involved in prosecution and that, in truth, 
he merely "rubber stamps" the prosecutorial initiatives which 
originate in DG IV. However, if one accepts that the 
Commissioner's formal role in taking prosecutorial measures is, in 
substance, transformed into a role of 'ex post facto' approval 
must one not also accept that his role of making draft 
infringement decisions is probably also exercised in terms of 
approval and that adjudication or crafting actually occurs within 13
131. See text accompanying fn 185 to 187 post.
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DG IV subject only to his supervision? In these circumstances, 
which probably correspond to the reality of the matter, the 
Commissioner does not really prosecute or adjudicate: major 
responsibility for the exercise of both roles really lies at the 
level of the Directorate General itself. In this case, can we 
detect any meaningful separation of roles within DG IV?
Separation of Roles in the Relationship among 
the Commission Officials of DG IV
In our earlier look at the internal practice of DG IV we 
established several things. First, that individual cases, from 
investigation through prosecution to decision-drafting, are the 
fundamental responsibility of the 'divisions' to which they are 
assigned. Delfino was correct at the time when he noted that
investigative and decision-making roles were separated within DG
1 3 2IV, but this is no longer the case . Second, that, although
Directorate A's "special administrative unit for the co-ordination
of competition decisions" is used to give a separate assessment on
each case prepared by the divisions, it benefits from no
guarantees of organisational independence or impartiality, vis a
. 133vis those divisions . Third, that although a hearing officer 
benefitting from such guarantees does exist, his role is confined 
to chairing the oral hearings of undertakings and does not extend 
to supervising the drafting of decisions. 132
132. See text accompanying fn 42 supra.
133. See text accompanying fns 55 to 56 supra.
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All of these factors lead us to the inevitable conclusion that DG 
IV does not employ a division of labour in infringement 
proceedings that would ensure that those involved in prosecutorial 
activities were structurally distinct from those involved in 
adjudicatory activities.
Separation of Roles created in the Advisory 
Role of the Commission's Legal Service
At first glance, the role of the Commission's Legal Service in the 
preparation of infringement decisions might suggest that a
meaningful separation of roles existed. The Legal Service is 
entirely independent of the Competition hierarchy, being 
responsible directly to the President of the Commission. 
Further, the decision of the member of the Legal Service to whom a 
case is assigned for advice is decisive in the outcome of the 
infringement proceedings; the Commissioner cannot proceed to
approve the draft decision submitted to him by DG IV unless it has
. . 134obtained the agreement of the Legal Service as to its content
In other words, the submission of a preliminary draft decision to 134
134. See practice cited in Case 5/85, 'AKZO v Commission' [1986] 
ECR 2585, para. 33 of judgment. Compare, however, the 
following comment: "[I]n theory, in the event of a
disagreement on the terms of a draft decision between the 
Legal Service and DG.IV, the matter is referred to the next 
oral session of the Commission, which, sitting as a a 
collegiate body, hears both points of view and rules on the 
question. In fact, such disagreements are almost always 
eliminated by discussion- and compromise between the two 
departments and formal referral to the Commission is rare",
F. Graupner, "Commission Decision-making on Competition 
Matters", (1973) 10 CMLRev, 291, 292 (emphasis added).
iI
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i
the Legal Service seems to provide an independent and impartial 
means of assessing the merits of any case.
Such an impression would be misleading, it is suggested. In the
first place, the Legal Service (like Directorate A's special unit)
does not deliberate on the merits of a proposed decision in
isolation from DG IV; on the contrary, the 'conseiller juridique'
I involved is in constant contact with the competition hierarchy
I regarding all aspects of the case, which serves as a convenient
opportunity for discussion and negotiation on the content of the 
135draft . The organisational impartiality of the 'conseiller* as 
, ^ a putative adjudicator can only be compromised if he adopts a
| negotiating posture . Finally, it must be pointed out that the
I role of the Legal Service, like any other legal adviser, is to
ensure that its client is acting in a way which can be defended 
against legal attack, in giving its opinion, the Legal Service 
(again like Directorate A's special unit) is ensuring that the 
Commission decision in question will not be annuled in subsequent 
proceedings and not endeavouring to judge it impartially on its 
merits. It would never, for instance, be prepared to block
unconditionally the adoption of a decision submitted to it; 
inadequate arguments of fact and/or law are seen as faults to be 
rectified rather than as arguments in which DG IV has been 
^ 'unsuccessful'. The Legal Service is certainly interested in 
examining the submissions of fact and law made by the affected 
undertakings, but only to the extent that they assist it to make 1356
135. See fn immediately above.
136. If we recall Gifford's theory of interactive decision-making 
as an aid to impartiality [see text accompanying fns 124 to 
127 supra] we will see that it would be difficult to accept 
a negotiator as a truly critical onlooker.
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the eventual decision which will inevitably be addressed to them 
secure against their subsequent challenges.
i
Conclusion
This part has shown that the "checks and balances" which Delfino 
deduced from the internal procedure for the adoption of 
infringement decisions were, in general, rather optimistic and 
that, with specific regard to internal DG IV operation, the facts 
upon which they are deduced have changed. At present, neither 
the relationship between the Commissioner and DG IV, nor that 
between the officials of DG IV, nor that between DG IV and the 
Legal Service, it is submitted, guarantees that such measures will 
be the subject of truly triadic decision-making.
The Non-Triadic Nature of Commission Adjudication and 
the Reaction of Undertakings - Loss of Credibility
The Article 85(l)/86 EEC Adjudication Structure 
as a Threat to Industry Confidence
A lack of confidence in the non-triadic nature of the system of 
adjudication under Articles 85(l)/86 EEC has been voiced by 
industry for years. In 1973, an english barrister noted that, 
"firms liable to be fined millions of dollars may well feel 
aggrieved at not being guaranteed the chance to" have their case
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established by a structurally impartial body . Evidence
submitted to the House of Lords Select Committee in 1982, quoting
an earlier United States Report on Anti-Trust enforcement,
expressed the concern that, "Commission decisions affecting
private rights and conduct lie under the suspicion of being
rationalizations of the preliminary findings which the Commission,
138in the role of prosecutor, presented to itself" . In other
evidence to the Committee, it was submitted by the 'Union des
Industries de la Communauté Européenne' that, while, "[iln theory
checks by other Directorates General and by the Commissioners may
appear to be adequate .. . they are not so regarded by those
outside the Commission" . This evidence continued to point out
the necessity, "of the parties to the proceedings having
140sufficient confidence in the objectivity of the procedure" , 
thereby implying a current lack of such confidence. K.P.E Lasok 
wrote in 1983 of the need to, "provide a fact-finding procedure in 
competition investigations in which undertakings have some 
confidence. At present this is not so ... partly because, 
understandably, the Commission is seen as both prosecutor and 
judge"^^. We need not overstate our case by citing more recent 1378940
137
137. Francis Graupner, "Commission Decisionmaking on Competition 
Matters" (1973) CMLRev 291, 304.
138. Eighth Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Communities (Session 1981-82), "Competition 
Practice", 34, per Joint Working Party on Competition Law of 
the Bar and Law Society.
139. ibid., page 73 at para. 8.
140. ibid., p 73, para. 10.
141. "Judicial Review of Issues of Fact in Competition Cases"
[1983] ECLR 85, 95.
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examples of industry grievance - suffice to say that lack of 
confidence in and lack of credibility of the system of
adjudication under Articles 85(l)/86 EEC is a phenomenon which
. . 142 persists
A respected American commentator in the field once observed:
"Lack of confidence may sometimes be nearly as serious as lack 
of fairness. Some portions of the community undeniably seem 
unwilling to place faith in a system in which the same men 
both accuse and judge, especially within the biases Ç§3the 
adjudicators are opposed to the biases of the objectors"
The unwillingness - however cynical it may be - of the European 
business community to place faith in the Commission system for 
adjudicating infringement decisions, is reflected most vividly, 
perhaps, in the many attempts by applicant undertakings to 
challenge the constitutionality of that system before the Court of 
Justice.
The Reaction of the Court of Justice to Structural 
Inappropriateness in Commission Adjudication
"The Commission has no judicial function? 
however inconsistent it must be, the procedure 
provided for by Regulation No. 17 is at all 1423
142. For a more recent statement of discontent see Van Bael & 
Beilis, "Competition Law of the EEC" (1987) CCH Editions, 
page 18.
143. K.C. Davis, "Separation of Powers in Administrative 
Agencies" 61 Harvard Law Review (1948) 612, 646.
a
82
times administrative" 144
The Court's Reaction (I) - Fundamental Rights
The Court of Justice is a highly politicised body, which, as one
of the, "chief architects of the constitutional order of the
145European Community" , is more conscious than most courts of the
political consequences of its decisions. The Court has issued
major judgments which are clearly intrusions into the political
sphere, sometimes rivalling or even surpassing the efforts of the
other explicitly political institutions of the Community in
146promoting the achievement of the common market . These should
be seen as examples of the lengths to which, "the pro-Community 
147policymaking" , of the Court can take it. In short, the Court 
of Justice, from early on, deliberately set itself up as an 
activist tribunal acting as some sort of motor of integration 
whose, "case law puts into effect bold conceptions which the 
architects of the Community have made the foundation of their 14567
144. Joined Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113 & 114/73, 'Suiker
Unie v Commission', [1975] ECR 1663, 2067, per Mayras AG
(emphasis added).
145. "On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice", Hjalte 
Rasmussen, 1986 Martinus Nijhoff, p3.
146. Cf. e.g., Case 26/62, 'Van Gend en Loos', [1963] ECR 1; Case 
22/70, 'AERT', [1971] ECR 263; Case 43/75, 'Defrenne', [1976] 
ECR 455; Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, [1979] ECR 649.
147. op. cit., loc. cit., fn 145 supra.
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edifice”148 149.
A major element in this highly instrumentalist jurisprudence is j
I
the so-called fundamental rights doctrine/ whereby certain, basic,
individual freedoms vis a vis the Community Institutions have been I,
accorded constitutional status. Most important has been the |
express incorporation, via the jurisprudence of the Court, of the J
freedoms enounciated in the European Convention on Human Rights of '
. 1 4 91950 into the Community legal order . However, this fundamental ¡j
rights doctrine must be read in the context of the overall Jj
political stance of the Court of Justice. j!
I.
I;
The Community legal order was confronted, in the early 1970's, ,j
with a refusal among some Member States - via their constitutional !:?
courts - to accept the principle of primacy of Community law ;■!
insofar as it implied the primacy of Community legislation over ;]
national constitutional guarantees of basic human rights. This |
reluctance was, it is submitted, a justifiable response to the j;
absence, in the Treaties, of a code of human rights circumscribing j:
the freedom of action of Community Institutions. f
I
i
Faced with such a clearly principled stance which, nevertheless, ]
¡i
threatened the autonomy of the supra-national legal order, the j1
analogous to that of the nascent îj
at the end of the Eighteenth Century. ! 1489
148. Pierre Pescatore, "The Law of Integration” (1974), page 90. 
See also Pescatore's candid reference to the Court's, 
"certaine idee de l'Europe", in "The Doctrine of Direct 
Effect: An Infant Disease of Community Law", 8 ELRev (1984), 
page 157.
149. Case 4/73, Nold v Commission, [1974] ECR 491.
Community was in a position 
United States of America
1
J
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However, unlike the latter case, the Constitutional text of the 
EC's was not formally amended to include a 'Bill of Rights'? 
instead the Court of Justice, taking up the challenge of inertia 
among the ’political1 organs (national and supra-national) of the 
Community, read the presence of just such guarantees into the 
existing text. To quote Rasmussen,
"it [the Court] aimed at undermining (if possible) the 
justifications for the mounting criticism of the
unavailability of an adequate Community protection [of human 
rights] without forcing the Community’s political processes 
into a constitutional straightjacket” 5 .
In this way, responsibility for the effective, constitutional
protection of individual interests vis à vis the Community’s
legislative and executive institutions has been shouldered by the
Court in order that constitutional clashes regarding such
interests between national and supra-national legal orders be
eliminated and the wheels of integration be lubricated: and this
effort has been most successful. The judicial creation of a code
of basic rights vis a vis the Community Institutions, roughly
analogous to those enjoyed under national constitutions vis a vis
national institutions, has eventually encouraged the unequivocal
acceptance by national constitutional courts of the primacy of the
151Community legislation over their own constitutional guarantees 150
150. op. cit. supra at fn 145, page 405.
151. In the case of the Federal Republic, the jurisprudence of 
the federal constitutional court, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht, traces this inter-tribunal process 
of 'winning over' in the most exceptionally candid terms: see 
especially, Case 2 BvL 52/71, "Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH", [1974] 2 CMLR 540, para. 35 of
judgment; Case 2 BvL 6/77, "FA Steinike und Weinlig", [1980] 
2 CMLR 531, para. 12 of judgment; Case 2 BvR 197/83, 
"Wüunsche Handelsgesellschaft", [1986] 3 CMLR 225, paras, 35, 
44, 45 and 48 of judgment.
T<
An important corollary of the Court's deliberate development of an 
"integration-friendly" fundamental rights doctrine is, it is 
submitted, the Court's evident refusal to go beyond what is 
broadly necessary to ensure the 'effet utile' of Community law at 
national level and, thereby, to interpret those fundamental rights 
so to speak "gratuitously" against the Community Institutions. In 
this context 'gratuitous' interpretation means interpreting human 
rights in a way which would hinder Community organs in their 
integrative work, or force them into a "constitutional 
straightjacket” in the absence of national constitutional pressure 
so to do. The practical import of this corollary is particularly 
significant with regard to the Court's decisions on the 
constitutionality of the allocation of adjudicative power to the 
Commission under Articles 85(l)/86 EEC.
The Court's Reaction (II) - Article 6(1) ECHR and its
Interpretation by the Court 
of Human Rights
Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides 
that:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or 
of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to 
a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law".
The European Court of Human Rights has developed a substantial 
jurisprudence on Article 6(1) of the Convention. We shall deal 
here with some of the most important dicta.
The Court of Human Rights has 
notion of the term 'tribunal' in 
Court enquires whether it is
developed a two-stage substantive 
Article 6(1). Firstly, the 
possible to describe the legal
T "
i
i
i
¡
i
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situation in issue as one implying a 'right to a tribunal’. This
enquiry involves looking at the function performed by the 
governmental agency with respect to the specific individual 
interests at stake . With regard to this functional element of 
the first stage, the Court has ruled that,
M[flor the purposes of Article 6 ... [an agency] comes within 
the concept of a 'tribunal' within the substantive sense of 
this expression ... [if] its function is to determine matters 
within its competence on the basis of rules of,, law, following 
proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner"
In other words, the protections supplied by Article 6 of the 
Convention can be invoked not only against the procedures and 
personnel of a court of law ('tribunal' in the formal sense), but 
also against those of any body, such as the EC Commission, which 
purports to exercise an adjudicatory function ['tribunal' in the 
substantive sense) whether formally independent of the executive 
or not. Furthermore the Court has emphasised that a body can be 
a tribunal within the substantive sense of the term in respect of 
any one of a variety of functions which it performs. In a recent 
case the Court ruled: 1523
152. It will be understood that the sort of function performed 
and the type of indvidual interests at stake are 
interdependent concepts. It is only when the application of 
rules of law can, as we have seen before, be articulated in 
terms of claims of right or accusations of fault (by being 
drafted in sufficiently 'closed* terms) that adjudication is 
implied. The Court of Human Rights deduced adjudicative 
function from type of interest at issue in this way in its 
judgment of 10 February 1983, 'Albert and Le Compte v 
Belgium’, Series A, Vol. 58, para. 29.
153. 'Sramek v Austria', judgment of 22 October 1984, Series A, 
Vol. 48, para. 35.
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"The [agency in question] performs many functions 
administrative, regulatory, adjudicative, advisory and 
disciplinary... This kind of plurality of powers cannot in 
itself preclude an institution from being a 'tribunal' in 
respect of some of them" s .
Once the 'right to a tribunal' has been found using this 
"descriptive" functional analysis, the second "prescriptive" stage 
of enquiry can begin. This stage involves assessing whether 
agency in question satisfies the other substantive elements of the 
term "tribunal" under Article 6(1). The Court of Human Rights 
has held that this second level definition of "tribunal",
"denotes bodies which exhibit not only common fundamental 
features, of which the most important is independence of the 
executive and of the parties tp-the case ..., but also the 
guarantees of judicial procedure"
This second level definition of "tribunal" relates, therefore, to 
the independence, impartiality and procedural propriety of the 
agency to which the first level definition of "tribunal" applies. 
It is important to note that the Court of Human Rights approaches 
this second level definition from the same substantive perspective 
as before. It has ruled, for example, that enquiry into
independence/impartiality means that the Court will have regard to 
the manner of appointment of the agency's members, the duration of 
their term of office and the existence of guarantees against 
outside pressures and the question of whether the body presents an 
appearance of independence. In this respect, "questions of 154
154. 'H v Belgium', Judgment of 30 November 1987, Series A, Vol. 
127, para. 50.
155. 'De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp', Judgment of 18 June 1971, 
Series A, Vol. 12, para. 78.
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internal organisation"^** (in the sense of intra-agency division
of adjudicatory powers from other powers), or of, "organisational 
157impartiality" are always highly relevant.
The final aspect of the Court of Human Rights' Article 6{1) 
jurisprudence we shall mention here relates to the hierarchical 
location of the "tribunal" identified according to the two-stage 
definition discussed. The Court has held that if an agency 
dealing with issues at first instance falls within the first level 
definition of Article 6(1), then, provided that the hierarchy of 
which it is a part provides a superior agency satisfying both 
levels of that definition, no violation of the Convention will 
occur. As the Court says: "[d]emands of flexibility and
efficiency, which are fully compatible with the protection of 
human rights, may justify the prior intervention of ... bodies 
which do not satisfy the ... requirements [of Article 6(1)] in 
every respect" . "Even where Article 6(1) is applicable", the 
Court stated on another occasion, then the system established must 
conform to one of two models, in which:
"either the jurisdictional organs themselves ['tribunals' 
according to the 'level one' definition] comply with the 
requirements of Article 6(1), or they do not so comply but are 
subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full 
jurisdiction [i.e., jurisdiction which is co-extensive with 
that of the dealing with the case at first instance] and does
156. 'Piersack', Judgment of 1 October 1982, Series A, Vol. 53, 
para. 30 (emphasis added).
157. 'Belios v Switzerland', Judgment of 29 April 1988, Series A, 
Vol. 132, para. 67. 158
158. fLe Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium', Judgment of 
23 June 1981, Series A, Vol. 43, para. 51.
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p r o v i d e  t h e  g u a r a n t e e s  o f  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 ) "
l a  c o n c l u s i o n /  t h e r e f o r e ,  w e  c a n  s a y  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  o f  H u m a n  
R i g h t s  a p p l i e s  a  t w o - l e v e l  s u b s t a n t i v e  d e f i n i t i o n  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  
t h e  t e r m  " t r i b u n a l "  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  C o n v e n t i o n .  T h e  
f i r s t  " d e s c r i p t i v e "  l e v e l  r e n d e r s  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 )  a p p l i c a b l e  i n  v i e w  
o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n  p e r f o r m e d  b y  a  g o v e r n m e n t a l  a g e n c y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
i n d i v i d u a l  i n t e r e s t s .  T h e  s e c o n d  " p r e s c r i p t i v e "  l e v e l  a p p l i e s  
t h e  n o r m a t i v e  s t r u c t u r a l  a n d  p r o c e d u r a l  g u a r a n t e e s  o f  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 )  
t o  t h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  s u c h  a  f u n c t i o n .  W e  h a v e  a l s o  s e e n  t h a t  
t h e  C o u r t  i s  p r e p a r e d  t o  a l l o w  a g e n c i e s  w h i c h  d e c i d e  a t  f i r s t  
I  i n s t a n c e  a n d  w h i c h  f a l l  w i t h i n  t h e  f i r s t  l e v e l  o f  d e f i n i t i o n  t o  
e s c a p e  t h e  d e m a n d s  o f  t h e  s e c o n d  l e v e l  d e f i n i t i o n  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  
t h e  i s s u e s  u p o n  w h i c h  t h e y  a d j u d i c a t e  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  f u l l  r e ­
a d j u d i c a t i o n  b y  a n  s u p e r i o r  a g e n c y  s a t i s f y i n g  t h a t  s e c o n d  l e v e l .
159
T h e  C o u r t ' s  R e a c t i o n  ( I I I )  -  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 )
b y  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e
O n  t w o  o c c a s i o n s  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  h a s  b e e n  a s k e d  t o  r u l e  t h a t ,  
b y  n o t  e x h i b i t i n g  a  t r i a d i c  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  s t r u c t u r e  i n
I  159
1 5 9 .  ' A l b e r t  a n d  L e  C o m p t e  v  B e l g i u m ' ,  c i t .  f n  1 4 7  s u p r a ,  l c c .  
c i t .  ( e m p h a s i s  a d d e d ) .  R e v i e w  t r i b u n a l s  w i t h  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
o v e r  p o i n t s  o f  l a w  a l o n e  p r o v i d e  a n  i n a d e q u a t e  s o l u t i o n  i n  
t h e  C o u r t ' s  o p i n i o n ,  s i n c e ,  " A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 )  d r a w s  n o
d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  q u e s t i o n s  o f  f a c t  a n d  q u e s t i o n s  o f  l a w .  
B o t h  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  q u e s t i o n s  a r e  e q u a l l y  c r u c i a l  f o r  t h e  
o u t c o m e  o f  [ a d j u d i c a t i o n ] " .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  t h e  ' r i g h t  t o  
a  t r i b u n a l ’ g u a r a n t e e d  b y  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 ) ,  " c o v e r s  q u e s t i o n s  o f  
f a c t  j u s t  a s  m u c h  a s  q u e s t i o n s  o f  l a w " ,  ' L e  C o m p t e ,  V a n
L e u v e n  e t c . ' ,  c i t .  i m m e d i a t e l y  a b o v e ,  l o c .  c i t .  ( e m p h a s i s  
a d d e d ) .
I
a d j u d i c a t i n g  c a s e s  u n d e r  A r t i c l e s  8 5 ( l ) / 8 6  E E C ,  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  
v i o l a t e s  t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  r i g h t  t o  a  f a i r  t r i a l  g u a r a n t e e d  b y
A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 )  a n d ,  a c c o r d i n g l y ,  b y  C o m m u n i t y  L a w .  O n  b o t h
o c c a s i o n s  t h e  C o u r t  h a s  f l a t l y  r e j e c t e d  s u c h  c l a i m s 1 6 ® .  I t  i s  
s u b m i t t e d  t h a t ,  i n  s o  f a r  a s  i t  p u r p o r t s  t o  r u l e  o n  t h e
a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  C o n v e n t i o n ,  t h e  r e a s o n i n g  i n  
t h e s e  c a s e s  i s  s e r i o u s l y  f l a w e d .
I n  t h e  ' F E D E T A B '  c a s e 1 **1 ,  t h e  a p p l i c a n t  u n d e r t a k i n g s  a r g u e d  t h a t
A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 )  w a s  a p p l i c a b l e  i n  C o m m i s s i o n  a d j u d i c a t i o n  u s i n g  t h e
f a m i l i a r  f u n c t i o n a l i s t  s t a n d - p o i n t  e m p l o y e d  b y  t h e  C o u r t  o f  H u m a n
R i g h t s  ( t h e  f i r s t  l e v e l  ' d e s c r i p t i v e *  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  " t r i b u n a l ” ) ,
a c c u r a t e l y  c i t i n g  t h a t  C o u r t ' s  ' K ö n i g '  d e c i s i o n 160 6 2  i n  s u p p o r t 1 6 3  164.
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  a r g u e d  t h a t ,  s i n c e  t h e
" e x e c u t i v e  p o w e r  o f  t h e  C o m m u n i t y  i s  i n  f a c t  v e s t e d  i n  i t ,  i t  i s
a t  l e a s t  d o u b t f u l  w h e t h e r ,  n o t  b e i n g  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  t h a t  p o w e r  [ i n
t h e  s e n s e  o f  e x h i b i t i n g  i n t e r n a l  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r s ] ,  i t  c a n
1 6 4
c o n s t i t u t e  a  t r i b u n a l  w i t h i n  t h e  [ m e a n i n g  o f  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 ) ] "
I n  s u p p o r t  o f  t h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n ,  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  c l a i m e d  s u p p o r t
1 6 0 .  J o i n e d  C a s e s  2 0 9  t o  2 1 5  a n d  2 1 8 / 7 8 ,  V a n  L a n d e w y c k  v
C o m m i s s i o n ,  [ 1 9 8 0 ]  E C R  3 1 2 5 ,  3 2 4 8 ,  p a r a .  8 1  o f  j u d g m e n t ?
J o i n e d  C a s e s  1 0 0  t o  1 0 3 / 8 0 ,  M u s i q u e  D i f f u s i o n  F r a n ç a i s e  v  
C o m m i s s i o n  [ 1 9 8 3 ]  E C R  1 8 2 5 ,  1 8 8 0 ,  p a r a .  7  o f  j u d g m e n t .
1 6 1 .  J o i n e d  C a s e s  2 0 9  t o  2 1 5  a n d  2 1 8 / 7 8 ,  ' V a n  L a n d w y c k  v  
C o m m i s s i o n ' ,  c i t e d  i m m e d i a t e l y  a b o v e .
1 6 2 .  J u d g m e n t  o f  3 1  M a y  1 9 7 8 ,  S e r i e s  A ,  V o l .  2 7 ,  p a r a .  9 0
163. Cited in 'FEDETAB' cit. fn 160 supra, para. 79 of judgment.
164. ibid, para. 80 of judgment.
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f r o m  t h e  C o u r t  o f  H u m a n  R i g h t s '  ' R i n g e i s e n '  d e c i s i o n  .  T o  t h e  
e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ’ s  a r g u m e n t  p u r p o r t s  t o  d e r i v e  f r o m  t h i s  
d e c i s i o n ,  i t  i s  m a n i f e s t l y  u n t e n a b l e .  I n  t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  c i t e d ,  t h e  C o u r t  o f  H u m a n  R i g h t s  s t a t e d  i n t e r  a l i a ,  " t h a t  
t h e  [ a g e n c y  w h i c h  w a s  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  t h e  c a s e ]  i s  a  ' t r i b u n a l *  
w i t h i n  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  A r t i c l e  6  p a r a g r a p h  1  o f  t h e  C o n v e n t i o n  a s  
i t  i s  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  a n d  a l s o  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s " * ^ .  
T h e  C o m m i s s i o n  i n t e r p r e t e d  t h i s  d i c t u m  t o  m e a n  t h a t  o n l y  b o d i e s  
w h i c h  p r o v i d e  t h e  g u a r a n t e e s  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e  e t c  d e m a n d e d  b y  
A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 )  c a n  l e g i t i m a t e l y  c o n s t i t u t e  t r i b u n a l s  w i t h i n  t h e  
m e a n i n g  o f  t h a t  A r t i c l e .  T h e  c o r o l l o r y  o f  t h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n ;  i . e ,  
t h a t ,  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  i t s  f u n c t i o n ,  a n  a g e n c y ' s  l a c k  o f  i n d e p e n d e n c e  
m e a n s  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  r e q u i r e d  t o  b e  i n d e p e n d e n t ;  e f f e c t i v e l y  
a b r o g a t e s  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 ) .  I t s  s c o p e  w o u l d  b e  l i m i t e d  m e r e l y  t o  
e n s u r i n g  t h a t  b o d i e s  w h i c h  a r e  f o r m a l l y  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  t h e  
e x e c u t i v e  p o w e r ,  e . g .  C o u r t s ,  m a i n t a i n  t h e i r  i n d e p e n d e n c e .
T h e  ' R i n g e i s e n '  d e c i s i o n  d o e s  n o t ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  s u p p o r t  s u c h  a  
p r o p o s i t i o n .  T h e  d i c t u m  c i t e d  b y  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  w a s  d e l i v e r e d  i n  
t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  s e c o n d  l e v e l  " p r e s c r i p t i v e "  a n a l y s i s  w e  
d i s c u s s e d  a b o v e ;  i n  t h e  p a r a g r a p h  w h i c h  i m m e d i a t e l y  p r e c e d e d  i t ,  
t h e  C o u r t  o f  H u m a n  R i g h t s  h a d  a l r e a d y  u n d e r t a k e n  t h e  f i r s t  l e v e l  
" d e s c r i p t i v e "  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  a g e n c y  i n  i s s u e  a n d  h a d  h e l d  t h a t ,  
d u e  t o  i t s  a d j u d i c a t i v e  f u n c t i o n ,  i t  w a s  a  ' t r i b u n a l '  w i t h i n  t h e  
m e a n i n g  o f  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 ) ,  w h i c h  w a s  r e q u i r e d  t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  165
165
1 6 5 .  J u d g m e n t  o f  1 6  J u l y  1 9 7 1 ,  S e r i e s  A ,  V o l .  1 3 ,  p a r a .  9 5  
( w r o n g l y  c i t e d  i n  t h e  ' F E D E T A B '  j u d g m e n t ,  c i t .  i m m e d i a t e l y  
a b o v e ,  l o c .  c i t . ,  a s  p a r a .  9 4 ) .
1 6 6 .  i b i d .
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g u a r a n t e e s  l i s t e d  b y  t h a t  A r t i c l e  .  I n  ' R i n g e i s e n ' ,  i f  t h e  
a g e n c y  i n  q u e s t i o n  h a d  b e e n  f o u n d  n o t  t o  b e  i n d e p e n d e n t ,  t h e n  
A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 )  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  v i o l a t e d  -  i t  w o u l d  n o t  h a v e  b e e n  
h e l d  i n a p p l i c a b l e .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  i n
' F E D E T A B *  p r o c e e d e d  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  a r g u m e n t  a n d  r u l e d  
t h a t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  c o u l d  n o t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a  t r i b u n a l  w i t h i n  t h e  
m e a n i n g  o f  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 ) 167 6 8 .
W e  h a v e ,  i n  ' F E D E T A B ' ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a  d e c i s i o n  w h i c h  p r e v e n t s  t h e  
e n f o r c e m e n t  o f  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h t  b y  s i m p l y  c o n f u s i n g  f o r m  a n d  
s u b s t a n c e .  I t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  t h i s  c o n f u s i o n ,  f a r  f r o m
d e r i v i n g  f r o m  t h e  C o u r t ' s  l i m i t e d  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  w a s  c r e a t e d  
p r e c i s e l y  b e c a u s e  i t s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s  
o f  s e p a r a t i n g  d e s c r i p t i o n  a n d  p r e s c r i p t i o n  w a s  t o o  f u l l .
T h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  h a s  a l w a y s  b e e n  a w a r e  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  
b e t w e e n  t h e  s u b s t a n t i v e  a n d  t h e  f o r m a l  c o n c e p t  o f  a  ' t r i b u n a l ' .  
I n d e e d ,  i n  i t s  d e c i s i o n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  A r t i c l e  1 7 7  E E C  i t  h a s  
d e v e l o p e d  a  f u n c t i o n a l i s t  j u r i s p r u d e n c e  v e r y  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  o f  
t h e  C o u r t  o f  H u m a n  R i g h t s  q u o t e d  a b o v e .
I n  d e f i n i n g  t h e  t e r m  " t r i b u n a l "  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  d e t e r m i n i n g  
f r o m  w h i c h  n a t i o n a l  b o d i e s  p r e l i m i n a r y  r u l i n g s  o n  t h e
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  C o m m u n i t y  L a w  a r e  a d m i s s i b l e  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  1 7 7  
E E C ,  t h e  C o u r t  h a s  s t a t e d  t h a t  a n y  b o d y  w h i c h ,  f o r  e x a m p l e :
" o p e r a t e s  w i t h  t h e  c o n s e n t  o f  t h e  p u b l i c  a u t h o r i t i e s  a n d  w i t h  
t h e i r  c o o p e r a t i o n  a n d  w h i c h ,  a f t e r  a n  a d v e r s a r i a l  p r o c e d u r e ,  
d e l i v e r s  d e c i s i o n s  w h i c h  a r e  i n  f a c t  r e c o g n i z e d  a s  f i n a l ,  167
167
1 6 7 .  i b i d .
168. case cit. at fn 160 supra, para. 81 of judgment.
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m u s t ,  i n  a  m a t t e r  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  C o m m u n i t y  l a w ,  
b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  a  c o u r t  o r ^ t r i b u n a l  o f  a  M e m b e r  S t a t e  w i t h i n  
t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  A r t i c l e  1 7 7 "  ;
o r ,  a s  t h e  A d v o c a t e  G e n e r a l  i n  t h e  c a s e  s a i d :
" [ a n y  p e r m a n e n t  b o d y ]  e n d o w e d  w i t h  p o w e r s  o f  a  p u b l i c  n a t u r e  
w h i c h  a d j u d i c a t e s  u p o n  d i s p u t e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  l e g a l  r u l e s  
a f t e r  a  p r o p e r  p r o c e d u r e  i n  w h i c h  J t j g  p a r t i e s  a r e  g i v e n  a  
h e a r i n g  [ c o n s t i t u t e s  s u c h  a  t r i b u n a l ] "  .
T h i s  f u n c t i o n a l i s t  o r  s u b s t a n t i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  t e r m
' t r i b u n a l *  i n  A r t i c l e  1 7 7  i s  j u s t i f i e d  b y  t h e  C o u r t  o n  t h e  g r o u n d s
$  t h a t  i f  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  a  n a t i o n a l  b o d y  w h i c h  o p e r a t e s  i n  t h e
w a y  t h e  C o u r t  d e s c r i b e d ,  " m a y  a f f e c t  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  r i g h t s
g r a n t e d  b y  C o m m u n i t y  l a w ,  i t  i s  i m p e r a t i v e  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  s h o u l d
h a v e  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  o f  r u l i n g  o n  i s s u e s  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  a n d
1 7 1v a l i d i t y  a r i s i n g  o u t  o f  s u c h  p r o c e e d i n g s "  .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  t h e  
p u r p o s e  o f  A r t i c l e  1 7 7  i n  p r o m o t i n g  u n i f o r m  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  a n d  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  r u l e s  o f  C o m m u n i t y  l a w  w o u l d  b e  f r u s t r a t e d  i f  
' t r i b u n a l *  w e r e  i n t e r p r e t e d  f o r m a l i s t i c a l l y .
A d v o c a t e  G e n e r a l  R e i s c h l  p u t  t h i n g s  e v e n  m o r e  c a n d i d l y  t h a n  t h e  
C o u r t  i n  t h e  s a m e  c a s e  w h e r e  h e  p o i n t e d  o u t :
" I f  . . .  t h e  t e r m  i n  q u e s t i o n  w e r e  t o  b e  c o n s t r u e d  a s  a  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  [ f o r m a l ]  n a t i o n a l  l a w ,  M e m b e r  S t a t e s  w o u l d  h a v e  
i t  i n  t h e i r  p o w e r  t o  t a k e  a w a y  f r o m  c e r t a i n  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  
b o d i e s  w h i c h  h a v e  t o  a p p l y  C o m m u n i t y  l a w  t h e  r i g h t ,  a n d  i n  
s o m e  c a s e s ,  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  r e q u e s t  a  p r e l i m i n a r y  r u l i n g  . . .  16970
1 6 9 .  C a s e  2 4 6 / 8 0 ,  B r o e c k m e u l e n  v  H u i s a r t s  R e g i s t r a t i e  C o m m i s s i e ,  
[ 1 9 8 1 ]  E C R  2 3 1 1 ,  2 3 2 8 ,  p a r a .  1 7 .
1 7 0 .  i b i d ,  p e r  A d v o c a t e  G e n e r a l  R e i s c h l  a t  p  2 3 8 8 .
171. ibid., p. 2328, para. 16.
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T h i s  w o u l d  l e a d  t o  t h e  f r a g m e n t a t i o n  o f  C o m m u n i t y  l a w ,  w h i c h  
i s  p r e c i s e l y  w h a t  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  1 7 7  i s  d e s i g n e d  
t o  a v o i d ”  7  .
B y  t h e  s a m e  t o k e n  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  b y  t h e  C o u r t  o f  H u m a n  R i g h t s  o f  
t h e  t e r m  ' t r i b u n a l *  i n  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  C o n v e n t i o n  o n  H u m a n  
R i g h t s  a s  a  r e f e r e n c e  o n l y  t o  f o r m a l l y  c o n s t i t u t e d  c o u r t s  w o u l d  
l e a d  t o  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  s a m e  r e s u l t  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  u n i f o r m  a n d  
e f f e c t i v e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h a t  A r t i c l e  i n  t h e  C o n t r a c t i n g  S t a t e s .  
A  r e s u l t  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  C o n v e n t i o n .
^  W h y ,  t h e n ,  d o e s  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  a d o p t  s u c h  d i f f e r e n t  
i n t e r p r e t a t o r y  t e c h n i q u e s  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  s a m e  t e r m ?  T h e  
a n s w e r  i s  c l e a r  a n d  r e l a t e s  a g a i n  t o  t h e  p o l i t i c a l l y  ' p r o -  
i n t e g r a t i v e '  s t a n c e  o f  t h e  C o u r t .  T o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  
o f  J u s t i c e  p r o c e e d e d  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  a r g u m e n t  i n  
' F E D E T A B ' ,  w h i l e  p u r p o r t i n g  t o  a p p l y  t h e  j u r i s p r u d e n c e  o f  t h e  
C o u r t  o f  H u m a n  R i g h t s  o n  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 ) ,  i t s  d e c i s i o n  w a s  
i n t e l l e c t u a l l y  u n s o u n d .  H o w e v e r ,  i f  w e  r e c a l l  w h a t  w e  h a v e  s a i d  
a b o u t  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e ' s  f u n d a m e n t a l  r i g h t s  d o c t r i n e  a n d ,  
s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  a b o u t  i t s  c o r o l l a r y  ,  t h e n  a t  l e a s t  t h e  m o t i v e  f o r  
i t s  d e c i s i o n  b e c o m e s  c l e a r .  I f  t h e  C o u r t  h a d  h e l d  t h a t  t h e
C o m m i s s i o n ’ s  l a c k  o f  i n t e r n a l  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  p o w e r s ,  o r  l a c k  o f  a  
t r i a d i c  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  s t r u c t u r e  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  a d j u d i c a t i o n  
o f  i n f r i n g e m e n t  c a s e s  v i o l a t e d  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  C o n v e n t i o n ,  t h e  
w h o l e  c o m p e t i t i o n  h i e r a r c h y  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  d i s a b l e d  u n t i l  t h e  1723
1 7 2 .  i b i d .  p .  2 3 6 6 .
1 7 3 .  S e e  t e x t  a c c o m p a n y i n g  f n  1 4 5  t o  1 5 1  s u p r a .
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f a u l t  c o u l d  b e  r e c t i f i e d  .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i n  v i e w  o f  t h e  C o u r t  o f  
J u s t i c e ' s  w h o l e - h e a r t e d  c o m m i t m e n t  t o  f a c i l i t a t i n g  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n ' s  i n t e g r a t i v e  w o r k ,  i t s  ' F E D E T A B '  d e c i s i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  
i n t e l l e c t u a l l y  u n s o u n d ,  i s  p o l i t i c a l l y  c o n s i s t e n t .
174
R e a c t i o n  o f  t h e  C o u r t  ( I V )  -  D e l e g a t i o n  o f  P o w e r s
T h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  h a s  n e v e r  r e c o g n i s e d  t h a t  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  
A r t i c l e s  8 5 ( 1 ) / 8 6  E E C  i s  a n  a d j u d i c a t o r y  f u n c t i o n  ,  n o r ,  
c o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h a t  i t s  d i s c h a r g e  r e q u i r e s  a  t r i a d i c  d e c i s i o n a l  
o r g a n i s a t i o n ;  h o w e v e r ,  i n  i t s  r e a c t i o n  t o  d e l e g a t i o n  o f  
p r o s e c u t o r i a l  C o m m i s s i o n  p o w e r s  u n d e r  t h e  c o m p e t i t i o n  r e g i m e  i t  
h a s  c e r t a i n l y  n o t  p r e v e n t e d  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  f r o m  c r e a t i n g  s u c h  a  
s t r u c t u r e .  1745
1 7 4 .  T o  h a v e  r u l e d  t h a t ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  c o n s t i t u t e d  a  
t r i b u n a l  w i t h i n  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 )  w i t h o u t  
s a t i s f y i n g  i t s  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  i t ,  a s  a  a p p e l l a t e  t r i b u n a l ,  
c o u l d  l e g i t i m a t e l y  c o m p e n s a t e  f o r  t h i s  f a i l i n g  a t  t h e  r e v i e w  
s t a g e ,  w a s  n o t  a n  o p t i o n  o p e n  t o  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e .  W e  
. h a v e  s e e n  a b o v e  [ S e e  f n  1 5 9  s u p r a  a n d  a c c o m p a n y i n g  t e x t l  
t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  o f  H u m a n  R i g h t s  d e m a n d s  r e - a d j u d i c a t i o n  o n  
t h e  f a c t s  a s  a n  e s s e n t i a l  f a c t o r  i n  f u l f i l l i n g  t h e  
r e q u i r m e n t s  o f  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 )  a t  t h e  r e v i e w  s t a g e ?  h o w e v e r ,  a s  
w e  s h a l l  s e e  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n ,  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  
i s  n o t  i n  a  p o s i t i o n  t o  o f f e r  f u l l  r e - a d j u d i c a t i o n  o f  
i n f r i n g m e n t  c a s e s  o n  t h e  f a c t s  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  l a w .
1 7 5 .  " A s  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  b e f o r e  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  i s  t o  
a p p l y  A r t i c l e  8 5  o f  t h e  T r e a t y ,  e v e n  w h e r e  i t  m a y  l e a d  t o  
t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  f i n e s ,  i t  i s  a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o c e d u r e " ,  
C a s e  4 4 / 6 9 ,  ' B u c h l e r  v  C o m m i s s i o n ' ,  [ 1 9 7 0 ]  E C R  7 3 3 ,  p a r a  2 0  
o f  j u d g m e n t .  S e e  a l s o ,  J o i n e d  C a s e s  5 6  & 5 8 / 6 4 ,  ' C o n s t e n  & 
G r u n d i g  v  C o m m i s s i o n ' ,  [ 1 9 6 6 ]  E C R  2 9 9 ,  3 3 8 .
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I n  1 9 8 6 ,  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  d e l i v e r e d  i t s  m o s t  r e c e n t  r u l i n g  o n  
t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l i m i t s  o f  d e l e g a t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  i n  a  
c a s e  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  p r o p r i e t y  o f  t h e  d e l e g a t i o n ,  t o  t h e  
C o m p e t i t i o n  C o m m i s s i o n e r ,  o f  t h e  p o w e r  t o  i s s u e  d e c i s i o n s  u n d e r  
A r t i c l e  1 4 ( 3 )  o f  R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2 .  I n  t h e  ' A K Z O '  d e c i s i o n ’1’ ^ * ' ,  
t h e  C o u r t  d e l i v e r e d  a  c l e a r  s t a t e m e n t  o n  t h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  t h e  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  c o l l e g i a l i t y  c o n t a i n e d  i n  A r t i c l e  1 7  o f  t h e  M e r g e r  
T r e a t y  h a d  t o  b o w  t o  a  p r i n c i p l e  o f  e f f i c a c y  w h i c h  i t  i n f e r r e d  
f r o m  A r t i c l e  1 6  o f  t h e  M e r g e r  T r e a t y *  .  T h e  C o u r t  i n t e r p r e t e d  
A r t i c l e  1 6  a s  a r t i c u l a t i n g  t h e ,  " n e e d  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  t h e  d e c i s i o n ­
m a k i n g  b o d y  i s  a b l e  t o  f u n c t i o n  [ w h i c h ]  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  a  p r i n c i p l e
1 7 8i n h e r e n t  i n  a l l  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s y s t e m s "  .  T h u s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e
c o n t a i n e d  i n  A r t i c l e  1 6  w a s  h e l d  t o  s a n c t i o n ,  " m e a s u r e s  a d o p t e d  b y
t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  i n  o r d e r  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  r u l e  r e q u i r i n g  c o l l e c t i v e
d e l i b e r a t i o n  f r o m  h a v i n g  a  p a r a l y s i n g  e f f e c t  o n  t h e  f u l l  
. . 1 7 9C o m m i s s i o n "  .  I n  c o n c e d i n g  t h a t ,  g i v e n  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s
I  1 7 6 .  C a s e  c i t .  s u p r a  a t  f n  1 2 9 ,  a p p l y i n g  c a s e  l a w  l a i d  d o w n  i n ,  
*  e . g . ,  J o i n e d  C a s e s  4 3  & 6 3 / 8 2 ,  ' V B V B  & V B B B  v  C o m m i s s i o n ' ,
, [ 1 9 8 4 ]  E C R  1 9 .  1789
1 7 7 .  A r t i c l e  1 6  o f  t h e  M e r g e r  T r e a t y  r e q u i r e s  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  t o  
a d o p t  i t s  r u l e s  o f  p r o c e d u r e ,  " s o  t h a t  b o t h  i t  a n d  i t s  
d e p a r t m e n t s  o p e r a t e  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  
T r e a t i e s  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  [ C o m m u n i t i e s ]  . . .  a n d  o f  t h i s  
[ i . e . ,  t h e  M e r g e r ]  T r e a t y " .  T h e  e x t e n t  t o  w h i c h  A r t i c l e  1 6  
r e q u i r e d  t h e s e  r u l e s  o f  p r o c e d u r e  t o  c o n f o r m  t o  A r t i c l e  1 7  o f  
t h e  M e r g e r  T r e a t y  w a s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  p o i n t  i n  i s s u e  i n  
' A K Z O ' . 178
1 7 8 .  i b i d . ,  p a r a .  3 7  o f  j u d g m e n t .
179. ibid., para. 31 of judgment.
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1 8 0  1 8 1  e n o r m o u s  w o r k - l o a d  ,  a  " d i v i s i o n  o f  l a b o u r  i s  u n a v o i d a b l e " “ ’
h o w  d i d  t h e  C o u r t  p r o c e e d  i n  ' A K Z O '  t o  f o r m u l a t e  a  p r i n c i p l e  b y
w h i c h  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  o f  s u c h  a  d i v i s i o n  o f  l a b o u r  c o u l d  b e
g a u g e d ?
T h e  C o u r t  r u l e d  i m p l i e d l y  t h a t  d e l e g a t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n
h i e r a r c h y  w o u l d  b e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i d e d  t h e y ,  " w e r e  l i m i t e d  t o
s p e c i f i c  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  m e a s u r e s  o f  m a n a g e m e n t  o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
182. . .  t h u s  e x c l u d i n g  b y  d e f i n i t i o n  d e c i s i o n s  o f  p r i n c i p l e "  .  T h e  
C o u r t  m a d e  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  " m e a s u r e s  o f
m a n a g e m e n t  o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n "  a n d  " d e c i s i o n s  o f  p r i n c i p l e "  i s  n o t  
t h e  s a m e  a s  t h a t  b e t w e e n  r u l e - a p p l y i n g  a n d  p o l i c y  a p p l y i n g  p o w e r .  
I n s t e a d  t h e  d e c i s i o n  e s t a b l i s h e s  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  c o m p e t i t i o n  s p h e r e ,  
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a  C o m m i s s i o n  d e c i s i o n  r e q u e s t i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n ,
i n i t i a t i n g  i n f r i n g e m e n t  p r o c e e d i n g s  o r  o r d e r i n g  t h e  s u b m i s s i o n  o f  
u n d e r t a k i n g s  t o  a n  i n s p e c t i o n  q u a l i f i e s  a s ,  " a  f o r m  o f  p r e l i m i n a r y  
i n q u i r y  [ i n  t h e  F r e n c h  t e x t ,  " e n  t a n t  q u e  m e s u r e  d ' i n s t r u c t i o n " 1
a n d ,  a s  s u c h ,  m u s t  b e  r e g a r d e d  a s  a  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  m e a s u r e  o f
1 8 3m a n a g e m e n t "  .  I t  w o u l d  a p p e a r ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  u n d e r  t h e
' A K Z O *  r u l e  o n l y  d e c i s i o n s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  o f
p r o c e e d i n g s ,  e . g ,  f i n d i n g  i n f r i n g m e n t s  o f  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 1 )  E E C ,  o r  
a p p l y i n g  A r t i c l e  8 5 ( 3 )  E E C  w o u l d  q u a l i f y  a s  n o n - d e l e g a b l e  
" d e c i s i o n s  o f  p r i n c i p l e " .  T h e  t a k i n g  o f  d e f i n i t i v e  d e c i s i o n s  18023
1 8 0 .  A n  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r k  b u r d e n  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  i n  t e r m s  
o f  i n d i v i d u a l  d e c i s i o n s  c a n  b e  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  t h e  f i g u r e s  
c i t e d  b y  L e n z  A G  i n  h i s  o p i n o n ,  i b i d . ,  7 2 3 .
1 8 1 .  O p i n i o n  o f  G a n d  A G  i n  C a s e  4 1 / 5 9 ,  ' A C F  C h e m i e f a r m a ’ ,  [ 1 9 7 0 ]
E C R  6 6 1 ,  7 1 1 .
1 8 2 .  ' A K Z O ' ,  o p .  c i t .  s u p r a  f n  1 3 4 ,  p a r a .  3 7  o f  j u d g m e n t .
1 8 3 .  i b i d . ,  p a r a .  3 8  o f  j u d g m e n t  ( e m p h a s i s  a d d e d ) .
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w h i c h  d i s p o s e  o f  s u b s t a n t i v e  i s s u e s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  b o u n d  t o  r e m a i n  w i t h i n  t h e  e x c l u s i v e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
o f  t h e  c o l l e g e  o f  C o m m i s s i o n e r s .
T h e  o t h e r  d e l e g a t e d  p o w e r  e x e r c i s e d  o n  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  b e h a l f  
u n d e r  R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2 ,  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  o r a l  h e a r i n g s ,  w a s
e x p r e s s l y  a p p r o v e d  b y  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  i n  t h e  ' B u c h l e r '  c a s e  
o f  1 9 7 0 .  I n  i t s  j u d g m e n t ,  t h e  C o u r t  s t a t e d :
" t h e r e  i s  n o t h i n g  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  M e m b e r s  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  w h o  
a r e  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t a k i n g  a  d e c i s i o n  i m p o s i n g  f i n e s  f r o m
^  b e i n g  i n f o r m e d  o f  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  t h e  h e a r i n g  b y  s u c h  p e r s o n s
* a s  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  h a s  a p p o i n t e d  t o  c o n d u c t  i t  i n  a c c o r d a n c e
w i t h  A r t i c l e  9 ( 1 )  o f  R e g u l a t i o n  9 9 / 6 3 " " L
T h i s  d e c i s i o n  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  e n t i r e l y  i n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  ' A K Z O *  
f o r m u l a ,  i n  t h a t  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  o r a l  h e a r i n g s  a r e  s i m p l y  o n e  m o r e ,  
" m e s u r e  d ' i n s t r u c t i o n " ,  o r  f o r m  o f  p r e l i m i n a r y  i n q u i r y  w h i c h  m a y  
b e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  d e l e g a t e d  o u t s i d e  t h e  c o l l e g e .
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  a l l o w i n g  t h e  D i r e c t o r  G e n e r a l  o f  D G  
I V  t o  s i g n  c e r t a i n  d o c u m e n t s  o n  b e h a l f  o f  t h e  C o m p e t i t i o n  
C o m m i s s i o n e r ,  t h e  C o u r t  h a s  t a k e n  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  t h i s  i s
p e r m i s s i b l e  p r o v i d e d  i t  d o e s  n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  a n  a t t e m p t ,  b y  t h a t
C o m m i s s i o n e r ,  t o  s u b - d e l e g a t e .  T h e  C o u r t  h a s  s a i d  t h a t  p r o v i d e d  
J  t h e  D i r e c t o r  G e n e r a l ' s  s i g n a t u r e  h a s ,  i n  e a c h  c a s e ,  b e e n  
p e r s o n a l l y  a p p r o v e d  b y  t h e  C o m p e t i t i o n  C o m m i s s i o n e r  i n  a d v a n c e  
t h e n  i t  c o n s t i t u t e s  a  p e r m i s s i b l e ,  " d e l e g a t i o n  o f  s i g n a t u r e "  a s  184
1 8 4 .  C a s e  4 4 / 6 9 ,  ' B u c h l e r  v  C o m m i s s i o n ’ ,  ( 1 9 7 0 ]  E C R  ,  p a r a  2 0  
o f  j u d g m e n t .
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1 8 5
o p p o s e d  t o  a n  i m p e r m i s s i b l e  s u b - d e l e g a t i o n  o f  p o w e r  .  T h e
C o m m i s s i o n ,  f o r  i t s  p a r t ,  m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  s u c h  a  p r o v i s o  i s  p a r t  o f
1 8 6s e t t l e d  p r a c t i c e  a n d ,  o n  o c c a s i o n s  w h e r e  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  s u c h
p e r s o n a l  a p p r o v a l  h a s  b e e n  q u e s t i o n e d  b y  a n  u n d e r t a k i n g  b e f o r e  t h e
C o u r t ,  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  w i l l  o f f e r  ( a n d  h a s ,  i n  a t  l e a s t  o n e  
1 8 7i n s t a n c e  ,  p r o v i d e d )  d o c u m e n t a r y  p r o o f  t h a t  t h i s  c o n s e n t  w a s  
o b t a i n e d .
W e  c a n  s e e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t ,  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  
s a n c t i o n s  a  d i v i s i o n  o f  l a b o u r  b e t w e e n  t h e  c o l l e g e  o f
C o m m i s s i o n e r s  o n  o n e  h a n d  a n d  t h e  h i g h l y  i n t e g r a t e d  c o m p e t i t i o n  
}  h i e r a r c h y  h e a d e d  b y  t h e  C o m p e t i t i o n  C o m m i s s i o n e r  o n  t h e  o t h e r ,  i t  
p e r m i t s  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a  t r i a d i c  d e c i s i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e .  H o w e v e r ,  
w e  s h a l l  n o w  s e e  t h a t ,  s i n c e  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  i s  n o t  r e a l l y  
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  c r e a t i n g  t h i s  s o r t  o f  s t r u c t u r e ,  s u c h  ' p e r m i s s i o n *  
i s  o f  n o  i m p o r t a n c e .
R e a c t i o n  o f  t h e  C o u r t  ( V )  -  t h e  " W r i t t e n  P r o c e d u r e "
188
I n  t h e  ’ B u c h l e r *  c a s e  ,  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  a p p r o v e d  t h e  u s e  o f
j
1 8 5 .  C a s e  4 8 / 6 9 ,  ’ I C I  v  C o m m i s s i o n ' ,  [ 1 9 7 2 ]  E C R  6 1 9 ,  p a r a  1 2  o f  
j u d g m e n t  ( r e g a r d i n g  s i g n i n g  o f  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  o f  o b j e c t i o n s ) ;  
C a s e  5 / 8 5 ,  ’ A K Z O ' ,  o p .  c i t .  s u p r a  f n  1 2 9  ( r e g a r d i n g  s i g n i n g  
o f  a n  o r d e r  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  1 4 ( 3 )  o f  R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2 ) .  1867
1 8 6 .  O p i n i o n  o f  V e r L o r e n  v a n  T h e m a a t  A G ,  i n  J o i n e d  C a s e s  4 3  & 
6 3 / 8 2 ,  ' D u t c h  B o o k s ’ ,  [ 1 9 8 4 ]  1  C M L R  2 7 ,  7 8 .
1 8 7 .  C a s e  4 8 / 6 9 ,  ' I C I  v  C o m m i s s i o n ' ,  c i t e d  a t  f n  1 8 5  s u p r a .
1 8 8 .  o p .  c i t . ,  s u p r a  f n  1 8 4 .
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t h e  w r i t t e n  p r o c e d u r e  f o r  t h e  f i n a l  a d o p t i o n  o f  d e c i s i o n s  a p p l y i n g  
A r t i c l e s  8 5 ( l ) / 8 6  E E C  .  I n  a  t e r s e l y  w o r d e d  d e c i s i o n ,  t h e  C o u r t  
h e l d  t h a t  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a l l  M e m b e r s  o f  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  h a d
r e c e i v e d ,  "  c o m p l e t e  a n d  d e t a i l e d  i n f o r m a t i o n
t h e  c a s e  a n d  h a d  a c c e s s
g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  t h e
c o l l e g i a t e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  w a s  f u l l y  r e s p e c t e d
w r i t t e n  p r o c e d u r e .
e s s e n t i a l  p o i n t s  o f  
1 8 9
f i l e "  ,  w a s  s u f f i c i e n t
r e g a r d i n g  t h e  
t o  t h e  e n t i r e  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  
b y  u s e  o f  t h e
I n  d i s c u s s i n g * t h e  C o u r t ' s  r e a c t i o n  t o  d e l e g a t i o n  o f  p r o s e c u t o r i a l  
p o w e r s  b y  t h e  c o l l e g e ,  w e  h a v e  a l r e a d y  m e n t i o n e d  t h a t  i t  w a s  n o t  
J  c o n s c i o u s l y  f o s t e r i n g  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a  t r i a d i c  s t r u c t u r e  f o r  t h e  
a d j u d i c a t i o n  o f  c a s e s  u n d e r  A r t i c l e s  8 5 ( l ) / 8 6  E E C ,  b u t ,  i n s t e a d ,  
w a s  s i m p l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  a s s i s t i n g  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  t o  r a t i o n a l i z e  
i t s  r e s o u r c e s .  W e  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  s u r p r i s e d ,  t h e n ,  i f  i t  w a s  t o  
p e r m i t  t h e  f u r t h e r  r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  c o u l d  b e  a c h i e v e d  b y  ' d e  
f a c t o '  d e l e g a t i o n  o f  d e f i n i t i v e  a d j u d i c a t o r y  p o w e r  f r o m  t h e  
c o l l e g e  t o  t h e  C o m p e t i t i o n  h i e r a r c h y  v i a  t h e  " w r i t t e n  p r o c e d u r e " .  
T h e  C o u r t ' s  A E C Z O  p r i n c i p l e  m a y  p r o h i b i t  t h e  d e l e g a t i o n  o f  s u c h  
p o w e r ,  b u t  i s  p o i n t e d l y  s i l e n t  a s  t o  i t s  i n f o r m a l  a b d i c a t i o n .
I
T h e  h i d d e n  a g e n d a  o f  t h e  A K Z O  p r i n c i p l e  i s  t h e  f a c i l i t a t i o n  o f  
C o m m i s s i o n  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  ' p e r  s e '  w i t h o u t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  t h e  
r o l e s  i n  w h i c h  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  c o n s i s t s .  T h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
l i m i t s  i t  p l a c e s  u p o n  d i s p e r s a l  o f  d e c i s i o n a l  p o w e r  w i t h i n  t h e  
C o m m i s s i o n  a r e  s u p e r f i c i a l .  T h e  C o u r t  i s  s i m p l y  n o t  p r e p a r e d  t o  
h i n d e r  t h e  C o m m u n i t y ' s  e x e c u t i v e  o r g a n  - b y  i m p o s i n g  m e a n i n g f u l  
s t r u c t u r a l  l i m i t s  o n  i t s  i n t e r n a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  T r y i n g  t o  189
189. i b i d . ,  p a r a .  22 of judgment .
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r e c o n c i l e  t h e  A K Z O  p r i n c i p l e  w i t h  t h e  ' B u c h l e r '  j u d g m e n t  m a k e s  
t h a t  p a i n f u l l y  c l e a r .
R e a c t i o n  o f  t h e  C o u r t  ( V I )  -  C o n c l u s i o n
T h e r e  a r e  t w o  t r e n d s  t o  w h i c h  w e  s h o u l d  d r a w  a t t e n t i o n  i n  
e x a m i n i n g  t h e  r e a c t i o n  o f  t h e  C o u r t  t o  t h e  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  
a l l o c a t i o n  o f  a d j u d i c a t o r y  p o w e r  t o  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n .  F i r s t ,  w e  
h a v e  s e e n  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  i s  u n w i l l i n g  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  t o  f o r c e  
y  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  t o  a d o p t  a  t r i a d i c  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  s t r u c t u r e  v i s  à  
v i s  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  A r t i c l e s  8 5 ( l ) / 8 6  E E C .  I t  w a s  f o r  t h a t  
r e a s o n  t h a t  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  C o n v e n t i o n  o n  H u m a n  R i g h t s  w a s  
h e l d  i n a p p l i c a b l e .  S e c o n d ,  i f  i t  i s  t r u e  t o  s a y  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  
h a s  n o t  p r e v e n t e d  d i v i s i o n  o f  l a b o u r  w i t h i n  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  f r o m  
r e n d e r i n g  i n f r i n g e m e n t  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  m o r e  t r i a d i c ,  i t  i s  e q u a l l y  
a c c u r a t e  t o  o b s e r v e  t h a t  i t  h a s  n o t  p r e v e n t e d  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  
d i v i d i n g  l a b o u r  f r o m  g o i n g  s o  f a r  t h a t  i t  a c t u a l l y  u n d e r m i n e s  
t r i a d i c  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  -  w i t n e s s ,  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  t h e  C o u r t ' s  
s i m u l t a n e o u s  a p p r o v a l  o f  d e l e g a t i o n  o f  p r o s e c u t o r i a l  p o w e r s  
o u t s i d e  o f  t h e  c o l l e g e  a n d  u s e  o f  t h e  " w r i t t e n  p r o c e d u r e "  i n  
d e f i n i t i v e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  i n  c o l l e g e .
)
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T H E  C O U R T 1 S  A P P L I C A T I O N  O F  A D M I N I S T R A T I V E  L A W  
P R I N C I P L E S ,  R A T H E R  T H A N  C O N S T I T U T I O N A L  L A W  
R E S T R A I N T S ,  T O  C O M M I S S I O N  A D J U D I C A T I O N
I n t r o d u c t i o n
T h e  l a s t  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  p a p e r  d e a l t  w i t h  t h e  i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s
J  i n h e r e n t  i n  a l l o c a t i n g  t o  t h e  p o w e r  t o  a d j u d i c a t e  u n d e r  A r t i c l e s
8 5 ( 1 ) / 8 6  E E C  t o  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  -  g i v e n  i t s  n o n - t r i a d i c  d e c i s i o n  -
m a k i n g  s t r u c t u r e .  T h e  l a s t  p a r t  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n  e x a m i n e d
t h e  r e l u c t a n c e  o f  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  t o  r e c t i f y  t h i s
i n a p p r o p r i a t e  a l l o c a t i o n  b y  f o r c i n g  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  t o  a d o p t  a
t r i a d i c  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  p r o c e d u r e  i n  s u c h  c a s e s .  H o w e v e r ,  i n  t h e
s a m e  b r e a t h  w i t h  w h i c h  i t  d e n i e d  t h e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 )
o f  t h e  C o n v e n t i o n  o f  H u m a n  R i g h t s  t o  t h e  ' a d j u d i c a t i o n  o f
i n f r i n g e m e n t  d e c i s i o n s ,  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  r e a f f i r m e d  t h a t ,
d e s p i t e  t h a t  f a c t ,  " [ t ] h e  C o m m i s s i o n  i s  b o u n d  t o  r e s p e c t  t h e
1 9 0p r o c e d u r a l  g u a r a n t e e s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  b y  C o m m u n i t y  l a w "  .  I n  t h i s  
s e c t i o n ,  w e  s h a l l  s e e  t h a t  i n  s p i t e  o f  i t s  u n d e r s t a n d a b l e  r e f u s a l  
j  t o  o b s t r u c t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n ' s  i n t e g r a t i v e  w o r k ,  t h e  C o u r t  h a s  
e n d e a v o u r e d ,  t h r o u g h  t h e  c a s e  b y  c a s e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  
p r o c e d u r a l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w ,  t o  c u r b  t h e  a d v e r s e  
e f f e c t s  w h i c h  t h i s  ' s t r u c t u r a l  i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s ' h a s  o n  t h e  
u n d e r t a k i n g s  t o  w h o m  p a r t i c u l a r  i n f r i n g e m e n t  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  
a d d r e s s e d .  190
1 9 0 .  ' F E D E T A B ' ,  c i t .  s u p r a  a t  f n  1 6 0 ,  p a r a .  8 1  o f  j u d g m e n t .
If
i
T r e a t y  G r o u n d s  f o r  t h e  R e v i e w  o f  C o m p e t i t i o n  D e c i s i o n s
A r t i c l e  1 7 3 :  R e c o u r s  p o u r  E x c è s  d e  P o u v o i r
1 9 1
A s  w e  h a v e  a l r e a d y  s e e n  ,  a n  u n d e r t a k i n g ,  w h i c h  i s  t h e  s u b j e c t  
o f  a  C o m m i s s i o n  d e c i s i o n  a p p l y i n g  A r t i c l e s  8 5 ( 1 ) ,  8 5 ( 3 )  o r  8 6  o f  
t h e  E E C  T r e a t y ,  m a y  a p p l y  t o  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  
1 7 3 ( 2 ) E E C  f o r  t h e  a n n u l m e n t  o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  i n  a n  a c t i o n  c l o s e l y  
m o d e l l e d  o n  t h e  " r e c o u r s  p o u r  e x c è s  d e  p o u v o i r "  k n o w n  i n  f r e n c h  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  l a w .  D e c i s i o n s  m a y  b e  a l l e g e d  t o  b e  ' u l t r a  v i r e s '  
t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  o n  f o u r  g r o u n d s ,  a g a i n  a n a l o g o u s  t o  t h o s e  a v a i l a b l e  
i n  t h e  f r e n c h  s y s t e m :  t h e s e  a r e ,  " i n c o m p é t e n c e ,  v i o l a t i o n  d e s
f o r m e s  s u b s t a n t i e l l e s ,  v i o l a t i o n  d u  p r e s e n t  t r a i t é  o u  d e  t o u t e  
r è g l e  d e  d r o i t  r e l a t i v e  à  s o n  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  o u  d é t o u r n e m e n t  d e  
p o u v o i r " .
A r t i c l e  1 7 2 :  R e c o u r s  d e  P l e i n e  J u r i d i c t i o n
F u r t h e r  m o r e ,  A r t i c l e  1 7 2  E E C  e m p o w e r s  t h e  C o u n c i l  t o  g i v e  t h e  
C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  u n l i m i t e d  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  p e n a l t i e s  
w h i c h  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  c a n  i m p o s e  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  1 5  o f  C o u n c i l  
R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2  E E C .  A r t i c l e  1 7  o f  t h a t  R e g u l a t i o n  a u t h o r i s e s  
t h e  C o u r t  a c c o r d i n g l y ,  a n d  p r o v i d e s  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  i t s  
u n l i m i t e d  j u r i s d i c t i o n ,  t h e  C o u r t ,  " m a y  c a n c e l ,  r e d u c e  o r  i n c r e a s e  
t h e  . . . [ p e c u n i a r y  s a n c t i o n ]  i m p o s e d " .  19
1 9 1 .  S e e  t e x t  a c c o m p a n y i n g  f n  1 8  t o  2 0  s u p r a .
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T h i s  f o r m  o f  r e v i e w ,  o n c e  a g a i n ,  b o r r o w s  h e a v i l y  f r o m  t h e  f r e n c h  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  l a w  m o d e l ,  t h i s  t i m e  f r o m  t h e  " r e c o u r s  d e  p l e i n e  
j u r i d i c t i o n "  a g a i n s t  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d e c i s i o n s .  A  c o u r t  e x e r c i s i n g  
u n l i m i t e d  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  t h i s  s e n s e  h a s  t h e  p o w e r  o f  r e ­
a d j u d i c a t i n g  t h e  s u b j e c t  m a t t e r  o f  t h e  i n i t i a l  d e c i s i o n .  F r e n c h  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o u r t s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  e x e r c i s e  t h i s  ’ r e -  
a d j u d i c a t o r y '  f u n c t i o n  i n  s e v e r a l  f i e l d s ,  n o t a b l y  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  
t h e  d e c i s i o n s  o f  e l e c t o r a l  o f f i c i a l s .
A r t i c l e s  1 7 3  a n d  1 7 2  E E C  C o m p a r e d
>
)
A  b a s i c  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  A r t i c l e  1 7 3  a n d  A r t i c l e  1 7 2  r e v i e w ;  t h e  
s a m e  d i f f e r e n c e  t h a t  e x i s t s  b e t w e e n  t h e  ' r e c o u r s  p o u r  e x c è s  d e  
p o u v o i r '  a n d  t h e  ' r e c o u r s  d e  p l e i n e  j u r i d i c t i o n '  i n  t h e  f r e n c h  
s y s t e m ;  l i e s  i n  t h i s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o v e r  t h e  f a c t u a l  b a s i s  o r  m e r i t s  
o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n ,  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  i t s  l e g a l i t y .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  t h e  
d u t y  o f  t h e  j u d g e  e x e r c i s i n g  u n l i m i t e d  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i s  a c t u a l l y  t o  
" s e c o n d - g u e s s "  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t o r .  T h e  p r o c e d u r a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  
t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  m e a n  t h a t ,  o n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  t h e  ' r e c o u r s  d e  p l e i n e  
j u r i d i c t i o n '  t a k e s  t h e  f o r m  o f  a n  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e v i e w :  a  r e ­
t r i a l  o f  f a c t s  a n d  i s s u e s  b e f o r e  a  s e c o n d ,  b u t  i n d e p e n d e n t ,  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d e c i s i o n - m a k e r  a n d  t h a t ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  
' r e c o u r s  p o u r  l ' e x c è e s  d e  p o u v o i r '  t a k e s  t h e  f o r m  o f  a  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w :  a n  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  t h e  f o r m a l  
p r o p r i e t y  o f  t h e  i n i t i a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d e c i s i o n  b y  a  j u d i c i a l  
d e c i s i o n - m a k e r .  T o  p u t  i t  a n o t h e r  w a y ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  a s k e d  b y  a  
c o u r t  i n  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  i s ,  " A r e  w e  s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  t h e  
a d m i n i s t r a t o r  w a s  l e g a l l y  e n t i t l e d  t o  a p p l y  r u l e  X  t o  s i t u a t i o n  
V ? " .  I n  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e v i e w  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s ,  
" W h a t  d o  w e  c o n s i d e r  r u l e  X  t o  b e  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  f a c t s  a s  w e  
f i n d  t h e m ? " .
1i
The European Court is e x p lic it ly  required to control the le g a lity  
of certa in  elements of a decision via the 'recours en annulation' 
and to exercise "unlim ited ju ris d ic tio n "  ( i .e .  ju ris d ic tio n  over 
the m erits ) in respect o f other elements under the 'recours en 
rfform ation ’ . On one hand, the Court is  functionally obliged by 
A rtic le  172 to consider a l l  facts and issues involved 'de novo'. 
On the other hand, A r t ic le  173(2) EEC imposes no obligation on the 
Court to reassess findings of fact made a t f i r s t  instance. I t  is 
crucial to note that while the Court is  not obliged to review 
facts under A r t ic le  173 EEC, th is  A rtic le  ce rta in ly  grants i t  the 
power to do so.
A r t ic le  173 EEC Authority for Jud ic ia l Review of 
Issues of Fact aris ing  in Commission Decisions
Error of Fact as Error of Law
One can look a t the head of i l le g a l i t y  on the ground of "v io la tio n  
of the Treaty or of any ru le  of law re la tiv e  to its  application"  
availab le  to undertakings under A rtic le  173 EEC in two ways. On 
one hand, the Treaty or some subordinate le g is la tiv e  measure can 
be regarded as v io la te d  by a competition decision which is  
o b je c tiv e ly  or 'ex fa c ie ' incompatible w ith the legal provisions 
in question: here the decis ion 's external le g a lity  is ca lled  into  
question. On the other hand, v io la tio n  of the Treaty e tc . can be 
seen to occur here the decision is sub jective ly  incom patib ility
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with the re levant rules of law, here i t  is  in terna l le g a lity  which
192is called in to  question
This las t idea of subjective incom patib ility  with the law or 
internal i l l e g a l i t y  can be more precisely defined as erroneous 
application of a ru le  o f law. C ru c ia lly , ju d ic ia l review of such 
an error o f law can lo g ic a lly  include the review o f issues of fac t 
when that e rro r is  alleged to have followed inexorably from 
erroneous findings of fa c t .  In  adm inistrative decision making, an 
error of law may lo g ic a lly  flow from an error of fac t in  two ways: 
f i r s t ,  the p a rtic u la r fac t s itu ation  to which a legal rule is  
stated to have been applied by the decision, ("exactitude  
m atérielle des fa i t s " ) ,  may have been misperceived by the 
administrator ; second, while re -creation  of the relevant fa c t-  
situation may have been accurately carried  out by the decision­
maker in his decision, h is subsumption of these facts w ith in  the 
relevant leg a l categories, ("q u a lific a tio n  jurid ique des fa its " ) ,  
may not.
While the d ifference between the "exactitude m atérie lle" and 
"q u a lific a tio n  jurid ique" of fac t s ituations is  d i f f ic u l t  to 
a rtic u la te  in the abstract, i t  becomes clearer when one takes an 
example. In  the case of a Commission decision applying A rtic le  
85(1) EEC to an a lleged , secret, market sharing agreement, for 
instance, Commission findings regarding the existence of the 
agreement in  question which were based on documents recovered from 
surprise inspections could be challenged on the grounds, e ith e r,
(a ), that the elements o f evidence upon which the finding that an 192
192. This dual c la s s ific a tio n  is  used, e .g .,  in Charles
Debbasch's "Contentieux A dm in is tra tif"  (3rd Ed), Dalloz, 
Chapter I I I ,  sections 1(1) and (2 ) .
i[t
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agreement existed was based were forged or incomplete, or 
otherwise u n re lia b le , (exactitude m a té rie lle ); or, (b ), that the 
elements o f evidence founded upon by the Commission decision were, 
even i f  unchallengeable under (a ) ,  in s u ffic ie n t, in point of law, 
to support the inference that an agreement existed, (q u a lific a tio n  
ju rid iqu e).
Comparison with the A r t ic le  33 ECSC
The Court of Justice is  granted, under A rtic le  33 of the Treaty 
establishing the Coal and Steel Community, ju risd ic tio n  sim ilar to 
that which i t  exercises under A rtic le  173 EEC. The Court is  
empowered to review the le g a lity  of and to annul acts of the High 
Authority under the same four heads availab le  under A rtic le  173 
EEC. The second paragraph e n tit le s  individual undertakings to 
seek the annulment 'in te r  a l ia '  of decisions, "concerning them 
which are ind iv id u a l in character".
However, the second sentence of the f i r s t  paragraph of A rtic le  33 
ECSC provides that the Court:
"may not . . .  examine the evaluation of the s ituation  resulting  
from economic fac ts  or circumstances in the lig h t of which the 
High Authority took its  decision . . .  save where the High 
A uthority  is alleged to have misused its  powers or to have 
m anifestly fa ile d  to observe the provisions of th is  Treaty"
In order to estab lish  misuse of power, the Court has held that an 
applicant must es tab lish  a strong and convincing case th a t, "the 
High A uthority , through want of foresight or serious lack of care 
amounting to disregard for the purpose of the law, has pursued 
objectives other than those for which the powers [in  question] . . .
iI
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were conferred upon i t "  . On the other hand, "manifest"
disregard of the Treaty e tc . has been held to presuppose, "that a
certain degree is  reached in the fa ilu re  to observe legal
provisions so that the fa ilu re  to observe the Treaty appears to
derive from an obvious error in the evaluation, having regard to
the provisions of the T reaty , of the s ituation  in  respect of which
194the decision was taken"
In contrast to A r t ic le  173 EEC, therefore , A rtic le  33 ECSC denies 
the Court of Justice power to review adm inistrative decisions on 
the basis of errors of law which derive from errors of fa c t, save 
y when the facts as stated by a decision are c le a rly  bizzare or can 
be shown to be p re te x tu a l.
The reasons for the insertio n  of th is lim ita tio n  into A rtic le  33 
ECSC are discussed by Advocate General Roemer in the 'Netherlands 
v High Authority* case. In his opinion he refers to the report 
of the French delegation to the negotiations regarding the 
drafting of the Treaty, which states that since, " i t  was 
considered that most decisions of the High Authority were by the 
very provisons of the Treaty made subject to the re a liza tio n  of 
factual conditions or the existence of s ituations of an economic 
nature . . .  [ , ]  examination by the Court of the ' le g a l i ty ' of
 ^ decisions taken by the High Authority would have had the e ffec t in 
re a lity  of le t t in g  the Court judge whether those decisions were 1934
193
193. Joined Cases 3 and 4/64, 'S idérurgie Français v High 
A u th o rity *, [1965] ECR 441, 454.
194. Case 6 /54 , 'Netherlands v High A u th o rity ', [1954-56] ECR, 
103, 115. This decision makes i t  c lear that "obvious error" 
re fers  to one, "evident from the decision" in  an 'ex fac ie ' 
sense ( ib id . ,  116).
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well founded" . This report concludes in the b e lie f that 
A rtic le  33 ECSC represents the.
195
"indispensible reco n cilia tio n  of the concern to maintain w ithin  
legal lim its  the action o f the High Authority and the 
necessity which is no less great of not obstructing that 
action in a f ie ld  where economic, p o lit ic a l or social 
considerations require a continuous appraisal of the factual 
circumstances which normally f a l l  outside the ju ris d ic tio n  of 
the judge"
I t  is  submitted that the Framers' inclusion of A rtic le  33(2) ECSC 
y  re fle c ts  a misconception of the danger posed by the ju d ic ia l 
review of fac t evaluation. In  the f i r s t  place, i t  presumes,
wrongly, that a l l  High Authority/Commission decisions subject to 
ju d ic ia l review are based upon, "continuous appraisal of . . .  
factual circumstances", o r, in  other words, that they are the sort 
of po licy -app ly ing , adm inistrative decisions oriented towards 
evolving fa c t s itu a tio n s , as opposed to the kind of ru le-applying, 
adjudicative decisions which are based upon a d iscre te ly  focussed 
assessment of narrow, h is to r ic  fac ts . In the second place (and 
linked to the f i r s t  misconception) i t  presumes that the Court 
would attempt to sc ru tin ize  errors of fa c t in the cases before i t ,  
without d if fe re n t ia t in g  between the two d is tin c t types of fact 
evaluation ju s t mentioned.
>
A rtic le  173 EEC includes no such express exclusion of ju ris d ic tio n  
over fac tu a l e rro r. I t  seems reasonable to assume that the 
decision not to include such a provision in th is  A rtic le  re fle c ts  1956
195. ib id . ,  126.
196. ib id , (emphasis added).
l i l i i l
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a re jec tio n  of the fear that the Court would use A rtic le  173 EEC 
to set i t s e l f  up as, "the supreme body representing the w il l  of 
*-.he Community in  economic questions in  place of the 
[Commission]" , and the acceptance of the b e lie f in  the Court's 
own sense o f s e lf - r e s tra in t  with regard to its  constitu tional role  
vis a v is  the other Community in s titu tio n s . How has the Court 
responded to th is  act of fa ith?  Has i t  subjected fact evaluation  
in Commission decision-making to a d iffe re n tia te d  standard of 
scrutiny? - Let us examine th is  point w ith regard to review of the 
fact evaluations underpinning decisions applying A rtic le  85(3) 
EEC, on one hand, and decisions applying A rtic le s  85(1)/86 EEC, on 
the other.
The D is tin c tio n  between Adjudicative Facts 
and Adm inistrative Facts employed by the Court
The 'Meroni' Case -  The Balance of Power
The Court of Justice has always distinguished between the
ad ju d ica tive /ru le -ap p ly in g  nature and the adm in istrâtiv e /p o lic y -
> applying nature of Commission decisions. This d is tin c tio n , i t  is
submitted, derives d ire c tly  from the Court's perception of its
role w ith in  the in s titu t io n a l system of the Community. In the
1 9 8celebrated 'Meroni' case of 1957 , the Court ruled th a t, "there
can be seen in the balance of powers which is ch arac teris tic  of 1978
197. ib id .
198. Case 9 /56, 'Meroni v High A u th o rity ’ , [1957-58] ECR 133,
i l
m
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the in s t itu t io n a l structure of the Community a fundamental 
quarantee granted by the Treaty in p articu lar to [ind iv idual
T O O
undertakings]” . For the Commission (in  'M eroni', the High 
A uthority), ” [ t ]o  delegate a d iscretionary power by entrusting i t  
to bodies other than those which the Treaty has established to 
effect and supervise the exercise of power each within the lim its  
of i ts  own au th o rity , would render that guarantee in e ffe c tiv e ”19 200 201.
The Court distinguishes "discretionary power” , which i t  defines as 
a power "mak[ing] possible the execution of actual economic 
policy” , from "executive power” , which i t  sees as one "clearly  
defined . . .  [according to ] objective c r i te r ia  determined by the 
delegating authority" . I t  w i l l  be obvious th a t, in  drawing a 
d is tin c tio n  between executive and discretionary power, the Court's 
c la s s ific a tio n  corresponds closely to the d iffe re n tia tio n  of 
adjudicative or rule-applying and adm inistrative or policy- 
applying powers of decision which we developed e a r lie r  in the 
paper.
The Court, in 'Meroni' emphasises th a t, while the Commission may 
co n stitu tio n a lly  delegate a rule-applying power to a body not 
established by the relevant Treaty, to do so in respect of a 
policy-applying power is  emphatically unconstitutional. The 
) logic behind th is  dichotomy lie s  in the Court's in te rp re ta tion  of 1920
199. ib id . ,  152 (emphasis added). The "Treaty" referred to here 
is , of course, the ECSC Treaty. I t  seems c le a r, however, that 
the "balance of powers” established by the EEC Treaty grants, by 
analogy, the same "fundamental guarantee".
200. ib id , (emphasis added).
201. ib id .
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the in s t itu t io n a l "balance of power" established by the Treaties .
In the eyes of the Court, the exercise of "executive" or ru le -
applying power by the Commission is  subjected by the Treaty
202p rin c ip a lly  to ju d ic ia l control . The exercise of such power,
even by a body other than the Commission, "can", in the words of
203the Court, "be subject to s t r ic t  [ ju d ic ia l]  review" , thereby
leaving the balance of power between Commission and the ju d ic ia l
hierarchy of the Community undisturbed. However, in  contrast,
while the Court possesses A rtic le  33 ECSC (and A rtic le  173 SEC)
ju ris d ic tio n  over the formal le g a lity  of the exercise of
discretionary power, i t  im pliedly regards the Treaties as
subjecting the substantive control of that power la rg e ly  to the
p o lit ic a l organs of the Community, in p a rtic u la r , the European 
204Parliament . The delegation of policy-applying type of power to 
a body which is  not accountable to the Parliament in the same way 20*4
202. Usually in the context of an action for anullment on the 
grounds of i l le g a l i t y  provided by A rtic le  173 EEC, see text 
accompanying fn 18 to 20 supra.
)  203. ib id . (emphasis added). The exercise by a 'delegatus1 of
any c le a rly  defined "executive" or rule-applying power 
granted by a Commission Regulation or Decision would normally 
be subject to review by national courts: the c r i te r ia  for 
exercise of such a t ig h t ly  defined grant would probably be 
d ire c t ly  e ffe c tiv e  and would, therefore, give rise to 
ind iv idual righ ts  which national courts would be bound to 
defend (Case 26/62, 'Van Gend en Loos', [1963] ECR 1, 12). 
The involvement of a national court in th is  way can, of 
course, u ltim a te ly  allow the in tervention  of the Court of 
Justice via A r t ic le  177 EEC (and i ts  equivalents in  the other 
T re a tie s ).
204. One thinks es s e n tia lly  of A r t ic le  144 EEC (and its  
equivalents in  the other T re a tie s ), for d e ta ils  see fn 116 
supra.
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as the Commission would, therefore, upset the pre-existing balance 
of power.
I f  the Court of Justice finds i t  necessary -  in view of its  
in s titu tio n a l ro le  in the Community -  to distinguish between 
adjudicative and adm inistrative decision-making in assessing the 
c o n s titu tio n a lity  of delegation of power, then perhaps i t  w il l  
make the same d is tin c tio n  -  in  view of that ro le -  in  reviewing 
the substance of Commission decisions applying A rtic le  8 5 (l)/8 6  
EEC and those applying A rtic le  85(3) EEC.
The 'Consten & Grundig' and 'Remia’ Cases
205In i ts  'Consten & Grundig' decision of 1966 , the Court of
Justice held , in a dictum frequently repeated, that exercise of 
the Commission's power to grant exemptions under A r t ic le  85(3) 
EEC:
"necessarily implies complex evaluations on economic matters. 
A ju d ic ia l review of these evaluations must take account of 
th e ir  nature by confining i t s e l f  to an examination of the 
relevance of the facts  and of_the leg a l consequences which the 
Commission deduced therefrom"
Here, the Court is c le a r ly  stating th a t the discretionary or 
policy-applying nature of the power to apply A rtic le  85(3) EEC 
means that i ts  exercise can be only be subjected to an attenuated 2056
205. Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, 'Consten & Grundig v Commission',
[1966] ECR 299.
206. ib id . ,  347 (emphasis added).
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degree of ju d ic ia l review. With regard to review of fac ts , th is
low leve l review w i l l  be res tric ted  to examining the reasoning in
the decision for manifest factual errors , or to assessing whether,
"the circumstances surrounding the decision in question gave rise
to serious doubts as to  the rea l reasons and, in p a rtic u la r , to
suspicions that those [re a l]  reasons were extraneous to the
objectives of Community law and hence amounted to a misuse of 
207powers" . In  other words, the Court does not wish to become 
involved in  reviewing the economic predictions or policy 
evaluations made by the Commission in applying A rtic le  85(3) EEC. 
A Court which has not forgotten the logic of 'Meroni* ta c it ly  
instructs l it ig a n ts  to make such arguments in the p o l i t ic a l ,  as 
opposed to the ju d ic ia l ,  arena.
In 1985 the Court delivered  a judgment which is clear proof that
the ' Consten & Grundig' log ic  does not apply to decisions applying
208A rtic les  8 5 ( l) /8 6  EEC. In  the 'Remia' case , the applicant 
undertaking was the subject of a Commission decision which found 
that a "non-competition" clause in  an agreement to which i t  was 
party v io la ted  A r t ic le  85(1) EEC. However, A rtic le  85(1) was not 
applied in  respect of the effects  the clause had produced during 
the f i r s t  four years o f i ts  existence. Remia sought to have the 
decision annulled on the ground that the factual need for the 
'non-application ' of A r t ic le  85(1) to these f i r s t  four years had 
not been s u ff ic ie n t ly  proved by the Commission. The Court, 
re jec ting  Remia's arguments, held: *2
207. Joined Cases 142 
Commission', [1987]
and 156/84, 'BAT and RJ Reynolds
2 CMLR 551, para. 11 of judgment.
v
208. Case 42/84, Remia v Commission', [1985] ECR 2545.
U l i *
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"Although as a general rule the Court undertakes a 
comprehensive review of the question whether or not the 
conditions fo r the application  of A rtic le  85(1) are met, i t  is  
clear that in  determining the permissible duration of a non­
competition clause0* . .  the Commission has to appraise complex 
economic matters" u .
The Court then proceeded to repeat the 'Consten 4 Grundig* formula 
as regards the leg itim ate  extent of ju d ic ia l review of such a 
decision. In ad d itio n . Advocate General Lenz's opinion in the 
case e x p lic i t ly  states th at, in  his opinion, the se lective  non­
app lication  of A r t ic le  85(1) is governed by, " c r ite r ia  s im ilar to 
j  those contained in A rtic le  85(3) EEC"209 10 21. What 'Remia'
ind icates, although in a negative way, is  that the facts and 
issues which underpin infringement decisions are subjected to a
q u a lita t iv e ly  d if fe re n t  standard of scrutiny by the Court than
211those upon which exemption decisions are based . This, i t  is 2091
209. ib id . ,  para. 34 of judgment (emphasis added).
210. ib id . ,  2559.
211. Ivo Van Bael has stated recently th at, "in i ts  'Remia* 
judgment in  a case which the Commission had decided under
P A r t ic le  8 5 (1 ), the Court came to the same conclusion [ i t  had
reached in  'Consten & Grundig* regarding the scope of 
ju d ic ia l review]", "Discretionary Powers of the Commission 
and th e ir  Legal Control in Trade and Anti-Dumping M atters", 
in , Jürgen Schwarze (E d .), "Discretionary Powers of the 
Member States in  the F ie ld  of Economic Polic ies and th e ir  
Lim its under the EEC Treaty" 1988, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 173 at 
page 187. I t  is submitted th a t, in  making th is  comment, Van 
Bael badly misrepresents 'Remia* on two counts; f i r s t ,  the 
part of the decision under review was not an ap p lication , but 
a non-application o f A rtic le  85(1) EEC which was held to be 
fu n c tio n a lly  analogous to an app lication  of A r t ic le  85(3) 
EEC; second, as we have seen, the Court did not decide that 
review of infringment decisions was lim ited  to the grounds 
specified  in 'Consten & Grundig', in  fa c t the dictum quoted 
shows that i t  decided precisely the opposite.
M n o n m n a n sMMWUV
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submitted, is  because of th e ir nature as adjudicative decisions 
a nature id e n tif ie d  in  'Meroni' as warranting s t r ic t  ju d ic ia l 
oversight. In  an opinion from 1972, Advocate General Mayras 
provides some guidance as to the Court's perception of the 
'specia l' nature of infringement decisions:
“Although infringements of the competition rules are defined in  
very general terms in  A rtic le  85 and re late  to a predominantly 
technical area which leaves the Commission and th is  Court a 
p a rt ic u la r ly  large degree of d iscretion , they are the subject 
matter of a lega l decision . . .  and . . .  the prohibitions  
provided in A r t ic le  85 are applicable to agreements, decisions 
or practices evidence of which must be brought before the 
Court"*11 .
In th is  passage, Mayras id e n tif ie s  the two fundamental differences  
between an exemption and an infringement decision. F irs t ,  the 
la t te r  is  a , "legal decision", in the sense of a decision applying 
pre-ex is ting  leg a l ru le s , while the former involves the
implementation o f non leg a l policy . Second, the la t te r  is  based 
on "evidence", in the sense of narrowly defined h is to r ic  facts , 
while the former rests upon predicted or assumed s ituations. 
These fundamental d iffe ren ces , the same fundamental differences we 
id e n tif ie d  in our e a r l ie r  th eo re tic a l discussion, are the 
foundation upon which the Court has b u ilt  up a jurisprudence which 
permits i t  to undertake the "comprehensive" as opposed to 
attenuated ju d ic ia l review of infringement decisions.
Conclusion 21
212. Case 7 /72 , 'Boehringer v Commission', [1972] ECR 1281, 1300.
!i
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The Court o f Justice has a clear idea of its  role in the in te r-  
in s titu tio n a l balance of power in the system established by the 
Treaties. I t s  view of i ts  role vis a vis the Commission is a 
dichotomous one. With regard to the exercise of d iscretionary  
power, the Court perceives its  ro le as somewhat peripheral, 
ensuring th at the 'ru les  o f play* are observed and no more. With 
respect to the exercise of adjudicatory power, in contrast, the 
Court considers i t s e l f  co n s titu tio n a lly  bound to play a central 
ro le, examining leg a l and factual ju s tific a tio n s  fo r action. 
This dichotomy has, we have noted, been extended into the review 
of competition decisions. While exemption decisions, amounting 
to exercises of d iscretionary power, are subject to low-level 
review, infringement decisions, as exercises of adjudicatory 
power, are subject to  h ig h -leve l review. We shall now examine 
the ways in which h ig h -leve l review is  carried out.
The “High Level” Standard of Ju d ic ia l Review to which 
the Court o f Justice subjects Infringement Decisions
Introduction
>
In th is  part we shall examine the manner in which the Court of 
Justice exercises 'h ig h -le v e l' review of infringement decisions. 
We sh a ll see that the subject matter of such review can be divided 
under three heads: reasoning, the standard of proof, and the onus 
of proof.
Reasoning in  Infringement Proceedings
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The Court's approach to the reasoning employed by the Commission 
in infringement proceedings may be divided into two parts: f i r s t  
the reasoning used in the proceedings leading up to decision and, 
second, the reasoning contained in the infringement decision 
i t s e l f .
We have already seen th a t, before taking a decision in application
of Art 8 5 (1 ), 8 5 (3 ), or 86 EEC, the Commission is required by
Council Regulation 17/62 EEC, A rtic le  19(1), to hear the
undertaking/s concerned. We have also seen that detailed  rules
for the conduct of such hearings are la id  down in Commission
Regulation 99/63 EEC, which declares that such rules are
necessitated by, "A rtic le  19(1) of Regulation No. 17 and with the
213rights of the defence" , the la t te r  ju s tif ic a t io n  being based on 
some p rin c ip le  supposedly underpinning the said A rtic le  19(1).
The "righ ts  of the defence" or "the rig h t to be heard", has been
accorded the status of an unwritten, h ie ra rch ica lly  superior rule
of Community law by the Court of Justice. In i t s  famous
214"Transocean Marine Paint" Decision , the Court referred  to ,
"the general ru le that a person whose in te rests  are
perceptib ly  a ffected  by a decision taken by a public 
au th o rity  must be given the opportunity t 0 2 j |k e  h is  point of 
view known [before the decision is  takenl" 21345
213. Preamble, f i f t h  r e c ita l .  Emphasis Added.
214. Case 17/74, "Transocean Marine Paint Association v 
Commission", [1974] ECR, 1063.
215. ib id . ,  paragraph 15 of judgment. Cf. Case 41/69, 'ACF 
Chemiefarmie v Commission’ , [1970] ECR 661, para. 27 of 
judgment, and Case 45/69, 'Boehringer Mannheim v Commission', 
[1970] ECR 769, para. 9 of judgment.
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In the proceedings leading up to the decision to apply or not to 
apply A r t ic le  85(3) EEC, the substantive content of the right to 
be heard is  lim ite d  to the right to comment on the policy judgment 
of the Commission and, therefore, the rig h t to be informed of the 
economic and po licy  considerations upon which the Commission 
intends to re ly . The precision with which such considerations are 
required to be communicated to p o ten tia l addressees is necessarily 
lim ited by th e ir  n a tu ra lly  imprecise or in d e fin ite  nature. 
However, in  infringement proceedings, the considerations upon 
which decisions are to be based are capable of being communicated 
in very precise form to po ten tia l addressees during the 
adm inistrative stage; as the Court ruled in the 'Hoffman La Roche' 
case:
"in  order to respect the rig h t to be heard the undertakings 
must have been afforded the opportunity during the 
adm in istra tive  procedure to make known th e ir views on the 
tru th  and relevance of the facts  and circumstances alleged and 
on the documents used by the Commisjsjon to support i ts  claim  
that there has been an infringement"
Accordingly, the Commission is required by the Court to disclose
. 217a l l  documentary evidence upon which i t  re lie s  2167
216. Case 85/76, 'Hoffman La Roche v Commission', [1979] ECR 461, 
para. 11 of judgment (emphasis added).
217. Non-disclosure of such documents constitutes a v io la tio n  of 
the r ig h t to be heard, ib id . ,  para. 14 of judgment. In  
paragraph 15 of the same judgment the Court suggested that 
such a v io la tio n  could be cured by disclosure in subsequent 
anullment proceedings, but in the 'D is t i l le r s ' case [Case 
30/78, 'D is t i l le r s  v Commission, [1980J ECR 2229], Advocate 
General Warner severely c r it ic is e d  th is  dictum as being out
(F o o tn o te  c o n t i n u e s  on n e x t  page)
l i l i * *
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The exemption or infringement decision eventually adopted by the 
Commission a t the conclusion of proceedings is required, pursuant 
to A r t ic le  190 EEC, to sta te  the reasons upon which i t  is  based. 
The value of th is  o b ligation  is that i t ,
"allow [s] the Court to exercise i ts  power of review as to the 
le g a lity  of the decision and . . .  provide[s] the person 
concerned with the information necessary to en^ÿje him to 
decide whether or not the decision is  well founded”
With regard to exemption decisions, we have seen that the review 
of ' le g a l i t y '  which th e ir  statement of reasons enables is simply a 
review of the 'ex fa c ie ' relevance and 'bona fid e s ' of the 
considerations upon which they are based. However, as we shall
(Footnote continued from previous page)
of l in e  with previous d ic ta  of the Court and as in im ical of 
the r ig h t to be heard, ib id . ,  2297-8. In addition. Advocate 
General Slynn stated  in the 'Pioneer* case th a t, "evidence 
comming to lig h t during the procedure before the Court 
should not be taken into  account, in support of the 
Commission's case, save to the extent that such evidence is  
d ire c t ly  re lated  to a llegations made by the Commission at 
the adm in istrative stage" [Joined Cases 100-103/80, 'Musique 
D iffus ion  Française v Commission, [1983] ECR 1825, 1931]. 
Documents not re lie d  upon by the Commission's case against 
an undertaking, e .g . ,  documents exonerating him, are not 
subject to the ob ligation  of disclosure: see 'VBVB & VBBB v 
Commission' c i t .  supra at fn 176, paras. 23 to 25 of 
judgment. However, the Commission, in response to pressure 
from undertakings has adopted the practice of giving  
undertakings access to the en tire  f i l e  of evidence i t  holds 
on th e ir  case during the adm inistrative proceedings, see 
announcement to th is  e ffe c t in the Twelfth Report on 
Competition Po licy, para. 34.
218. 'VBVB and VBBB v Commission', c i t .  supra fn 176, para. 22 of 
judgment.
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see, the review of the 'legality' of infringement decisions made 
possible by the statement of reasons involves detailed examination 
of the elements of proof which underly them.
Standard of Proof in Infringement Proceedings
The Court is always open to argument that the factual evidence 
upon which an infringement decision is based is insufficient, in 
I point of law, to support the conclusions that it reaches; as it 
stated in the 'Sugar* case:
"[tjhe examination of the question whether the Commission has 
or has not produced sufficient evidence of the2i§lle<3e<* 
infringement forms part of the substance of the case"
We saw earlier in this section that an error of law can derive
from an error of fact which results either from the mis-perception
of the facts of a case, or the mistaken subsumption of those facts
within the relevant legal rules. Arguments that either or both
of these mistakes have occurred in Commission fact assessments
will be given serious consideration by the Court during annulment
proceedings. The test which the Court will apply in reviewing
y the sufficiency of Commission evidence is that enounced in 1984 of
whether, "the Commission has ... produced sufficiently precise and
220coherent proof to justify [its legal conclusions]" . Evidence 2190
219. Joined Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113 & 114/73, 'Suiker
Unie v Commission', [1975] ECR 1663, para. 440 of judgment.
220. Joined Cases 29 & 30/83, 'CRAM & Rheinzink v Commission',
[1984] ECR 1679, para. 20 of judgment (emphasis added).
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is sufficiently "precise and coherent" when, as Advocate General
Slynn has said, it constitutes, "material upon which the
Commission can be satisfied reasonably that there was [an
221infringement" . Advocate General Mayras, in the 'Sugar' case,
described the precision and coherence test in the context of
judical review when he stated that it is the role of, "the
Community judge to determine whether the material produced as
evidence by the Commission is conclusive", or, in other words,
222"strong, precise and relevant" . Whatever the formula used to
describe sufficiency, it is clear that Commission evidence must be
223of a very high standard to withstand the scrutiny of the Court , 
particularly since it is the Commission which carries the onus of 
proof.
Burden of Proof in Infringement Proceedings
Inasmuch as infringement decisions represent the culmination of 
'accusatory' proceedings (the undertaking in question being 
accused of infringing Treaty provisions) their adoption implies 
that the Commission has established the truth of its accusations. 
In annulment proceedings before the Court of Justice, therefore, 
it is the Commission and the Commission alone which must prove 
that the infringement it found actually occurred. In this sense, 
the Commission carries the legal burden or onus of proof before 213
221. 'Pioneer' case, cit. supra fn 217, loc. cit.
222. Cit. supra fn 144, 2067.
223. J. M. Joshua, "Proof in Contested EEC Competition 
1987 ELRev 315, 320.
Cases",
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the Court, while, in contrast, the applicant undertaking does not.
In the 'United Brands' case, the Court stated that, "it is for the
224Commission to prove that the applicant [infringed the Treaty]" ,
while, in the 'Sugar' case, Advocate General Mayras stated even
more candidly that, "[t]here is no doubt in my view that the
225burden of proof lies on the Commission"
As Brearly says, "(t]he legal burden of proof is the obligation of 
a party to meet the requirement of a rule of law that a fact in 
issue be provided to the satisfaction of the Court. It is a
burden of persuasion and carries with it the risk of non- 
persuasion" . In other words, failure to discharge the burden 
of proof means losing the case and, in infringement cases, having 
the infringement decision annulled. The only burden carried by 
undertakings vis a vis the Commission is that of adducing 
evidence, one which simply requires them, "to adduce sufficient
evidence to raise an issue as to the existence of [the specific
2 2 7facts they allege]" . Applicant undertakings, free from the 
legal burden of proof when contesting infringement decisions:
"do ... not have to go so far as to show that the Commission's 
decision was wrong. It may-gSuffice to show that it was
unsafe or insufficiently proven" , or 245678
224. Case 27/76, 'United Brands v Commission', [1978] ECR 207, 
para. 264 of judgment.
225. Cit. supra fn 144, loc. cit.
226. M. Brealy, "The Burden of Proof before the European Court", 
1985 ELRev 250, 255.
227. ibid., 250.
228. Advocate General Slynn, 'Pioneer', cit. supra fn 212, loc. 
cit.
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"to prove circumstances which casts the facts established by 
the Commission in a different light and which thus allow 
another explanation of the facts to2be substituted for the one 
adopted by the contested decision"
In a concerted action case, for example, the Commission must prove
that the, "conduct which ... [it] alleges and regards as
[evidence] ... of the concerted practice can only reasonably be
230explained by the existence of a concerted action" . If an
applicant undertaking is able to prove that the conduct was
conceivably explainable otherwise, then there will exist a doubt
231fatal to the Commission's case 
Conclusion
We have seen that the 'high-level' review to which the Court of 
Justice subjects infringement decisions is qualitatively different 
than the 'low-level' review to which it subjects exemption 
decisions. 'High-level' review is concerned with issues of law 
and of proof, while 'low-level' review is concerned solely with 
formal aspects of decisional legality. 'High-level' review
extends into the substance of the matter, demanding that 
infringement decisions demonstrate not only rational legal 
deduction, but also a high degree of evidential conclusiveness. 231
229. 'CRAM & Rheinzink', cit. 
judgment.
supra fn MMMM, para. 16 of
230. 'Sugar' case, cit. supra fn 
(emphasis added).
139, para. 301 of judgment
231. Case 26/75, 'General Motors v Commission', [1975] ECR 1367, 
para. 21 of judgment.
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Subjecting infringement decisions to 'high level* review is most 
certainly a means of alleviating the adverse effects experienced 
by undertakings. By requiring that such decisions demonstrate 
that a legal burden of proof has been duly discharged and that 
they deal comprehensively and convincingly with the relevant 
evidence, the Court offers undertakings an opportunity to 
challenge their factual basis in annulment proceedings, and, 
thereby, to eliminate or minimise injustices suffered at the hands 
of a non-triadic decision maker.
However, offering an opportunity is one thing; allowing effective 
use to be made of that opportunity is entirely another. In the 
next section shall see that, while the Court of Justice has, on 
the one hand, created a formal opportunity for undertakings to 
challenge the fact assessments upon which infringement decisions 
are based, it is unable and/or unwilling, on the other, to permit 
them to exploit that opportunity effectively.
)I
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THE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY THE COURT OF JUSTICE 
IN UNDERTAKING THE 1 HIGH-LEVEL1 REVIEW OF 
COMMISSION DECISIONS APPLYING ARTICLES 85(l)/86 EEC
'.f Introduction
It was seen in the last section that the Court of Justice has 
interpreted its jurisdiction to review the legality of
infringement decisions as also permitting the comprehensive
investigation of the fact assessments upon which they are based.
*
In this section we shall see that two factors? first, the limited
dispositive powers available to the Court under Article 173 EECr
and, second, the inadequacy of the judicial resources which are
committed to carrying out review of infringement decisions? have
created an, "allergy of the Court of Justice to reviewing the
232facts established by the Community authorities" , thereby 
handicapping the efforts of undertakings to obtain effective 
'high-level' review of infringement decisions.
The Court of Justice's Limited Power of Disposal under 
Article 173 SEC compared with that under Article 172 EEC
Power to Annul v. Power to Reform
232. Van Bael, op. cit., supra fn 211, 189.
itJ
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We know that the jurisdiction exercised by the Court of Justice 
under Article 173 EEC differs from that exercised under Article 
172 EEC to the extent that whilst the former enables review of 
fact-finding and fact assessment, the latter obliges such review.
)
However, a difference of much greater importance between the two
jurisdictions exists in respect of the nature of the powers of
disposal they create. The powers of disposal attached to a
jurisdiction consist of the orders which a court is entitled to
issue at the conclusion of proceedings before it. Indeed, the
traditional french classification of the 'recours du droit
administratif', "repose sur la constatation selon laquelle les
pouvoirs du juge varient en fonction de la matière 
233contentieuse" . Under this system, the jurisdiction which the 
Court of Justice exercises under Article 172 EEC, can be 
classified as a 'recours de pleine juridiction', in which, "°l§e 
juge peut ... réformer totalement ou partiellement la décision
4
administrative attaquée" . This means that in disposing of an 
action against a fine or periodic penalty payment imposed in an 
infringement decision, the Court of Justice may 'reform1 the 
sanctioning element of the decision by cancelling, reducing or 
increasing the fine or penalty. On the other hand, the 'recours 
pour excès de pouvoir' available under Article 173 EEC can, 
according to this system, be defined as a ’recours en annulation', 
in which le, "juge ne peut que procéder à une annulation, il ne 
peut réformer la décision" . In other words, in disposing of an 2345
233. Charles Debbasch, "Contentieux Administratif" 3rd Ed. 1981, 
Dalloz, Paris, para. 700.
234. ibid., para. 701.
235. ibid., para. 702.
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action against the provisions of a Commission decision, the Court 
of Justice must either uphold or annul them - it may not 'reform' 
or 're-make' them.
The consequences of this limited power or jurisdiction with 
respect to infringement decisions are important. In the words of 
the Court in its 1979 decision, 'France v Commission',
''[I]n the context of an application for annulment under Article 
173 of the Treaty the legality of the contested measure must 
be assessed on the basis of the elements of fact and of law 
existing at the time when the measure was adopted.
Rectifications subsequent to that date cannot therefore23^e 
taken into account for the purposes of such an assessment"
This principle derives directly from the role of the Court in 
exercising its Article 173 EEC jurisdiction as opposed to its
Article 172 EEC jurisdiction. The power to annul or uphold an
infringement decision on grounds of (il)legality is premissed upon 
the existence of an historically distinct legal 'event' which is 
the object of review by the Court. The legal and factual
elements of that event are fixed in time and are not subject to
i
236. Joined Cases 15 & 16/76, judgment of 7 February 1979, [1979] 
ECR 321, paras. 7 and 8 of decision. In its decision in 
Case 85/76, 'Hoffman La Roche v Commission' delivered six 
days later, the Court caused confusion by indicating that 
rectifications undertaken by the Commission after the date of 
adoption of an infringment decision could cure otherwise 
fatal defects ([1979] ECR 461, para. 15 of decision). 
However, this dictum was severely criticised by Advocate 
General Warner in Case 30/78, 'Distillers Co. v Commission’, 
as permitting the Commission to ignore due process 
requirements at the administrative stage in the knowledge 
that, "irregularit[ies] can be put right in the course of the 
appeal", [1980] ECR 2229, 2298.
■I
Ili
129
change after the date on which it took place. The power to re­
adjudicate or reform a decision is premissed upon the notion that 
the legal 'event' {i.e. the decision) has yet to occur and that, 
therefore, the elements of fact and law of which it consists have 
still to be determined in Court.
Given the premise for Article 173 EEC review, then, can we say 
that the limited powers of disposal available to the Court in 
reviewing the legality of infringement decisions act as a 
disincentive to judicial fact-finding in this field?
Limited Power of Disposal as a Factor Influencing 
The Court vis a vis Infringement Decisions
Each provision of an infringement decision, other than that 
imposing a pecuniary sanction, is subject to Article 173 EEC 
review, as opposed to Article 172 EEC review. Consequently, if 
an attack against any such provision is sustained by the Court 
then that provision must be annulled in its entirety. Assuming 
that a provision of an infringement decision consisting of a 
Commission fact evaluation is annulled due to insufficiency or 
unpersuasiveness of evidence, then the findings of law which are 
logically derived from it must fall as well. Moreover, the 
undertaking who is the subject of an infringement decision 
obviously benefits from the right against double jeopardy, or 'non 
bis in idem', and, therefore, should that decision be annulled on 
’evidential' grounds, the Commission is subsequently barred from 
taking a new one dealing with the same substantive circumstances 
but based on other evidence or argumentation.
In sustaining an attack against a mistaken fact evaluation of the 
Commission, therefore, the Court must assume the responsibility of 
allowing an undertaking to escape all punishment in circumstances
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where, given a second chance, the Commission might well have been 
able to present a more convincing or differently argued case 
capable of withstanding such an attack. Were the Court empowered 
to re-adjudicate the fact evaluations upon which the findings in 
an infringement decision were based, then the Commission would in 
turn be entitled to reargue its case and present evidence in 
amplification or supplementation of, or as an alternative to that 
already presented in its decision. In such circumstances the 
Court would be able to avoid nullifying the Commission's work by 
recasting the latter's decision on the basis of re-evaluated 
evidence.
In view of the Court's clear committment towards facilitating the 
Commission's integrative work, it would not be surprising to find 
it refusing to act in the politically 'negative' way that 
annulment under Article 173 EEC demands. It is submitted, 
therefore, that the lack of a power of 'reformation' might well 
be a factor which subtly influences the Court’s decision whether 
or not to take the opportunity (a) to investigate or (b) to accept 
the arguments of applicant undertakings that the Commission's fact 
evaluations are incorrect.
The Inadequate Resources of the European Court 
vis a vis High-Level Review of Infringement Decisions
The Crisis of Resources caused by the 
Width of the Court's Jurisdiction
The Court of Justice occupies an unique position in t rhe 
maintenance of the constitutional balance of the Community legal 
order. By virtue of Article 177 EEC, thousands of courts and
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other quasi-judical bodies all over the Community have the ability 
and, for some, the duty, to refer questions on points of Community 
law to the Court of Justice for 'preliminary rulings' before they 
attempt to apply it. Under Article 169 EEC, the Court has
exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate in disputes between the 
Commission and the Member States and between the Member States 
themselves as to the compatibility of national actions with the 
Treaty. In addition, the Court's jurisdiction under Articles 173 
and 175 EEC is frequently invoked against the Community 
institutions themselves by the Member States {and by other 
institutions) as to the legality of their behaviour.
However, and in striking contrast to its role in respect of these
weighty constitutional, inter-institutional and inter-governmental
issues, the 13 judges are obliged by Article 179 EEC to adjudicate
in all disputes arising between the Community institutions and
their many thousands of servants. According to the President of
the Court himself, "[t]he Court is at the same time a
constitutional Court and an employment tribunal” . Last, but
by no means least, the Court is required to hear all direct
actions brought by natural or legal persons against acts of the
238Community institutions under Articles 173(2) and 175 EEC
)  2378
237. Ole Due, "The Court of First Instance” (unpublished 
manuscript of 1989 in possession of author) page 10.
238. This paragraph is, of course, subject to the observations to 
be made in the next section concerning the transfer of 
jurisdiction to the Court of First Instance in 'staff cases’ 
and direct actions challenging individual applications of 
Articles 85 and 86 EEC.
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The case load created by these jurisdictions is enormous. The
latest figures available from the Court disclose that in 1988 some
334 new cases were brought and 231 judgments were delivered,
. 239leaving a backlog of 542 cases pending . The average time
taken by the Court to deal with cases amounted, in 1987, to 18
months for preliminary rulings and 22 months for direct
actions^ . Given such a caseload and the delays which it
produces, the Court has, in the words of its President, been,
"forced to choose certain priorities. Constitutional problems
and preliminary questions which keep in suspense the work of the
y other institutions or the cases pending before the national courts
must necessarily be given top priority. This, of course, makes
other cases suffer. Among these cases we find a number of
actions where individual applicants contest the facts on which the
241defending Community institution has based its decision1' . In 
view of the Court's desire to concentrate its energies on its 
constitutional role, therefore, it is the competition case 
entitled to 'high level' review of mixed questions of fact and 
law, which has had to bear the brunt of the 'resource 
rationalization' which the Court has undertaken in order that it 
can continue to function. In which ways has the Court attempted 
to rationalize its resources vis à vis the hearing of competition 
cases? There are principally two: firstly, minimization of the
f) use of fact-finding procedures and, secondly, division of labour. 
We shall now proceed to assess the adverse effects which these two 239401
239. These figures reflect the situation as of 18th November 1988 
and reported in, "The Essential Minimum: The Establishment of 
the Court of First Instance" by Tom Kennedy, 1989 ELRev 7, 8. 240
240. ibid.
241. Due, op. cit., supra fn 237, loc. cit.

measures may have upon the quality of the 'high level’ review 
which undertakings expect from the Court when they contest the 
factual/economic/legal evaluations made by the Commission under 
Articles 85{1)/86 EEC.
The Court's Fact-Finding Procedure242
Direct actions before the European Court, including competition 
cases brought under Articles 173(2) EEC, involve three distinct 
stages. First, and most important, is a "written procedure": the 
exchange of pleadings in which the parties set out the form of 
court order sought, the points of fact and law they rely on and 
the nature of any evidence used to found their claims. With 
regard to the latter, the Court of Justice allows undertakings a 
wide degree of freedom, during the written procedure, to submit a 
wide range of documentary evidence upon which they base their 
attack on the "exactitude matérielle" of Commission findings of 
fact. In addition to the documents submitted in the pleadings, 
the Court, as its inquisitory role requires, can and does request, 
via a letter from its Registrar, the submission of information or 
the production of documents which it considers necessary to enable 24
242. See, with regard to the EEC Treaty, Arts. 165 and 188 EEC, 
The Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the 
EEC and The Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, 
(particularly Titles 2 and 3 of the Rules). An excellent 
commentary on the Court's procedure can be found in "The 
European Court of Justice: Practice and Procedure" (1984) by
K.P. Lasok.
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, . . 243it to reach a decision .
On the basis of these written submissions, the "juge rappporteur" 
compiles a 'rapport ¿'audience' or preliminary report, summarising 
the arguments and recommending whether or not to move immediately 
to the final stage or, instead, to the second stage - "preparatory 
inquiries".
Preparatory inquiries may, as will be discussed presently, be
carried out by the Court or a Chamber of the Court. After
considering the recommendations of the "juge rapporteur” and after 
hearing the Advocate General, the Court or Chamber may formally 
order the carrying out of certain measures of inquiry in order to 
determine specific issues of fact. In either case, the measures 
of inquiry ordered can be carried out by the "juge rapporteur" 
acting alone. Measures of inquiry can involve the personal 
appearance of the parties themselves? the summoning, in
consultation with the parties and the Advocate General, and
judicially mediated questioning of oral witnesses; the
presentation of experts' reports; the production, at the request 
of the Court or Chamber, of documentary evidence or other 
information243 44 and, lastly, the inspection of the place or thing
243. These requests are made directly under the authority of 
Article 21 of the Court Statute and not, of course, as a 
measure of inquiry in accordance with the Rules of Procedure.
244. We have seen, however, that this provision is more or less a 
dead letter since the Court normally obtains such documentary 
material informally during the written procedure.
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in question
At a date after the preparatory inquiries have been completed, the 
Court or Chamber holds an "oral hearing". This is an opportunity 
for the representatives of the parties to make fairly short, legal 
submissions before the judges who will ultimately decide the case 
and for the judges and advocate general to put their questions to 
the representatives. At the end of the oral hearing and before 
the judges leave to consider their decision, the Advocate General 
delivers an oral opinion containing a relatively objective 
assessment of the issues raised in the case.
245
Minimisation of Fact-Finding as an Impediment to 
Effective 'High Level' Review of Infringement Decisions
An inquisitorial procedure such as that operated by the Court of 
Justice places a great deal of responsibility on the judge as 
opposed to the litigant with respect to fact-finding. Parties to 
a competition case have no right to 'lead* evidence before the 
Court and the Court has no duty to hear such evidence, instead it 
is the task of the Court as inquisitor to seek out those elements 
^ of fact which rt considers necessary to enable resolution of the 
*  issues at hand. Of course, the parties in dispute are not 
excluded from participating in the evidence gathering process 
(indeed, most, if not all, of the evidence which the Court 245
245. This is the official translation of the french, "la descente 
sur les lieux", which conveys a narrower idea, along the 
lines of Mohamed coming to the mountain instead of the 
mountain coming to Mohamed. No doubt, the latter would not, 
in appropriate cases be ruled out as a competent measure of 
inquiry.
1!
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examines will have been brought to its attention by them), 
however, in terms of the allocation of judicial time, their role 
is to a greater or lesser degree subordinated to that of the Court 
itself.
The principal benefit of such a judicially controlled fact-finding 
procedure is that of speed. It is effectively impossible for an 
undertaking to delay or burden proceedings by leading superfluous 
or unduly repetitive evidence before the Court of Justice. 
However, by empowering the judge to supervise fact-finding in 
^ order to prevent unnecessary delays, the inquisitorial system 
introduces the possibility that this power will be used in a way 
which goes beyond preventing unnecessary delay (in the sense of 
delay created by the leading of superfluous evidence) and which 
becomes a means of preventing delay ’per se*. In other words, 
when it is the judge's priorities and not the parties' priorities 
which determine the length of the fact-finding process, then the 
burden of pending cases - a burden only in the eyes of the judge - 
is a factor which could (illegitimately) influence the the Court's 
decision whether or not to undertake a particular measure of 
inquiry. ; -i
It cannot be doubted that the huge case-load of the European Court
) has been a powerful factor in discouraging the Court from
undertaking extensive fact-finding inquiries. In dealing with
competition cases the Court has heard oral witnesses on only three 
246occasions and has appointed an expert to compile a report on *217
246. "Suiker Unie", cit. supra fn 144, "Pioneer"
217 and "AKZO" cit. supra fn 134.
cit. supra fn
1i
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o n ly  o n e 2 4 7  248. R e q u e s t s  f o r  d o c u m e n t a r y  e v i d e n c e  a n d  o t h e r
i n f o r m a t i o n  by t h e  C o u r t  d u r i n g  t h e  w r i t t e n  p r o c e d u r e  a r e ,  i n
p r a c t i c e ,  m ore  f r e q u e n t  o c c u r r e n c e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  e v en  t h i s  i s
r e s t r i c t e d  by  t h e  p r e s s u r e  o f  r e s o u r c e s  f e l t  by t h e  j u d g e s
c o n d u c t i n g  p r o c e e d i n g s .  I n d e e d ,  i t  w o u ld  seem t h a t  t h e  most
p o p u l a r  m e a n s  o f  c o l l e c t i n g  e v i d e n c e  a t  p r e s e n t  i s  t h e  s o  c a l l e d
" q u e s t i o n  t i m e "  w h i c h  o c c u r s  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  o r a l  p r o c e d u r e  and
i n  w h i c h  t h e  j u d g e s  an d  a d v o c a t e  g e n e r a l  q u e s t i o n  t h e
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  b e f o r e  r e t i r i n g  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e i r
d e c i s i o n .  • I n  t h e  w o r d s  o f  P r e s i d e n t  Due ,  i n  f a c t ,  " t h e  r u l e s  on
t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  m e a s u r e s  o f  i n q u i r y  a r e  becom ing  more and  more
dead  l e t t e r s  an d  . . .  t h e  ' q u e s t i o n  t i m e '  h a s  t o  a g r e a t  e x t e n t
248r e p l a c e d  t h e  t a k i n g  o f  e v i d e n c e  i n  d u e  p r o c e d u r a l  f o r m ” . Now, 
th e  ' q u i c k  f i r e '  o r a l  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  c o u n s e l  i s  t o  be  welcomed a s  
u s e f u l  i n  i t s e l f ,  b u t  t h i s  means o f  c o l l e c t i n g  e v i d e n c e  i s  meant 
t o  s u p p l e m e n t  an d  n o t  t o  s u b s t i t u t e  o t h e r  f a c t - f i n d i n g  m e a s u r e s .
In  c o m p e t i t i o n  c a s e s  i n  w h ic h  c o m p le x  e c o n o m i c  e v a l u a t i o n s  a r e  i n  
i s s u e ,  t h e  m i n i m a l  u s e  w h ic h  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  m a k es  o f  i t 3  
e x t e n s i v e  f a c t - f i n d i n g  p o w e rs  c a n  o n l y  im pede  t h e  p r o f e s s e d
a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  C o u r t  t o  c o n d u c t  ' h i g h  l e v e l ’ r e v i e w .
|  D i v i s i o n  o f  L a b o u r  i n  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e
The E u r o p e a n  C o u r t  i s  a  c o l l e g i a t e  c o u r t ,  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  i t s  13 
j u d g e s  a r e  o f  e q u a l  r a n k  a n d  may s i t  a s  a c o l l e g e ,  " e n  s e a n c e  2478
247 .  C a s e  4 8 / 6 9 ,  ” I C I  v C o m m i s s i o n ”
2 4 8 .  o p .  c i t . ,  s u p r a  f n  2 3 7 ,  11 .
° 1 9 7 2 §  ECR 6 1 9 .
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p l é n i è r e "  ( t h e  q u o r u m  b e i n g  s e v e n ) , t o  h e a r  any  one  c a s e  o r  d e c i d e  
any i s s u e ,  h o w e v e r  t r i v i a l .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  whole  
Court  i s  r a r e l y ,  i f  e v e r ,  c o n v e n e d .  E f f i c i e n t  u s e  o f
manpower d i c t a t e s  t h a t  i n  m o s t  c a s e s ,  t h e  C o u r t  w i l l  o p e r a t e  v i a  
chambers o f  t h r e e  o r  f i v e  o f  i t s  M embers .
The C ham bers  o f  t h e  C o u r t  may be u s e d  t o  a d j u d i c a t e  i n  t h e  name o f  
the  C o u r t  i n  a  d i r e c t  a c t i o n ,  s u c h  a s  one  b r o u g h t  u n d e r  A r t s  172 
and 1 7 3 ( 2 )  EEC, " i n  s o  f a r  a s  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o r  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  
case  o r  p a r t i c u l a r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a r e  n o t  s u ch  a s  t o  r e q u i r e  t h e  
j  the  C o u r t  d e c i d e  i t  i n  p l e n a r y  s e s s i o n "  o r  may be u s e d  s i m p l y  
as j u d i c i a l  f a c t - f i n d e r s  t o  c o n d u c t  " p r e p a r a t o r y  i n q u i r i e s "  i n  
c a s e s  w h i c h  t h e  f u l l  C o u r t  a d j u d i c a t e s  i t s e l f .
When an  a p p l i c a t i o n  i n i t i a t i n g  a n  A r t i c l e  1 7 3 (2 )  a c t i o n  i s  
r e g i s t e r e d  w i t h  t h e  C o u r t ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  s e l e c t s  o n e  o f  t h e  
Chambers .  He a p p o i n t s  one  j u d g e  f r o m  t h i s  Chamber t o  be  " j u g e  
r a p p o r t e u r "  t o  t h e  C o u r t  d u r i n g  t h e  " w r i t t e n  p r o c e d u r e ” a n d  
p r o v i s i o n a l l y  a s s i g n s  t o  t h e  Chamber t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  a n y
p r e p a r a t o r y  i n q u i r i e s  w h i c h  i t  m i g h t  o r d e r .  When t h e  w r i t t e n  
p r o c e d u r e  i s  c o n c l u d e d ,  t h e  C o u r t ,  a f t e r  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  
p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t  o f  t h e  " j u g e - r a p p o r t e u r "  and  a f t e r  h e a r i n g  t h e  
A d v o c a t e - G e n e r a l  a s s i g n e d  t o  t h e  c a s e  i t  may a s s i g n  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  
3  any m e a s u r e s  o f  i n q u i r y  i t  c o n s i d e r s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  t h e  Chamber o r  249
249. R u l e s  o f  P r o c e d u r e  o f  ECJ,  A r t  9 5 ( 1 ) .  How ever ,  A r t  9 5 ( 3 )  o f  
t h e  R u l e s  a l l o w s  t h e  C o u r t  no s u c h  d i s c r e t i o n  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  
s o  c a l l e d  " S t a f f  C a s e s " ,  [ i . e .  a c t i o n s  b r o u g h t  a g a i n s t  
Community  I n s t i t u t i o n s  by t h e i r  s e r v a n t s  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  179 
EEC], w h e re  a d j u d i c a t i o n  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  d e v o l v e s  on  t h e  
C h am b ers  t o  w h ic h  t h a t  c l a s s  o f  a c t i o n s  a r e  a s s i g n e d ,  i n  
r o t a t i o n ,  on an  a n n u a l  b a s i s ,  [ C f .  d e c i s i o n  o f  C o u r t  o f  
3 0 . 9 . 8 1 ,  OJ (1 9 8 1 )  C 2 6 5 /3 ?  s e t t i n g  up s y s t e m  w h e r e b y  s t a f f  
c a s e s  a r e  h e a r d  i n  r o t a t i o n  by  t h e  Chambers  c o n t a i n i n g  t h r e e  
j u d g e s  ] .
Ti
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may, i f  a p p r o p r i a t e  d e c i d e  t o  r e f e r  a l l  o f  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  s t a g e s  o f  
the  c a s e  t o  t h e  C h a m b e r .
D i v i s i o n  o f  L a b o u r  a s  a n  I m p e d im e n t  t o  t h e
E f f e c t i v e  ' H i g h  L e v e l '  R e v i e w  o f  I n f r i n g e m e n t  D e c i s i o n s
The ' d o s s i e r '  o f  f a c t u a l  and  l e g a l  i s s u e s  p r e s e n t e d  t o  t h e  C o u r t  
in  a c o m p e t i t i o n  c a s e  c a n  be  enorm ous  a n d ,  u n l e s s  a l l  o f  t h e  
j u d g e s  who a r e  t o  d e c i d e  t h e  c a s e  a r e  g i v e n  a r e a s o n a b l e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  a b s o r b  t h e  i n t r i c a c i e s  o f  su ch  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  t h e y  
c a n n o t  b e  e x p e c t e d  t o  be  w i l l i n g  o r  a b l e  t o  d i s c h a r g e  t h e i r  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f u l l y .  G iv e n  t h e  p r e s s u r e  o f  r e s o u r c e s  f a c e d  by 
t h e  C o u r t ,  i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e  u s e  o f  i n v e s t i g a t i n g  cham bers  
a n d ,  t o  a  l e s s e r  e x t e n t ,  ' r a p p o r t s  d ' a u d i e n c e *  i n  h e a r i n g  
c o m p e t i t i o n  c a s e s  i m p e d e s  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  members o f  t h e  C o u r t  
t o  a c q u a i n t  t h e m s e l v e s  p r o p e r l y  w i t h  t h e  f a c t s  a n d  a r g u m e n t s  o f  
a p p l i c a n t  u n d e r t a k i n g s .
The House  o f  L o r d s  S e l e c t  C o m m i t t e e  R e p o r t  on t h e  p r o p o s a l  f o r  a
250C o u r t  o f  F i r s t  I n s t a n c e  p o i n t e d  o u t  two g r o u n d s  o f  c o n c e r n  
a r i s i n g  f r o m  t h e  d i v i s i o n  o f  l a b o u r  e m p loyed  by t h e  C o u r t  i n  
h e a r i n g  c o m p e t i t i o n  c a s e s .  F i r s t l y ,  t h e  L o r d s  c r i t i c i s e d  t h e  
C o u r t ' s  p r a c t i c e  o f  d e l e g a t i n g  t o  ch am b e rs  b o t h  t h e  c o n d u c t  o f  an y  
p r e p a r a t o r y  i n q u i r i e s  an d  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  w r i t t e n  e v i d e n c e .  
C o n c e rn  was  e x p r e s s e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t h a t  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  t a k i n g  
o r a l  e v i d e n c e  i n  a n y  p r e l i m i n a r y  i n q u i r y  b e f o r e  a  m i n o r i t y  o f  t h e  250
250 .  "A New C o u r t  o f  F i r s t  I n s t a n c e " ,  5 t h  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  House  o f  
L o r d s  S e l e c t  C o m m i t t e e  on t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t i e s ,  S e s s i o n  
1 9 8 7 - 8 8 ,  (HL P a p e r  2 0 ) .
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judges  d e c i d i n g  t h e  c a s e  d e p r i v e d  t h e  ma3 o r i t y  o f  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  
o p p o r t u n i t y  o f  o b s e r v i n g  t h e  d e m e a n o u r  o f  w i t n e s s e s  q u e s t i o n e d .  
In t h i s  c r i t i c i s m  t h e  L o r d s  a r e  j o i n e d  by S i r  Gordon  S l y n n ,  
f o r m e r ly  A d v o c a t e  G e n e r a l  t o  a n d  now j u d g e  o f  t h e  C o u r t  o f  
J u s t i c e ,  who h a s  s a i d :
" I  do n o t  f i n d  s a t i s f a c t o r y  t h e  h a l f - w a y  h o u s e  w h ich  s o m e t im es  
h a s  t o  b e  a d o p t e d  u n d e r  w h i c h  a ch am b e r  h e a r s  t h e  e v i d e n c e  
and  r e p o r t s  t o  t h e  f u l l  C o u r t  w h ic h  t h e n  p r o c e e d s  on t h e  
b a s i s  o f  t h a t  r e p o r t  w i t h o u t  a c t u a l l y  s e e i n g  t h e  w i t n e s s e s .  
I f  c r e d i b i l i t y  i s  i n  i s s u e  t h a t  i s  n o t  s a t i s f a c t o r y "
)  Second,  t h e  L o r d s  s t a t e d  t h a t ,  s i n c e  t h e  ' p r e l i m i n a r y  r e p o r t '
com pi led  by  t h e  " j u g e  r a p p o r t e u r "  a l o n e  a t  t h e  end  o f  t h e  w r i t t e n
p r o c e d u r e  r e p r e s e n t s  o n l y  a  som ewhat  r e f i n e d  o r  s i f t e d  a c c o u n t  o f
the  e v i d e n c e  s u b m i t t e d ,  t h e  j u d g e s  who f i n a l l y  d e c i d e  t h e  c a s e  on
the b a s i s  o f  t h i s  r e p o r t  a n d  w i t h o u t  h a v i n g  exam ined  t h e  d o s s i e r
co m p i le d  b y  t h e  p a r t i e s  a r e  a c t i n g  w i t h o u t  h a v i n g  t r u l y  a c q u a i n t e d
t h e m s e l v e s  w i t h  a l l  o f  t h e  w r i t t e n  e v i d e n c e  s u b m i t t e d .  I n  c a s e s
where d e t a i l e d  f a c t u a l  s u b m i s s i o n s  a r e  o f  s u c h  i m p o r t a n c e ,  t h e
Commit tee  o b s e r v e d  t h a t  i t  i s  c r u c i a l  t h a t  j u d g e s  e x a m in e  a s  much
253e v i d e n c e  a t  f i r s t  h a n d  a s  p o s s i b l e .  I t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  t h i s
s ec o n d  c r i t i c i s m  i s  a t  l e a s t  p a r t i a l l y  v a l i d .  The ' r a p p o r t
251
)
251. When t h e  c a s e  i s  t o  be  d e c i d e d  by a  Chamber o r  by t h e  C o u r t ,  
t h i s  o c c u r s  i f  i t  i s  t h e  " j u g e  r a p p o r t e u r "  a l o n e  who e x a m in e s  
t h e  w i t n e s s .  When t h e  c a s e  i s  t o  be  d e c i d e d  by t h e  C o u r t  
i t s e l f ,  t h i s  c a n  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  o c c u r  e v e n  when e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  
t h e  w i t n e s s  i s  u n d e r t a k e n  by  e v e r y  member o f  t h e  Chamber  t o  
w h ic h  t h e  h o l d i n g  o f  p r e p a r a t o r y  i n q u i r i e s  h a s  b e e n  a s s i g n e d .
252. 1985 F o rd h am  C o r p o r a t e  Law I n s t i t u t e ,  p 3 9 3 .  See a l s o ,  Due, 
o p .  c i t .  s u p r a  f n  2 3 7 ,  1 1 ,  " t h e  t a k i n g  o f  e v i d e n c e  b e f o r e  a 
b e n c h  w h i c h  may n o t  c o m p r i s e  a l l  t h e  j u d g e s  t h a t  a r e  g o i n g  
t o  d e c i d e  t h e  c a s e  i s  a  t o t a l l y  u n s a t i s a c t o r y  p r o c e d u r e " .
253. Op. c i t . ,  s u p r a ,  f n  2 5 0 ,  p a r a . 6 4 .
L
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¿ ' a u d i e n c e '  p r e p a r e d  by t h e  " j u g e  r a p p o r t e u r "  i s  a lw a y s  
s u p p l e m e n t e d  by p r i m a r y  e v i d e n t i a l  m a t e r i a l s  ( t r a n s c r i p t s  o f  
t e s t i m o n y ,  d o c u m e n t a t i o n ,  r e p o r t s ,  w r i t t e n  p l e a d i n g s  e t c . )  wh ich  
a r e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  b y  t h e  d e c i d i n g  j u d g e s .  However,  
g i v e n  t h e  r e s o u r c e  s h o r t a g e  i n  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e ,  i t  i s  
u n l i k e l y  t h a t  t h o s e  j u d g e s  w i l l  f i n d  t h e  t i m e  o r  t h e  e n e r g y  t o  
examine t h e s e  p r i m a r y  m a t e r i a l s  ( e s p e c i a l l y  when t h e y  a r e  a s  
complex a s  t h o s e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  a  c o m p e t i t i o n  c a s e ) .
P r o p o s a l s  f o r  R efo rm  o f  t h e  S y s te m  o f  J u d i c i a l  
R e v ie w  o f  I n f r i n g e m e n t  D e c i s i o n s
I n t r o d u c t i o n
We h a v e  s e e n  a b o v e  how t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  h a s  b e e n  h i n d e r e d  i n  
two ways  i n  p e r f o r m i n g  i t s  s e l f - p r o f e s s e d  t a s k  o f  s u b j e c t i n g  
i n f r i n g e m e n t  d e c i s i o n s  t o  ' h i g h  l e v e l '  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w .  F i r s t l y ,  
t h e r e  i s  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  C o u r t  t o  p e r f o r m  f u l l  r e ­
a d j u d i c a t i o n  o f  a n  i n f r i n g e m e n t  c a s e  w h ich  d e r i v e s  f rom  i t s  
l i m i t e d  p o w e r s  o f  d i s p o s a l  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  173 SEC. S e c o n d ,  t h e r e  
)  i s  t h e  c r i s i s  o f  r e s o u r c e s  i n h i b i t i n g  j u d i c i a l  f a c t - f i n d i n g  w hich  
d e r i v e s  f r o m  a m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  a n d  t h e  s h o r t a g e  o f  
manpower i n  t h e  C o u r t .  Over  t h e  y e a r s ,  p r o p o s a l s  t o  e l i m i n a t e  
b o th  o f  t h e s e  o b s t a c l e s  t o  e f f e c t i v e  ' h i g h  l e v e l '  r e v i e w  h a v e  b e e n  
p u t  f o r w a r d .
P r o p o s a l s  f o r  a  ' R e c o u r s  en  P l e i n e  J u r i d i c t i o n '
f rom t h e  S u b s t a n t i v e  F i n d i n g s  i n  I n f r i n g e m e n t  D e c i s i o n s
i[
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B e f o r e  R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 / 6 2  was e v e n  e n a c t e d  t h e r e  were  p r o p o s a l s  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  a  ’ r e c o u r s  e n  p l e i n e  j u r i d i c t i o n '  a g a i n s t  i n f r i n g e m e n t  
d e c i s i o n s .  The  s o - c a l l e d  " D e r i n g e r  R e p o r t ” o f  1961» which  
embodied  t h e  EEC A s s e m b l y ' s  o p i n i o n  on  t h e  p r o p o s a l  f o r  R e g u l a t i o n  
1 7 / 6 2 ,  s t a t e d  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d  t h a t :
" I l  e s t  un  p r o b l è m e  q u i  n e  p e u t  p a s  ê t r e  r é s o l u  d a n s  l e  
r è g l e m e n t ,  m a i s  q u e  l a  C o m m is s io n  de  l a  CEE ne d e v r a i t  p a s  
p e r d r e  d e  v u e :  c ' e s t  l ' a m p l e u r  d e  c o n t r ô l e  de  l a  Cour d e  
J u s t i c e  . . .  En c e  q u i  c o n c e r n e  l e s  d é c i s i o n s  r e l a t i v e  aux  
e n t e n t e s  . . .  l e s  f a i t s  e t  l e u r  a p p r é c i a t i o n  éco n o m iq u e  e t  
p o l i t i q u e  j o u e n t  un r ô l e  i m p o r t a n t .  C ' e s t  p o u r q o u i  i l  
f a u d r a  d é c i d e r  s i  l a  Cour d e  J u s t i c e  d i s p o s e r a  d ' u n  p o u v o i r  
d e  c o n t r ô l e  a u  f o n d  ou s ' i l  e s t  p o s s i b l e  d ' i n s t i t u e r  une  
i n s t a n c e  s p é c i a l e - i n t e r m é d i a r e  e n t r e  l a  C om m iss ion  e t  l a  
C o u r  d e  J u s t i c e " .
The s u g g e s t i o n  h e r e  was c l e a r l y  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  o u g h t  t o  be
g i v e n ,  " u n  p o u v o i r  d e  c o n t r o l e  au  f o n d " ,  i . e . ,  n o t  t h e  r e v i e w
j u r i s d i c t i o n  o r  ' j u r i d i c t i o n  de  1 ' a n u l l a t i o n ' , o f  t h e  C o u r t  ( i . e .
u n d e r  A r t i c l e  1 7 3 ( 2 )  EEC), b u t  a  j u r i s d i c t i o n  on  t h e  m e r i t s  o r
1j u r i d i c t i o n  de  r e f o r m a t i o n ' s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  e x e r c i s e d  u n d e r
A r t i c l e  172 EEC, o r ,  a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  t h a t  a  new s u b o r d i n a t e
t r i b u n a l  o u g h t  t o  b e  g i v e n  su ch  p o w e r .  T h i s  p o s i t i o n  h a s  b e en
f o l l o w e d  c o n s i s t e n t l y  by  t h e  E u r o p e a n  P a r l i a m e n t  d u r i n g  t h e  1 9 62-
88 p e r i o d  i n  i t s  c r i t i c i s m s  o f  t h e  ' p u r e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a p p r o a c h '
255j  t o  a d j u d i c a t i o n  s e t  u p  i n  R e g u l a t i o n  1 7 /6 2  . I n  1985 ,  f o r
i n s t a n c e ,  P a r l i a m e n t  s t a t e d  t h a t  f r o m  t h e  p o i n t  o f  v iew  o f  
u n d e r t a k i n g s ,  254
254 .  O p i n i o n  o f  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  A ss e m b ly  o n  p r o p o s a l  f o r  R e g u l a t i o n  
No. 1 7 ,  Doc. 1 0 4 / 1 9 6 0 - 6 1 ,  p a r a .  118 ( e m p h a s i s  a d d e d ) .
255 .  S e e ,  e . g . ,  R e s o l u t i o n  o f  EP on  1 0 t h  R e p o r t  on  C o m p e t i t i o n  
P o l i c y ,  OJ 1981  C 1 4 4 / 1 9 ,  p a r a .  41 a n d  R e s o l u t i o n  o f  EP on 
1 1 t h  R e p o r t ,  OJ 1982 C 1 1 / 7 2 ,  p a r a .  4 7 .
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" t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a p p r o a c h  l a c k e d  a n  e s s e n t i a l  i n g r e d i e n t  
w i t h o u t  w h i c h  a n y  p u r e l y  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a p p r o a c h  i s  
f u n d a m e n t a l l y  d e f e c t i v e ;  t h a t  i s ,  a l r i g h t  o f  a p p e a l  t o  a  
h i g h e r  t r i b u n a l  on f i n d i n g s  o f  f a c t "  .
The C o m m is s io n  i t s e l f  j o i n e d  w i t h  P a r l i a m e n t  i n  1982 t o  s t a t e  t h a t  
i t  f o u n d  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  s u c h  a  s y s t e m  o f  "une  d o u b l e  i n s t a n c e  de  
c o n t r ô l e  j u d i c i a r e "  a n o m a l o u s  and  e x p r e s s e d  i t s  s u p p o r t  f o r :
" l ' i n t r o d u c t i o n  d ' u n e  d o u b l e  i n s t a n c e :  un t r i b u n a l  d e  p r e m i è r e  
i n s t a n c e  q u i  s e  p r o n o n c e r a i t  t a n t  s u r  l e s  q u e s t i o n s  de  f a i t  
qu e  d e  d r o i t ,  l ' i n t e r v e n t i o n  de  l a  deu x ièm e  i n s t a n c e  é t a n t  
a l o r s  l i m i t é e  à un  r é e x a m e n  d e s  q u e s t i o n s  d e  d r o i t "
The b e l i e f  i n  t h e  m e r i t s  o f  s u c h  a  r e f o r m  c a n  be  s e e n  t o  be  s h a r e d  
by K .P .  L a s o k  i n  h i s  e v i d e n c e  t o  t h e  House o f  L o r d s  S e l e c t  
Commit tee  on t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t i e s  w h e r e ,  a s s e s s i n g  t h e  
p r o s p e c t s  o f  s u c c e s s  o f  t h e  p r o p o s e d  C o u r t  o f  F i r s t  I n s t a n c e  which  
i s  t o  e x e r c i s e  p a r t  o f  t h e  C o u r t ' s  e x i s t i n g  j u r i s d i c t i o n  v i s  à v i s  
c o m p e t i t i o n  d e c i s i o n s  , he  s t a t e d :
"The t r u e  s o l u t i o n  l i e s  i n  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a  c o u r t  w i t h  t h e  
pow er  t o  c a r r y  o u t  w ha t  c o u l d  be  d e s c r i b e d  a s  an  
" a d m i n i s t r a t i v e "  a s  o p p o s e d  t o  " j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w "  o f  a c t s  o f  
t h e  Community  i n s t i t u t i o n s ;  i n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  a  c o u r t  ( o r  
t r i b u n a l )  w h i c h  h a s  t h e  u n l i m i t e d  j u r i d i c t i o n  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  
p o s s e s s e s  o n l y  in  e x c e p t i o n a l  c a s e s "  .
> 256789
256. O p i n i o n  o f  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  on L e g a l  A f f a i r s  an d  C i t i z e n s '  
R i g h t s  on t h e  R e s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  P a r l i a m e n t  on t h e  
1 4 t h  A n n u a l  R e p o r t  on C o m p e t i t i o n  P o l i c y ,  ?E Doc.  A2- 
1 2 8 / 8 5 / A n n e x ,  1 2 .
257. O n z ièm e  R a p p o r t  s u r  La P o l i t i q u e  C o m m u n a u ta i r e  de  l a  
C o n c u r r e n c e ,  p a r a g r a p h  16 ( e m p h a s i s  a d d e d ) .
258. F o r  d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  C o u r t  o f  F i r s t  I n s t a n c e  s e e  n e x t  c h a p t e r .
259.  HL R e p o r t ,  o p .  c i t .  s u p r a  a t  f n .  2 5 0 ,  E v i d e n c e ,  p a g e  8 3 .
(i
à ouasDOB
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W id esp read ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  t h e  c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  ' h i g h  l e v e l *  r e v i e w  
of i n f r i n g e m e n t  d e c i s i o n s  w i l l  b e  e f f i c i e n t  o n l y  i f  t h a t  r e v i e w  i s  
c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  a r e - a d j u d i c a t i o n  on t h e  m e r i t s ,  by 
a t r i b u n a l  w i t h  t h e  p o w e r  o f  *r é f o r m a t i o n *
P r o p o s a l s  t o  A l l e v i a t e  t h e  P r e s s u r e  o f  R e s o u r c e s  
v i s  à  v i s  t h e  H e a r i n g  o f  C o m p e t i t i o n  C a s e s
The p r o b l e m s  c a u s e d  b y  t h e  o v e r - b u r d e n i n g  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o u r t
have b e e n  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  p r o p o s a l s  f o r  r e f o r m  s i n c e  1974 when t h e
f  Cour t  s o u g h t  t o  b e  r e l i e v e d  o f  i t s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  t h e  s o  c a l l e d
’s t a f f  c a s e s ’ . W h i l e  t h a t  p r o p o s a l  was n o t  a d o p t e d  by t h e
C o u n c i l ,  i t  was  d e c i d e d  i n  t h e  same y e a r  t o  p e r m i t  t h e  C o u r t  t o
a s s i g n ,  w i t h i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  i t s  R u l e s  o f  P r o c e d u r e ,  t h e  h e a r i n g
26 Xof  c e r t a i n  c l a s s e s  o f  p r e l i m i n a r y  r u l i n g s  t o  ch am b e rs
In 1978 t h e  C o u r t  p r o d u c e d  a  memorandum i n  w h ich  i t  p r o p o s e d  an
i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  number  o f  j u d g e s  a n d  a d v o c a t e s  g e n e r a l ,  c e r t a i n
changes  i n  t h e  R u l e s  o f  P r o c e d u r e  a n d ,  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  t h i s  
s t u d y ,  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  C o u r t  o f  f i r s t  i n s t a n c e  t o  d e a l  w i t h  
a c t i o n s  b r o u g h t  by  p r i v a t e  p e r s o n s  i n  c o m p e t i t i o n  m a t t e r s  o r  f o r  
damages s u b j e c t  t o  a  r i g h t  o f  a p p e a l  t o  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  on 2601
3
260. K e n n e d y ,  o p .  c i t .  s u p r a  f n  2 3 9 ,  9 .
261. C o u n c i l  D e c i s i o n  7 4 / 5 8 4  EEC E u r a t o m  ECSC o f  November  26,  
1 9 7 4 ,  OJ 1974 L 3 1 8 / 2 2 .
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p o i n t s  o f  l a w  . The p r o p o s a l  t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  f i r s t  i n s t a n c e
t r i b u n a l  t o  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  c o m p e t i t i o n  c a s e - l o a d  was n o t  a c t e d  
upon, h o w e v e r ,  a n d  t h e  C o u r t  h a d  t o  w a i t  u n t i l  t h e  i n t e r ­
g o v e r n m e n t a l  c o n f e r e n c e  o f  1985 b e f o r e  t h e  Member S t a t e s  p r o v i d e d  
the  T r e a t y  b a s i s  f o r  s u c h  r e f o r m .  A r t i c l e  11 o f  t h e  S i n g l e
European A c t ,  i n t r o d u c i n g  A r t i c l e  168A EEC, p r o v i d e s  t h a t  t h e  
C o u n c i l  a c t i n g  u n a n i m o u s l y  on  a  r e q u e s t  f ro m  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  
may,
262
" a t t a c h  t o  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  a c o u r t  w i t h  j u r i s d i c t i o n  t o  
h e a r  a n d  d e t e r m i n e  a t  f i r s t  i n s t a n c e ,  s u b j e c t  t o  a r i g h t  o f  a 
f  a p p e a l  t o  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  on p o i n t s  o f  l a w  o n l y  and i n
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  l a i d  down i n  t h e  S t a t u t e  [ o f  
t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e ] ,  c e r t a i n  c l a s s e s  o f  a c t i o n  o r  p r o c e e d i n g  
b r o u g h t  by  n a t u r a l  o r  l e g a l  p e r s o n s  " ,
The C o u n c i l  D e c i s i o n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  C o u r t  o f  F i r s t  I n s t a n c e  o f  
th e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t i e s  was a d o p t e d  o n  t h e  2 4 t h  o f  O c t o b e r  1988 
and we s h a l l  c o n s i d e r  i t s  c o n t e n t  i n  d e t a i l  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p a r t .  26
3
262. Memorandum o f  21 J u l y ,  1978  ( p u b l i s h e d  i n  'EUROPE* o f  20 
D ecem ber  1978)  a n d  p r o p o s a l s  r e g a r d i n g  m e a s u r e s  t o  e n s u r e  
t h e  e f f i c i e n t  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  C o u r t  ( u n p u b l i s h e d ) .  
D i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  2 3 r d  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  House  o f  L o r d s  S e l e c t  
C o m m i t t e e  on  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t i e s ,  S e s s i o n  1 9 7 9 - 8 0 ,  
" E u r o p e a n  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e :  R / 2 0 7 5 / 7 8 ,  4 6 7 9 / 7 9 ,  P r o p o s a l s  o f  
t h e  C o u r t  f o r  i t s  R e o r g a n i s a t i o n ” , 12 t o  1 8 .  See  a l s o  
K e n n e d y ,  o p .  c i t .  s u p r a  f n  2 3 9 ,  10 t o  1 2 .
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THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
I n t r o d u c t i o n
f
On t h e  2 4 t h  o f  O c t o b e r  1 9 8 8 ,  t h e  C o u n c i l ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e
p r o v i s i o n s  o f  A r t i c l e  168A o f  t h e  EEC T r e a t y  a s  i n t r o d u c e d  by
263A r t i c l e  11 o f  t h e  S i n g l e  E u r o p e a n  A c t ,  d e c i d e d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  
Court  o f  F i r s t  I n s t a n c e  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t i e s .  The  seco n d  
r e c i t a l  o f  t h e  p r e a m b l e  t o  t h a t  D e c i s i o n  s t a t e s :
" W h e r e a s ,  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  a c t i o n s  r e q u i r i n g  c l o s e  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  
c o m p le x  f a c t s ,  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  s e c o n d  c o u r t  w i l l  
i m p r o v e  t h e  j u d i c i a l  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  i n t e r e s t s ?
The r e f o r m s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a r e  e x p l i c i t l y  d i r e c t e d  t o w a r d s  im p r o v in g  
the  q u a l i t y  o f  j u d i c i a l  s c r u t i n y  o f  c o m p le x  f a c t u a l  i s s u e s  a t  
f i r s t  i n s t a n c e .  How w e l l  i s  t h i s  a s p i r a t i o n  s e r v e d  by t h e  
s u b s t a n c e  o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n ?  I n  t h i s  p a r t ,  we s h a l l  examine  
f i r s t  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f r am e w o rk  o f  t h e  new s y s t e m  f o r  t h e  
j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  o f  c o m p e t i t i o n  d e c i s i o n s  an d  t h e n ,  s e c o n d ,  we 
s h a l l  a s s e s s  w ha t  s o r t  o f  im p a c t  t h i s  new s y s t e m  w i l l  h a v e  on t h e  
|  " j u d i c i a l  ■ p r o t e c t i o n  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  i n t e r e s t s "  v i s  a v i s  
i n f r i n g e m e n t  d e c i s i o n s .  263
263. C o u n c i l  D e c i s i o n  8 8 / 5 9 1  EEC E u r a t o m  ECSC o f  24 O c t o b e r  1988,  
OJ L 3 1 9 / 1  o f  25 November 1 9 8 8 .
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The m e c h a n i c s  o f  t h e  New S ys tem 264
The CFI -  C o m p o s i t i o n  a n d  P r o c e d u r e
The D e c i s i o n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  The C o u r t  o f  F i r s t  I n s t a n c e ,  ( C F I ) ,
p r o v i d e s  t h a t  i t  w i l l  c o n s i s t  o f  12 j u d g e s ,  a p p o i n t e d  f o r
r e n e w a b le  t e r m s  o f  s i x  y e a r s ,  e l e c t i n g  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  CFI
from among t h e i r  number  f o r  a  r e n e w a b l e  t e r m  o f  t h r e e  y e a r s .
G e n e r a l l y  s p e a k i n g ,  t h e  CFI  w i l l  s i t  i n  Cham bers  o f  t h r e e  o r  f i v e
j u d g e s ,  b u t  i n  c e r t a i n  c a s e s  -  d e s i g n a t e d  by t h e  C F I ' s  R u l e s  o f
2 6 5P r o c e d u r e  -  i t  may s i t  i n  p l e n a r y  s e s s i o n  . F u r t h e r ,  t h e  CFI 
w i l l  n o t  a s  a r u l e  b e  a s s i s t e d  by A d v o c a t e s  G e n e r a l ,  t h o u g h  a g a i n ,  
in c e r t a i n  c a s e s  -  d e s i g n a t e d  by t h e  C F I ' s  R u l e s  o f  P r o c e d u r e  -  *245
264. G o v e r n e d  by A r t i c l e  168A EEC, C o u n c i l  D e c i s i o n  8 8 / 5 9 1  EEC 
E u r a t o m  ECSC and A r t i c l e s  44 t o  54 o f  t h e  P r o t o c o l  on  t h e  
S t a t u t e  o f  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  o f  t h e  EEC, a s  i n s e r t e d  by 
A r t i c l e  7 o f  t h a t  D e c i s i o n .  S e e  g e n e r a l l y ,  K e n n e d y ,  o p .  
c i t .  s u p r a  f n  239 ,  21 t o  2 7 .
0  265. The n e e d  f o r  t h e  CFI t o  s i t  i n  p l e n a r y  s e s s i o n  was n o t
a c c e p t e d  by t h e  C o u r t  i n  i t s  f o r m a l  p r o p o s a l  s i n c e ,  i n  i t s  
o p i n i o n ,  i t ,  " i t  i s  f o r  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  t o  e n s u r e  
c o n s i s t e n c y  i n  j u d i c i a l  d e c i s i o n s ,  a v o i d  p o s s i b l e  d i v e r g e n c e s  
b e t w e e n  t h e  c h a m b e r s  o f  t h e  C o u r t  o f  F i r s t  I n s t a n c e  and 
d e v e l o p  Community  l a w " ,  [Cou 8 7 7 0 / 8 7 ,  e x p l a n a t o r y  n o t e  
a c c o m p a n y i n g  p r o p o s e d  A r t i c l e  2 ,  p a r a .  2 ] ,  ( a l t h o u g h ,  w i t h o u t  
e l a b o r a t i n g ,  i t  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  i t s  p r o p o s a l  w o u ld  n o t  p r e v e n t  
t h e  h o l d i n g  o f  p l e n a r y  s e s s i o n s  " t o  d i s c u s s  q u e s t i o n s  o f  
l a w " ,  [ i b i d . ] ) .  T he  a l t e r n a t i v e  v i e w ,  e x p r e s s e d  i n  t h e  
e v i d e n c e  s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  L o r d s  C o m m i t t e e  ( o p .  c i t . ,  s u p r a  fn
2 4 5 ,  E v i d e n c e ,  p 3 6 ,  Q. 1 5 9 ) ,  was t h a t  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  s i t  in  
p l e n a r y  s e s s i o n  t o  r e s o l v e  d i v e r g e n c e s  b e t w e e n  c h a m b e r s  on 
p o i n t s  o f  l a w ,  w h ic h  c o u l d  f o r s e e a b l y  be u s e f u l  w h e r e  t h e r e  
was no  ' i n  p o i n t '  r u l i n g  on  t h e  m a t t e r  f r o m  t h e  E u r o p e a n  
C o u r t ,  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  e l i m i n a t e d .  T h e  C o u n c i l  h a s  c h o s e n  in  
i t s  d e c i s i o n  t o  p r o v i d e  t h i s  ' s a f e t y  v a l v e ' .
1I
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one o f  t h e  j u d g e s  t h e m s e l v e s  may b e  c a l l e d  upon  t o  p e r f o r m  t h e
task  o f  a n  A d v o c a t e  G e n e r a l  . T he  p r o c e d u r e  b e f o r e  CFI w i l l  be
267governed  by  T i t l e  I I I  o f  t h e  S t a t u t e  o f  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  an d  by
i t s  R u l e s  o f  P r o c e d u r e  w h i c h  i t  w i l l  a d o p t  i n  a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  t h e
26fi
Court o f  J u s t i c e ,  w i t h  t h e  u n a n im o u s  a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l
U n t i l  t h e s e  R u l e s  a r e  a d o p t e d ,  t h e  R u l e s  o f  P r o c e d u r e  o f  t h e  C o u r t
269of  J u s t i c e  w i l l  a p p l y  t o  i t  ' m u t a t i s  m u t a n d i s '
The CFI i s  t o  t a k e  o v e r  t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i n  c o m p e t i t i o n  c a s e s  
p r e s e n t l y  e x e r c i s e d  by t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  u n d e r  A r t i c l e s  172 and 
173(2) o f  t h e  EEC T r e a t y ^ ® .  The e x c l u s i v i t y  o f  t h e  C F I ' s  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  i s  u n d e r l i n e d  by A r t i c l e  49 o f  t h e  S t a t u t e  o f  t h e  
Court  o f  J u s t i c e ,  a s  i n s e r t e d  by A r t i c l e  7 o f  t h e  D e c i s i o n ,  which 
p r o v i d e s ,  i n t e r  a l i a ,  t h a t  i n  t h e  e v e n t  o f  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  
r e c e i v i n g  a n  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  a d j u d i c a t e  i n  s u c h  p r o c e e d i n g s ,  i t  i s  
r e q u i r e d  t o  r e f e r  t h e  a c t i o n  t o  t h e  C F I ,
A p p ea ls  f r o m  t h e  CFX t o  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e
o
266. C o u n c i l  D e c i s i o n  8 8 /5 9 1 /E C S C / E E C /E u r a to m ,  A r t i c l e  2 .  The 
new A r t i c l e  4 6 ( 3 )  o f  t h e  C o u r t  S t a t u t e  p e r m i t s  t h e  
s u b m i s s i o n s  o f  an  A d v o c a t e  G e n e r a l  t o  t h e  CFI t o  b e  made i n  
w r i t i n g .  267890
267. A r t i c l e  168A(2)  EEC; w i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n ,  (made b y  A r t i c l e  
4 6 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  C o u r t  S t a t u t e ) ,  o f  A r t i c l e  20 ,  w h ic h  r e l a t e s  t o  
p r e l i m i n a r y  r u l i n g s .
268. A r t i c l e  168A(4)  EEC.
269. A r t i c l e  4 6 ( 2 )  o f  t h e  C o u r t  S t a t u t e .
270. C o u n c i l  D e c i s i o n ,  A r t i c l e  3 ( 1 ) ( c ) .
i
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The C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  i s  u n e q u i v o c a l  i n  i t s  d e s i r e  t o  a v o i d
becoming b o g g e d  down i n  a p p e l l a t e  h e a r i n g s  a f t e r  t h e  CFI comes
in to  o p e r a t i o n .  R a t h e r ,  i t  w o u ld  p r e f e r ,  a s  t h e  t h i r d  r e c i t a l  o f
the p r e a m b l e  t o  t h e  C o u n c i l  D e c i s i o n  p u t s  i t , " t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  i t s
a c t i v i t i e s  on  i t s  f u n d a m e n t a l  t a s k  o f  e n s u r i n g  u n i f o r m
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  Community  l a w " :  a  t a s k  w h ic h  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f
the C o u r t ,  i n  1 9 7 8 ,  c a l l e d ,  " i t s  t r u e  and  m ain  r o l e  w i t h i n  t h e
271framework o f  t h e  Community"  . The l i m i t e d  g r o u n d s  an d  th e  
e x p e d i t e d  p r o c e d u r e  t o  b e  em p lo y e d  d u r i n g  a p p e a l  f rom  d e c i s i o n s  o f  
the CFI u n d e r l i n e  t h i s  d i s t a t e  f o r  f a c t  e x a m i n a t i o n .
L im i te d  G r o u n d s  o f  A p p e a l
272  273An a p p e a l  w i l l  l i e  t o  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  f r o m  t h e  CFI
a g a i n s t  f i n a l  d e c i s i o n s  an d  d e c i s i o n s  d i s p o s i n g  o f  t h e  s u b s t a n c e
of a c a s e  i n  p a r t  o r  d i s p o s i n g  o f  a  p r o c e d u r a l  i s s u e  c o n c e r n i n g  a
271. "EUROPE" No. 1034 ,  o f  2 0 . 1 2 . 7 8 ,  p 4 .
272. The e n g l i s h  v e r s i o n  o f  t h e  C o u n c i l  D e c i s i o n  r e f e r s  t o  an  
" a p p e a l "  f rom  t h e  CFI t o  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e .  T h i s  s h o u l d  
n o t  b e  c o n f u s e d  w i t h  t h e  f r e n c h  l e g a l  t e r m  " a p p e l "  which  
r e p r e s e n t s  a  c o m p l e t e l y  d i f f e r e n t  c o n c e p t .  The f r e n c h  t e x t ,  
w h ic h  u s e s  t h e  t e r m  " p o u r v o i " ,  m akes  i t  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  a p p e a l  
p r o c e d u r e  i s  t o  be  a n a l o g o u s  t o  t h e  " p o u r v o i  e n  c a s s a t i o n "  o f  
t h e  f r e n c h  s y s t e m .  T h i s  i d e a  f i t s  i n  n i c e l y  w i t h  t h e  d e s i r e  
o f  t h e  C o u n c i l  a n d  C o u r t  t o  e m p h a s i s e  t h e  l a t t e r ' s  r o l e  as  
t h e  C o u r  d e  C a s s a t i o n  o r  Suprem e  C o u r t  o f  t h e  Community  l e g a l  
o r d e r . 273
273. The d e t a i l e d  r u l e s  o f  a p p e a l  p r o c e d u r e  b e f o r e  t h e  C o u r t  o f  
J u s t i c e ,  w h ic h  a r e  t o  b e  l a i d  down i n  i t s  R u l e s  o f  P r o c e d u r e ,  
a r e  n o t  y e t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  a u t h o r .  The p r o p o s e d  c h a n g e s ,  
s e t  down i n  , a n d  w h ic h  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  h im ,  w i l l  be 
d i s c u s s e d  i n  s e c t i o n  B. b e l o w  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  
t h e  r e f o r m s .
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plea  o f  l a c k  o f  c o m p e t e n c e  o r  i n a d m i s s i b i l i t y  . A p p e a l s  a r e
l i m i t e d  t o  p o i n t s  o f  l a w  on  g r o u n d s  o f ,  " l a c k  o f  c o m p e t e n c e  o f  t h e
Court  o f  F i r s t  I n s t a n c e ,  a  b r e a c h  o f  p r o c e d u r e  b e f o r e  i t  w h ich
a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t s  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  a p p e l l a n t  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e
2 7 5i n f r i n g e m e n t  o f  Community  law  by t h e  C o u r t  o f  F i r s t  I n s t a n c e "
I t  w i l l  be  n o t e d  t h a t  i n  s o  f a r  a s  t h i s  l a s t  g r o u n d  o f  a p p e a l  more
or l e s s  r e p r o d u c e s  t h e  g r o u n d  f o r  a n n u l m e n t  o f  a c t s  u n d e r  A r t i c l e
173(2) EEC w h i c h  r e a d s ,  " v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  T r e a t y  o r  o f  a n y  r u l e  o f
law r e l a t i v e  t o  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n " ,  t h e  r e v i e w  by t h e  C o u r t  o f
J u s t i c e  o f  t h e  C F I ' s  " q u a l i f i c a t i o n  j u r i d i q u e  d e s  f a i t s "  i s
g u a r a n t e e d  . H o w e v e r ,  i n  c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n  t o  r e v i e w  o f
i n f r i n g e m e n t  d e c i s i o n s  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  1 7 3 ( 2 )  EEC, r e v i e w  o f
t h e ,  " e x a c t i t u d e  m a t é r i e l l e " ,  o f  f a c t s  f o u n d  by t h e  CFI i s  l i k e l y
to  be e s c h e w e d  by a  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  a n x i o u s  t o  e s c a p e  t h e  b u r d e n s
of  f a c t - f i n d i n g .  W i th  r e g a r d  t o  a p p e a l s  i n  c o m p e t i t i o n  c a s e s .
P r e s i d e n t  Due h a s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t ,  i n  t h e  C o u r t ' s  v i e w ,  " t h e
f i n d i n g s  o f  t h e  C o u r t  o f  F i r s t  I n s t a n c e  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  e c o n o m i c
and c o m p e t i t i v e  s i t u a t i o n  on  t h e  m a r k e t  s h o u l d  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  
2 7 7f i n a l "  . Two p r o c e d u r a l  d e v i c e s  w h i c h  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e
Q 274. A r t i c l e  4 9 (1 )  o f  t h e  C o u r t  S t a t u t e .
275. A r t  51 o f  C o u r t  S t a t u t e .  T h i s  l a s t  g r o u n d  o f  a p p e a l  i s  a 
r e v i s e d  fo r m  r e p l a c i n g  t h e  p r o p o s e d ,  " i n c o r r e c t  a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  Community  l a w "  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  C o u r t ’ s  D r a f t  P r o p o s a l  o f  
1987 [ P r o p o s a l  f o r  a  C o u n c i l  D e c i s i o n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a C o u r t  o f  27
F i r s t  I n s t a n c e ,  Cou 8 7 7 0 / 8 7 ,  
S t a t u t e  ] .
p r o p o s e d A r t 50 o f C o u r t
276. P r e s i d e n t  Due h a s  i n d i c a t e d i n  t h i s r e g a r d t h a t , " t h e
[ l e g a l ]  c r i t e r i a  u s e d  f o r  d e f i n i n g  t h e  r e l e v a n t  m a r k e t  [ i n  a 
c o m p e t i t i o n  c a s e ]  c o n s t i t u t e  a  p o i n t  o f  l a w  s u b j e c t  t o  
a p p e a l  . . .  [ a s  d o e s  t j h e  q u e s t i o n  w h i c h  p a r t y  h a s  t o  b e a r  
t h e  b u r d e n  o f  p r o o f " ,  o p .  c i t .  s u p r a  f n  23 7 ,  5 .  27
277. i b i d .
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w il l  p r o b a b l y  employ  i n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  a p p e a l s  u n d e r l i n e  i t s
r e l u c t a n c e  t o  r e - e x a m i n e  f a c t s  d e t e r m i n e d  a t  f i r s t  i n s t a n c e .
F i r s t l y ,  t h e  C o u r t  h a s  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  i n  h e a r i n g  a p p e a l s  i t  s h o u l d
have no p o w e r  t o  u n d e r t a k e  f r e s h  p r e p a r a t o r y  i n q u i r i e s  /  " m e s u r e s  
278d ' i n s t r u c t i o n ” , b y  w h i c h  o l d  i t e m s  o f  e v i d e n c e  c o u l d  b e  " r e ­
heard"  o r  new i t e m s  o f  e v i d e n c e  i n t r o d u c e d .  S e c o n d ,  t h e  C o u r t  has  
p ro p o sed  t h a t  an  a p p e a l  b e  made s i m p l y  b y  l o d g i n g  a  n o t e  o f  a p p e a l
( s t a t i n g  t h e  g r o u n d  o f  a p p e a l  an d  t h e  a r g u m e n t s  o f  l a w  r e l i e d
279upon) t o  w h i c h  i s  a t t a c h e d  t h e  c o n t e s t e d  d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  CFI ,
which w i l l  c o n t a i n  ' i n  g r e m i o '  a  s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  f a c t s  t h a t  i t
280has f o u n d  p r o v e n  a n d  r e l e v a n t  .
Ora l  A rgum en t  i n  A p p e a l s
i. 27890
278. Cou 8 7 7 0 / 8 7 ,  p r o p o s e d  A r t i c l e  1 1 8 ( 3 )  o f  R u l e s  o f  P r o c e d u r e  
a n d  a c c o m p a n y i n g  e x p l a n a t o r y  t e x t .  H o w ev e r ,  i t  s h o u l d  be  
re m e m b ered  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  h a s  a  r e s i d u a l  power 
u n d e r  A r t i c l e  21 o f  t h e  C o u r t  S t a t u t e  t o  o b t a i n  i n f o r m a t i o n  
w h ic h  c o u l d  be i n v o k e d  i n  e x c e p t i o n a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
279. Cou 8 7 7 0 / 8 7 ,  p r o p o s e d  A r t i c l e  112 o f  R u l e s  o f  P r o c e d u r e  o f  
t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e .
280. I t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  t h a t  o n l y  i f  t h e  C o u r t  w e re  g i v e n  good 
g r o u n d s  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  t h e  CFI h a d  c o m m i t t e d  some t r u l y  
g r o s s  f a c t u a l  e r r o r  f a l l i n g  w i t h i n  t h e  e q u i t a b l e  s c o p e  o f  t h e  
" i n f r i n g m e n t  o f  Community  law"  g r o u n d  o f  a p p e a l .  The^ r i g h t  
t o  a  f a i r  h e a r i n g  b e f o r e  a n  i m p a r t i a l  t r i b u n a l ;  w h i c h  i s  
g u a r a n t e e d  by A r t i c l e  6 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o n v e n t i o n  on 
Human R i g h t s  ( a n d  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  
j u r s i p r u d e n c e  o f  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e ,  a  f u n d a m e n t a l  r i g h t  o f  
Community  law  w h i c h  i t  i s  b o u n d  t o  d e f e n d )  w o u ld ,  i t  i s  
s u b m i t t e d ,  be  v i o l a t e d  i n  t h e  e v e n t  t h a t  t h e  CFI d i d  commit 
m a n i f e s t  o r  g r o s s  e r r o r s  o f  f a c t .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  t r u l y  g r o s s  
e r r o r s  c o u l d  a l s o  c o n s t i t u t e  a n  a b u s e  o f  ( j u d i c i a l )  p o w e r ,  
a g a i n  a  g r o u n d  i m p l i c i t l y  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  " i n f r i n g e m e n t  o f  
Community  law"  g r o u n d  o f  a p p e a l .
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Accord ing  t o  A r t i c l e  52 o f  t h e  C o u r t  S t a t u t e ,  a p p e a l s  b r o u g h t
j b e fo re  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  w i l l  c o n s i s t  o f  a w r i t t e n  p a r t  an d  an
' o r a l  p a r t ;  p r o v i d e d  t h a t ,  i n  l i n e  w i t h  c o n d i t i o n s  t o  be l a i d  down
in i t s  R u l e s  o f  P r o c e d u r e ,  t h e  C o u r t  m ay ,  h a v i n g  c o n s u l t e d  t h e
' p a r t i e s  a n d  t h e  A d v o c a t e  G e n e r a l  on  t h e  m a t t e r ,  d i s p e n s e  w i t h  t h e
I o r a l  p a r t .  The new A r t i c l e  1 2 0 ( 1 )  o f  t h e  R u l e s  o f  P r o c e d u r e  o f
' the  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  e n a b l e s  t h e  C o u r t  t o  d i s p e n s e  w i t h  t h e  o r a l
p a r t  u n l e s s  o n e  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  o b j e c t s  o n  t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  t h e
w r i t t e n  p a r t  d i d  n o t  p e r m i t  him f u l l y  t o  d e f e n d  h i s  p o i n t  o f  v i e w .
f This p r o v i s i o n  d i f f e r s  f r o m  t h e  f o r m a l  p r o p o s a l  o f  t h e  C o u r t  i n
i* which t h e  C o u r t  c o u l d  h a v e  p r o c e e d e d  t o  j u d g m e n t  w i t h o u t  r e c o u r s e
to o r a l  p r o c e e d i n g s  i f  -  e x e r c i s i n g  u n l i m i t e d  d i s c r e t i o n  -  i t
281c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  t h e y  w e re  n o t  r e q u i r e d
D i s p o s a l  o f  A p p e a l s
I f  an  a p p e a l  i s  w e l l  f o u n d e d ,  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  w i l l  q u a s h  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  CFI a n d ,  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  i n t e r l o c u t o r y  d e c i s i o n s ,  
r e f e r  t h e  c a s e  b ack  f o r  d i s p o s a l .  I f  a n  a p p e a l  f rom a  f i n a l  
d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  CFI i s  w e l l  f o u n d e d ,  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  may, 
i n s t e a d  o f  r e f e r r i n g  t h e  c a s e  b a c k  f o r  d i s p o s a l ,  i s s u e  f i n a l  
0  judgm en t  i t s e l f .  I f  a  c a s e  i s  r e f e r r e d  b a c k  t o  t h e  CFI i t  i s  
bound b y  t h e  d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  C o u r t  o f  J u s t i c e  on p o i n t s  o f  law^®^. 281
281. Cou 8 7 7 0 / 8 7  ( F i n a l ) ,  c i t e d  by H o u se  o f  L o r d s  R e p o r t ,  o p .  
c i t . ,  f n .  14 s u p r a ,  Addendum, p a r a .  1 6 .
282. C o u r t  S t a t u t e ,  A r t i c l e  5 4 ,  p a r a g r a p h s  (1) a n d  (2) 
r e s p e c t i v e l y .
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The Court of First Instance and Improvement of 
Fact-Finding in the Review of Infringement Decisions
Introduction
In this section we shall assess the creation of the Court of First 
Instance in terms of its likely impact on judical fact-finding in 
the review of infringement decisions. We shall focus, first, on 
the resource implications of the new court and, second, on the 
nature of the CFI's jurisdiction.
Increased Resources as an Incentive to 
Undertake Fact-Finding
In so far as it creates, (in terms of numbers, composition and
organisation), a second Court of Justice to exercise only 30% of
283the jurisdiction of its 'predecessor' , the Decision to 
establish the CFI must be seen as a useful reform. This is 
particularly so since we have seen that the very heavy case load 
of the European Court has been at least partly responsible for its 
minimal use of its fact-finding powers. One would expect, 
therefore, that such generous provision would be likely to
283. Figure suggested by 
House of Lords Report,
the Court itself, and quoted in the 
op. cit. supra fn 250, para., 79.
uuuuuuuuiitg
1
I
I
154
284encourage these judges to use their fact-finding powers more 
widely. Indeed, in the words of one of the witnesses to the House 
of Lords Select Committee stated,
"I think probably where the difference [in judicial practice] 
will come is the preparatory inquiries [which], particularly 
if they [the judges of the CFI] are given specialist back up 
and particularly given the nature of the economic subject 
they will often be discussing, will be very much more 
extensivgj-and more developed than the Court of Justice at the 
moment"28
Fact-finding techniques and devices hitherto unused by the Court
of Justice for resource reasons are more likely to be tested out
286by the CFI with its, "relatively easy case-load" . In many 
ways, the criticisms levelled at the Court of Justice for the 
under-utilization of its powers by the House of Lords Select 
Committee in its Report on the Court of First Instance may be met 
by the approach taken by the CFI.
The Committee suggested that the procedure for oral examination of 
witnesses could be improved by allowing lawyers for the parties to 
take a more active part in the examination of witnesses. There 28456
284. Details of the fact-finding procedures of the CFI are as yet 
unavailable. The basic structure of proceedings before the 
CFI will certainly be similar to that of the Court of 
Justice, in the sense that Title III of the Court Statute 
will apply to them. However, the Rules of Procedure of the 
CFI (which, according to Art 168(4) EEC, have to be agreed 
between the two courts and then approved by the Council) are 
some way off - even in draft form.
285. House of Lords, op. cit. supra fn 250, Evidence, Q. 177, 
(per Joint Working Party on Competition Law of the Bar and 
Law Society, David Vaughan QC, Chairman).
286. Due, op. cit. supra fn 237, 13.
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was room, the Committee suggested, for such adversarial techniques 
to supplement the inquisitorial function of the Court and help
23*7clarify facts . This is, of course, an area in which the CFI 
will be free to experiment. The Committee also noted that the 
Court did not, as a matter of routine, require a list of all 
documents relevant to the case held by each party to be disclosed 
to the other party . Again the CFI may explore this
possibility, given its increased resources. Finally, the
Committee felt that the lack of any procedure for "discovery of 
documents" as exists in Common Law systems impeded the fact­
finding process. This procedure, whereby a court, on the 
application of one of the parties, orders the other to produce 
some class or specific item of documentary evidence sought by that 
party, would be, from the point of view of those contesting an 
annulment action, an improvement on the existing procedure. The 
problem is not one of coercive power , but is, once again, one
287. House of Lords Report, op. cit supra fn 250, Addendum, para.
1 0 .
288. Although this is a weakness in the fact finding process 
which could, in principle, damage the interests of either 
party, the practice of the Commission of giving more or less 
unrestricted access to the file of information relevant to an 
Article 85/86 EEC decision [12th Report on Competition 
Policy, point 32] more or less removes the practical import 
of this criticism as far as the interests of an undertaking 
seeking anullment of such a decision are concerned.
289. Formally speaking, the Court has no power to punish a 
refusal to produce evidence; indeed, all it is expressly 
empowered to do by the Treaties is to "take note" of the 
refusal [Court Statute, Article 21]. However, on the rare 
occasions where this has occurred, the Court has shown no 
hesitation in punishing what it views as behaviour
(Foo tno te  c o n t i n u e s  on n e x t  page)
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of lack of resources. The crucial defect highlighted by the
Committee is that, as a result of time restraints, the Court will
seek production only insofar as it considers it absolutely
necessary for it to reach its decision. If the Court believes it
has heard all it needs to in order to proceed to judgement it will
2 9 0refuse to admit more . The CPI, which will operate using the 
same inquisitorial 'modus operandi' will, in contrast to the Court 
of Justice, have more time available to allow parties to seek 
production of documents. Although the traditional discovery 
procedure which exists in Common Law jurisdictions can become 
extremely burdensome, in that it allows the contestants great 
freedom in using the powers of the judge to search for relevant 
documents (a freedom which, of course implies the opportunity for 
abuse) a move towards enhanced control by the parties over 
production of documentary evidence, combined with greater 
availability of judicial time to allow such freedom, could do much
(Footnote continued from previous page)
threatening the integrity of its review function by using 
other very effective coercive 'tools'. In the case of an 
appeal against a Commission decision sanctioning infringment 
Art 85(1) EEC, if refusal were to come from the applicant 
undertaking, the Court would simply infer the truth of the 
Commission findings which the undisclosed information is 
alleged to rebut, Case 19/77, "Miller Internationale
Schallplatten GmbH v Commission", [1978] ECR 131 (in which 
truth of Commission findings was inferred), or, if it were 
the Commission which refused to disclose information, simply 
proceed to anull the decision appealed against, e.g., Case 
155/78, "M v Commission", [1980] ECR 1797 (in which
Commission decision was anulled).
290. See e.g. Joined Cases 19 and 65/63, "Prakesh v. Commission"
[1965] ECR 533 at 561.

to enhance the quality of 'high level' judicial review of 
infringement decisions.
The Continuing Lack of a 'Juridiction de Reformation' 
as a Barrier to Improved Use of Fact-Finding Powers
Previously we have discussed how the European Court's lack of 
unlimited jurisdiction vis avis infringement decisions could 
discourage it from subjecting them to 'high level' review. We 
) saw that the limited powers of disposal available to the Court 
under Article 173 EEC make full re-adjudication of infringement 
decisions impossible. We concluded, therefore, that the Court of 
Justice would perhaps be reluctant to investigate the accuracy of 
Commission fact evaluation when such investigation could only be 
carried out in the context of reviewing the legality of the 
infringement decision and not for the purpose of re-adjudicating 
the substance of the case.
We also s a w  that, for this reason, the creation of 'pleine 
juridiction' with respect to infringement decisions has been 
suggested for many years as one solution to the problem of the 
Court of Justice's under-utilization of its powers of inquiry vis 
 ^ a vis those decisions. However, the Court of First Instance
established in 1988 will exercise only the existing jurisdiction 
of the Court of Justice over infringement decisions, i.e. that 
under Article 173 EEC; it will not have the power to re-adjudicate 
analogous to that available under Article 172 EEC. Consequently, 
it is submitted that the Council Decision of 24 October, in 
failing to extend the substantive scope of judicial review of 
infringement decisions, has done less than it could have done to 
improve the judicial protection of individual interests vis a vis 
infringement decisions.
yI
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Conclusion
The creation of the Court of First Instance is something of a 
mixed blessing, it brings improvements, but those improvements are 
brought at a price - perhaps a high one. The transfer of the 
competition case jurisdiction to the CFI is, to a large degree, to 
be welcomed by applicant undertakings, although the failure of the 
Council to extend the substantive scope of judicial review of 
infringement decisions by creating a 'recours en reformation' is 
j perhaps unfortunate. In terms of the injection of resources it 
brings it will almost certainly improve the quality of 'high 
level1 judicial review of infringement decisions. However,
insofar as the creation of the CFI is the response to a very 
specific problem - the overloading of the Court of Justice - the 
improvements which it will bring are also necessarily limited.
The whole process of reforming the structure of judicial review of 
infringement decisions was aimed solely at relieving the adverse 
effects which the European Court's resource crisis has had on the 
'high level* judicial review of infringement decisions. On the 
other hand, this paper has demonstrated that the resource crisis 
of the Court is primarily a 'symptom' of an underlying 'cause' in 
) the system for the adjudication of cases under Articles 85(1)/86 
EEC. In concentrating on alleviating this 'symptom', the creation 
of the CFI ignores the fundamental 'cause' of the resource crisis, 
i.e. the lack of confidence which undertakings have in the 
treatment they receive during infringement proceedings, which in 
turn derives from the inappropriate allocation of adjudicatory 
power to the Commission. To suggest an analogy, it is as though 
one had a factory producing sulphuric acid where employees were 
not issued with protective clothing. Clearly, a very large number 
of acid burns requiring hospital treatment would be likely to
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occur in these circumstances. However, imagine that the local 
hospital (a general hospital dealing with many different sorts of 
cases) was unable, due to lack of specialist resources, to give 
these unfortunates the care they needed. The creation of the 
Court of First Instance with respect to the review of infringement 
decisions is analogous, it is submitted, to establishing a special 
acid-burns hospital near our imaginary factory to relieve the 
'case-load' of the general hospital. Just as there is a more 
direct solution in the analogy (i.e., ensuring that the factory 
workers were properly clothed) so, it is suggested, there are more 
direct ways of protecting undertakings against injustices arising 
in infringement decisions than the creation of a CFI.
In the following part we shall examine the alternatives to the CFI 
which were and are available as a means of addressing directly the 
lack of confidence in the administrative stage of infringement 
proceedings.
i
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STRU CTU RA L S E P A R A T IO N  O F R O L E S  W IT H IN  THE C O M M ISSIO N  
A S TH E B E S T  GUARANTEE O F A D JU D IC A T O R Y  DUE PR O C E S S
Introduction
In the last part we examined the reforms introduced in 1988 by the 
Council of Ministers in the shape of the Court of First Instance. 
More specifically we sought to assess the impact of this reform on 
the fact-finding procedures used in the 'high level' judicial 
review of infringement decisions. We concluded that part by
noting that, while the Council's move would be likely to improve 
’high level’ review with the injection of much needed human 
resources into the system, it did not address the fundamental 
problem of regulatory mis-match which is responsible for placing 
so much emphasis upon this form of review vis à vis infringement 
decisions.
The failure to address the issue of regulatory mis-match directly
is truly exasperating, since, the division of powers in anti-trust
adjudication has been explicitly debated and guaranteed in all
291comparable systems . In this part we shall look at the
administrative systems for the adjudication of anti-trust cases 
established in the United States and France and examine how they 
have attempted to divide accusatory and adjudicative roles within 
those systems. Then we shall proceed to examine the criticisms of
291. See, House of Lords Report, op. cit., supra fn 
and 78.
138, PP 69
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the European Parliament and of business circles arising from the 
Community's failure to address regulatory mis-match directly. 
Finally#- we shall look at ways in which, with relatively little 
effort, the Council or Commission could tackle the problem 
themselves.
Division of Accusing and Judging Roles within the 
Federal Trade Commission under 
the Anti-Trust Laws of the United States
Introduction
The United States of America pioneered the area of anti-trust with 
its 'Sherman Act' of 1890 . This and other laws created
specific criminal offences relating to anti-competitive cartels
2 93and to monopolies . These offences are, naturally, prosecuted 
and punished via the judicial machinery of the US District Courts 
and the courts of the various states.
However, in addition to the criminal court system, there exists a 
parallel administrative system for the enforcement of the anti­
trust prohibitions centred on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
. 294The FTC was established m  1914 with the mandate of 2934
292. USCA, Title 15, Chapter 1.
293. ibid., ss 1 and 2.
294. Federal Trade Commission Act of 26 September 1914.
I I I l i l i
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investigating and suppressing the same sort of unfair trade
practices prohibited under the Sherman Act. To this extent the
FTC is explicitly empowered to act as both prosecutor {with
discretion to decide whether proceedings are in the public
interest or not) and judge (with power to issue orders prohibiting
. 295conduct which it finds violatory of the anti-trust laws)
Adjudication by the FTC
I
I If the FTC, "has reason to believe", that a violation of the anti­
trust laws is taking/has taken place and it considers that 
proceedings by it, "would be in the public interest", it may issue 
a written complaint stating its charges against the relevant 
undertakings. The latter then have a right to appear before the 
FTC to show cause why an order requiring them to cease and desist 
from specified conduct should not issue. If, upon hearing the 
undertakings, the FTC is, "of the opinion", that a violation 
exists, then it makes a written report stating its findings as to
the facts and issues an order requiring the undertakings in
296question to cease and desist from certain specified conduct 
Undertakings who are subject to a cease and desist order may have
) their cases reviewed, within a specific time limit, by a United
v  2 9 7States Court of Appeals 29567
295. ibid., s 5(b).
296. ibid.
297. ibid., s 5(c).
m u l i
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The Administrative Procedure Act: Hearings,
Record and Initial Decisions
In 1946, the adjudicatory system described above - and those of
all other federal administrative agencies which were also
determined on the basis of a written record after an opportunity
for an agency hearing - was fundamentally reformed by the
298Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The (APA) provides, inter
alia, that the officer who, "presides at the reception of
evidence", in an adjudication (i.e. who 'hears' the parties) is
the person who must take the relevant adjudicatory decision on
behalf of the agency in question . This 'adjudicator' may
either be the panel of persons who comprise the agency itself (in
the case of the FTC, the five commissioners appointed by the
President), or one or more of this panel, or an officer appointed
by the agency for this purpose”*^. The officer presiding at the
hearing has total control over the summoning of witnesses, the
receipt of evidence, the course of the hearing and the
301administration of oaths . The transcripts of all evidence
302received etc. constitutes the "exclusive record" from which the 
officer's decision (and any order issued) must be clearly and 
explicitly deduced . Where hearings are presided over by an 298301
298. Act of 11 June 1946.
299. CISC Title 5, Chapter 5, Subchapter II, s 554(d).
300. ibid., s 556(b).
301. ibid., s 556(c).
302. ibid,, s 556(e).
., s 557(c).303. ibid
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officer appointed by the agency, his "initial decision" becomes
the definitive decision of the agency within a certain time period
. 304unless there is an appeal to or review by the agency
The Administrative Procedure Act: Separation 
of Powers and Administrative Law Judges
Officers appointed by an agency like the FTC to perform
adjudications are required by the APA to be "administrative law 
305| judges" (ALJ's). It is made clear by the APA that ALJ's are to 
form an independent corps within each agency who are not to, 
"perform duties inconsistent with" their adjudicatory ones^**. 
ALJ's are appointed by the relevant agency and, as such, are 
employees of that agency; however, they may be removed from office 
only for "good cause" established and determined by the
independent Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) on the record 
after the opportunity for a hearing . Finally, the pay (and 304567
304. ibid., s 557(b). In addition, it is possible for an agency 
to require, as a general rule or in a specific case, that the 
record established during the hearing be certified to it for 
decision (ibid.).
305. ibid., ss 556(b)(3) and s 3105. The term "administrative 
law judge" was introduced in 1972 by decision of the Civil 
Service Commission [(CSC Reg) 5 CFR s 930.203a] to replace 
the term of "hearing examiner" originally used by the APA.
306. ibid., s 3105.
307. ibid, s 7521. Clearly, the MSPB's decision to remove an 
ALJ is itself subject to APA requirements and, therefore, 
must be carried out by another ALJ.
i
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pay increases) to which an ALJ is entitled are determined not by
308the employing agency but by the Civil Service Commission
In performing their functions as adjudicators, ALJ's are required 
by the APA to be insulated both from the individuals against whom 
an order is proposed to be issued and from agency employees 
dealing with earlier stages of cases. The Act achieves this by 
placing obligations upon the ALJ himself and upon the other agency 
personnel involved in a case, it provides:
"[An ALJ may not] consult any person or party on any fact in 
issue unless upon notice and opportunity for all to 
participate, or be responsible to or subject to the 
supervision or direction of any officer or agent engaged in 
the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for 
any agency.... [and no] employee or agent engaged in the 
performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for any 
agency in a case may not in that or any factually related 
case, participate or advise in the decision ... except as 
witness or counsel in public proceedings"
Conclusion
The APA provides that whoever proposes that an order be issued by
an agency bears the burden of proof. Further, it requires that a
decision to issue an order must be explicitly, "supported by and
[be] in accordance with reliable, probative and substantial 
3 1 0evidence" . In requiring this, the APA also institutes a fully
308. ibid., s 5362.
309. ibid., s 554(d) .
310. ibid., s 556(d) .
m u  f f
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triadic structure for the performance of the adjudications which 
precede the issue of such orders. Discharge of the burden of 
proof is principally determined by an independent person within 
the agency and not 'ex post facto* in the context of judicial 
review. Similarly, as a rule, the reliability, probity and 
sufficiency of evidence is subject to independent evaluation at 
the stage of adjudication rather than on appeal^11.
While the scope of the intra-agency separation of powers mandated
312by the APA is, by no means, free from criticism , the 
appropriateness of such separation in the context of accusatory 
proceedings such as those before the FTC for violation of the
anti-trust laws is taken, more or less, for granted by scholarly
. . . 313opinion in the US
Division of Accusing and Judging Roles within the 
"Conseil de la Concurrence" under French Anti-trust Law 312
311. In 'Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB' 340 US 474 (1951), the 
US Supreme Court underlined the decisive weight which the 
evidential determinations of the ALJ have vis a vis those of 
the agency in the event of review of "initial decisions" by 
the latter.
312. The principal criticisms of the ALJ system arise in
connection with its use in ' non-accusatory' (what we have 
previously termed 'administrative' or 'policy applying') 
decision-making: see Pops, op. cit. supra fn 112, also
Boyer, op. cit. supra fn 28.
313. See, e.g., Gerald Harwood, "How Necessary is the 
Administrative Law Judge", 6 Western New England Law Review 
(1984), 793.
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Introduction
Like the United States, France has a dual system of anti-trust 
enforcement. On the one hand, anti-competitive behaviour in the 
form of cartels or abuses of dominant market position are subject
i  j
to criminal sanctions applied by the courts'3 . On the other
hand, there exists an administrative system for the enforcement of
these prohibitions, which is centred upon the "Conseil de la
Concurrence" (the Conseil). The Conseil is empowered to issue
cease and desist orders like the FTC, but may also impose
financial sanctions which may amount to 5% of turnover for
. 315corporate actors and 10 million francs for individuals . The 
Conseil is capable of acting in co-operation with the "Ministre de 
l'Economie" or independently of it. In both cases, adjudications 
involving the Conseil are characterised by a clear separation of 
functions.
Conseil de la Concurrence: Composition and Procedure
The Conseil consists of 16 members nominated by executive decree
316for renewable terms of six years . Seven of these are 31456
314. Ordonnance No.
315. ibid., Article
316. i b i d . ,  A r t i c l e
86-1243 of 1 December 1986, 
13.
2 .
Article 17.
I(
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3 1 7recruited from members of former members of the judiciary , four
are selected from a list, prepared by the Conseil's judical
members, of eight individuals experienced in the fields of
economics, competition, or consumer concerns and five are
319industry or the professions . The full time 
i ?noosts'
chosen from 
320 of president and two vice-presidents of the Conseil are
)
appointed from its judicial members {excluding those appointed 
from 'juridictions judiciares') and its lay members . The 
Rapporteur General and other permanent rapporteurs to the Conseil 
are appointed by the executive on the proposal of the President of 
the Conseil and the role of the commisseur du gouvernement 
before the Conseil is performed by the designate of the "Ministre
de l'Economie 1*324
3 7^in, "sections" and
The Conseil may sit, "en séance plenière" or 
may act within strict limits via its.
317. ibid., Art 2{1), which includes judges from both the 
'juridictions administratives' and 'juridictions judiciares'.
318. ibid., Art 2(3).
319. ibid., Art 2(3).
320. ibid., Article 3.
321. ibid. Article 2(3), which further provides that the judicial 
members of the Conseil can provide no more than two of these 
posts and rhe lay members must provide no less than one of 
them.
322. ibid., Art 4.
323. This position, which is a feature of French judicial 
procedure, is analogous to the role of the Advocate General 
before the Court of Justice.
324. ibid., Art 3.
325. i b i d . ,  Ar t  4.
u n n i
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"commission permanente" composed of the President and two vice 
presidents
The Conseil may act either on its own initiative, or when "saisi"
by one of a list of bodies including the "Ministre de l'Economie",
local authorities, professional, industrial and consumer
327organisations and individual undertakings . Once proceedings
before the Conseil are initiated, its President appoints one or
more of its rapporteurs to carry out all necessary "mesures 
328d'instruction" and, to this end, they are armed with wide
. . 329investigatory powers . Once the rapporteur has completed his
inquiries he prepares, "griefs provisoires", which are
communicated to the commisseur du gouvernement, the body
initiating proceedings and the undertakings alleged to have
violated the competition rules. They have two months in which to
submit their observations before the rapporteur issues his
"rapport definitif" (based on the information he has received from
all sources) to which they may submit replies within a further two 
330month period . Finally, before the members of the Conseil or 
"section" proceed to take their decision, any of the recipients of 326789
326. ibid. The 'commission permanente* may only impose financial 
sanctions up to a maximum of 500 000 francs and, in any 
event, may only determine a case if all parties agree (ibid. 
Art 22) .
327. ibid.. Article 11.
328. ibid., Art 50.
329. ibid., Art 45.
330. ibid., Art 21.
4c
(
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the "griefs provisoires"
I
nay demand a full oral hearing 331
Separation of Powers in the Context of 
i a "Saisine Ministerielle" of the Conseil
I The initiation of proceedings before the Conseil by the "Ministre
de l'Economie" represent the culmination of extensive
investigations and inquiries by the agents of the executive.
These agents possess wide oowers of inspection of business records
332f and entry into business premises . The "saisine" of the
Conseil will normally take the form, then, of the submission of a
detailed "dossier" of evidence by the Direction Générale de la
Concurrence (an executive agency responsible for the investigation
of anti-competitive practices) which presents an alleged case of
infringement. The role of the Conseil, on receipt of such a
dossier, is functionally restricted to that of allowing the
undertakings accused of anti-competitive behaviour to defend
themselves against the accusations of the Direction Générale, in
333proceedings which are "pleinement contradictoires" , before 
proceeding to decide the case on its merits.
In the context of "saisine ministerielle", therefore, there exists 
 ^ a clear separation of powers between the Conseil, which is acting 
as independent adjudicator, "complètement déconnecté ... de la 312
331. ibid., Art 25, which also provides that the Conseil may hear 
anyone else it desires.
332. ibid. Art 45.
333. ibid., Art 18.
I l
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hiérarchie administrative" , within which the Direction Général, 
which is acting as prosecutor, is is integrated.
334
Separation of Powers in the Context of 
either "Saisine d ’Office" or by Others
The Conseil is empowered to determine cases on its own initiative 
and on the complaint of, e.g,, the aggrieved competitor of an 
undertaking. it is true that in these cases, without the
Direction Générale performing a prosecuting role, the Conseil 
could be technically acting as both prosecutor and judge. Are 
there features of the procedure of the Conseil, however, which 
minimise or eliminate the dangers of undivided power in this 
context? It is submitted that there are.
In the first place, it is clear that the Conseil perceives its
role principally as that of adjudicator and not as investigator of
market practices or even as initiator of proceedings. In the
first two years of its existence, proceedings aimed at obtaining a
decision on the merits were initiated 148 times - only on four of
these occasions was the Conseil itself the "auteur de la 
3 35saisine" . It is submitted that the membership of the Conseil, 
or more specifically its strong judicial component, would 
naturally incline it towards passivity. In addition, the Conseil 
has demonstrated an unwillingness to take a very active role in 345
334. R. Drago, "Le Conseil ce la Concurrence", La Semaine 
Juridique (Doctrine) 1987, 3300, para. 7.
335. "Revue de la Concurrence et de la Consommation", DG de la 
Concurrence &c., Paris, No. 46, Nov-Déc 1988, page 5.
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assisting third parties who initiate proceedings to establish the
factual basis for their claims. Of the 56 decisions which the
Conseil issued in the period mentioned above, the only ten to
receive a judgment on the merits ("au fond") were those resulting
from "saisines ministerielles". All of the decisions deriving
from saisines by enterprises and others stopped short of a
decision 'au fond' and either ruled proceedings to be "classé" or,
as was generally the case, declared saisines to be
"irrecevable" . Many of the decisions of "irrecevabilité"
focussed on the insufficiency of evidence of anti-competitive
behaviour which was presented by the relevant "auteurs". The
Cour d'Appel de Paris has, infact, found it necessary to widen the
definition of evidence capable of creating a "saisine recevable"
so as to include all facts capable, d ’, "établir la réalité ou, à
tout le moins, la vraisemblence de pratiques 
. 337anticoncurrentielles" . It is obvious, therefore, that the 
Conseil is reluctant to act on a simple ’complaint' and undertake 
roving investigations of undertakings, but prefers aggrieved 
parties, like the government, to build a prima facie case which it 
can then adjudicate.
The second, and perhaps more important, feature of the Conseil 
which makes fusion of its prosecuting and judging roles unlikely 
is, of course, the internal functional division of labour between 367
336. ibid., page 10.
337. Arrêt of 17 December 1987, 'Société des Lubrificants du 
Midi', Revue de la Concurrence et de la Consommation &c., Ko. 
41, Jan-Fév 1988, 28, commentaire A. Targa (emphasis added). 
The Cour d'Appel exercises jurisdiction "en annulation" and 
"en réformation" over decisions of the Conseil "Ordonnance 
86-1243 of 1 December 1986, Art 15, as inserted by Loi 87-498 
of 6 July 1987].
(«
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the members of the Conseil (i.e., the 16 appointees) and its
rapporteurs. The only member of the Conseil to have any regular
contact with the rapporteurs who carry out its investigative work
is the President, who allocates cases among them. In many cases,
therefore, the only contact which the members of the Conseil
deciding a case (e.g. a 'section') will have with the relevant
rapporteur will be formally, on occasions open to the
participation of the other parties. The only problematic feature
of the rapporteur's role is his presence at the private
338deliberations of the Conseil . Clearly, there is an
opportunity for unfairness here and the need for his presence
rather than that of the registrar (greffier) has been
questioned38 39 3401. The Cour d'Appel has ruled, in this regard, that
provided that the presence of the rapporteur at the deliberations
of the Conseil is directed, "exclusivement en vue de répondre,
dans les limites du rapport écrit acquis aux débats, aux demandes
340de renseignements des membres du Conseil" , then the "pleinement 
contradictoire'* nature of proceedings is not impaired. Even with 
this pronouncement, however, the presence of the rapporteur can
only detract from the image of impartiality presented by the
. 341 Conseil 389401
338. Ordonnance 86-1243 of 1 December 1986, Art 25.
339. F.C. Jeantet, "L'Esprit du Nouveau Droit de la Concurrence", 
La Semaine Juridique (Doctrine) 1987, 3277, para. 31.
340. Arrêt of 26 May 1988, 'SNSO c. GADOBAT et autres', Gazette 
du Palais 1988. 2. 662, 563.
341. In Scots law, for example, the mere suspicion of unfairness 
raised by such 'proximity' of investigator and judge would be 
sufficient to vitiate any decision reached, cf. 'Barrs v. 
Scottish Wool Marketing Board’, 1957 SLT, 153.
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Conclusion
The administrative system established in France for the
enforcement of the prohibitions against anti-competitive conduct
has, since its introduction in 1977, featured a clear division of
executive and adjudicatory functions. Indeed, from 1977 onwards,
this system has been the subject of further reforms aimed at
entrenching this division by 'judicialising' the administrative
342agency involved. The original "Commission de la Concurrence" ,
whose independent adjudicative function was performed in order to
343enable a ministerial decision to sanction conduct , has been
replaced by the independent "Conseil de la Concurrence", whose
adjudications, in contrast, represent the conclusion of
proceedings. In addition, whereas previously the ministerial
decisions following adjudication were the subject of a ’recours en
344pleine juridiction’ before the Conseil d'Etat , the 
adjudications of the "Conseil de la Concurrence", treated as truly 
judicial decisions, are now the subject of an appeal ("recours en 
annulation ou reformation") before the Cour d'Appel de Paris, a 342
342. Established by Loi No. 77-806 of 19 July 1977. This body, 
in terms of composition and adjudicative procedure was very 
similar to the Conseil.
343. The law of 1977 cited above, enabled the "Ministre de 
l'Economie" to impose financial sanctions or injunctions 
against undertakings provided he had first seised the 
"Commission de la Concurrence" and it had delivered a 
favourable decision [Ordonnance No. 45-1483 of 30 June 1945, 
Arts 53 & 54, as inserted by the law of 1977].
344. Law of 1945, cited above, Art 56.
«1
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, 345court of ’juridiction judiciare' . According to its authors,
this reform represents,
"une étape importante ... dans la voie vers la 
«judiciarisatign>> complète du contrôle de 
la concurrence”
The French system, like the American system, is characterised by a 
desire to dissociate prosecuting and judging functions in the 
administrative system for enforcement of anti-trust. The French 
system, infact, has gone further than the American in realising 
this desire by entrusting the latter function to what amounts to a 
court of law, albeit a highly specialised one.
Criticism of the Lack of Division of Accusing 
and Judging Roles within DG IV with respect 
to Infringement Decision-making
The European Parliament 3456
345. Loi 87-498 of 6 July 1987, Art 1(11) amending Art 15 of the 
Ordonnance of 1986 [cited supra fn 333] which had provided 
for a ’recours en pleine juridiction' before the Conseil 
d 'Etat.
346. Assemblé Nationale, 2e Séance du 18 Décembre 1986, Journal
Officiel de la Republique Française 1986 (Débats, Ass.
Nat.), 7813 (M. A Lamassoure).
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The Deringer Report of 1961 suggested that the legal protection of 
undertakings under the proposed Regulation 17/62 would, perhaps, 
I be more effective,
"si on peut créer spécialement un «office européen des 
ententes» subordoné"
The inspiration for this suggestion was clearly the 
"Bundeskartellamt" (in French, "l'Office Federal des Ententes") of 
the Federal republic of Germany, whose operations, both then and 
now, are characterised by an internal division of investigative 
J functions and adjudicative functions - the latter being exercised 
| by a branch of officials which is genuinely independent^48.
I
| Regulation 17/62 did not, of course, institute such a system and
I Parliament had to adopt an approach of criticising the undivided
.  3 4 9| powers possessed in that which had been established . In 1981, 
Parliament urged,
"that the Commission, following consultation with Parliament, 
adopt and publish formal Rules of Procedure relating to 34789
1
347. op. cit. supra fn 254, loc. cit.
348. A discussion of the decision making structure of the
'Bundeskarellamt' is outwith the scope of this paper.
Suffice to say that much of what was said about the US system 
is applicable 'mutatis mutandis'. A brief discussion of the 
’separated powers' aspect of the German system can be found 
in, "5eme Journées Juridiques Franco-Allemands", Bulletin de 
la Société de Legislation Comparée, contained in Revue 
Internationale de Droit Comparé 2-1988, page 469.
349. It shoulds be remembered that until 1979 Parliament was not 
directly elected and that, therefore, most of its 'livelier' 
criticisms of Commission procedure date from then.
(
.......  /

The intention here is-obviously to obtain a commitment from the
Commission to separate these three functions in a public and
formal way. When it was announced in 1985 that the investigative
and decision-making directorates of DG IV (previously enjoying a
351sort of mutual independence) were to be merged , Parliament
asked the Commission to reconsider and, "to distinguish clearly" 
352between the two
With the announcement in 1983 of the creation of the post of
353Hearing Officer within DG IV , Parliament began a campaign to
raise the profile of this office and to increase the resources at
its disposal in order that, "an effective guarantee of fair
354procedure can be given" . It has always been the contention of 
Parliament that the Hearing Officer could satisfy the needs for a 
genuinely triadic adjudicative procedure, but that his ability to 
do so is contingent upon his obtaining (1) real powers of decision 
and (2) resources sufficient to make the exercise of such powers 350124
investigation, prosecution and decision-making procedures"350.
350. Resolution of EP on 9th Report on Competition Policy, 1981 
OJ C 144/19, para. 7(c)- In 1984, Parliament issued a sharp 
rebuke to the Commission for its failure to act on this 
proposal, 13th Report on Competition Policy, Annex, EP 
Resolution on 12th Report, para. 53.
351. 14th Report on Competition Policy, point 47(iv).
352. 15th Report on Competition Policy, Annex, Resolution of EP 
on the 14th Report, para. 45.
353. Details of the role and powers of the Hearing Officer can be 
found supra, text accompanying fns 40 to 49 supra.
354. 15th Report on Competition Policy, Annex, Resolution of EP 
on 14th Report, para. 47.
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effective . While his powers remain advisory and largely 
ancillary the office of Hearing Officer will be seen by Parliament 
and others as an empty gesture.
355
Business and Lawyers
The dissatisfaction of undertakings, and their lawyers, with the 
undivided powers of the Commission is well summed up by the 
Consultative Committee of the Bars and Law Societies of the 
European Community as follows:
"In most cases, the point which gives rise to concern ... is 
not the belief that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, but 
the suspicion that such a miscarriage may have occurred in 
circumstances^, where it is impossible to find out whether it 
has or not"
This notion of an irremediable miscarriage has two aspects. 
First, there is the risk of supression or misstatement of evidence 
in the possession of the Commission. However, this risk has been 
more or less minimised by the introduction by the Commission of 
the practice of opening most of its file on a case to those 
concerned . Second, and more important here, is the 3567
355. See, e.g., 14th Report on Competition Policy, Annex, 
Resolution of EP on 13th Report; 15th Report, Annex, 
Resolution of EP on 14th Report, para. 47; 17th Report, 
Annex, Resolution of EP on 15th Report, para. 49(i).
356. House of Lords Report, op. cit. supra fn 138, pages 78-79.
357. The so-called "Access to the File" was announced in the 12th 
Report on Competition Policy, point 34.
............ •■ni ni ili I'H i.... ..
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recognition that, "there is no formal or functional guarantee that
the facts have been properly investigated and objectively
assessed; ... or that the points made in defence have been fully
358and fairly weighed and taken into account" . In other words, 
the concern is that there is no *a priori* guarantee that the 
Commission is truly open to the arguments of undertakings that it 
ought not decide against them. The use of 'high level' judicial 
review by the Court of Justice to provide this objective 
assessment 'ex post facto' is regarded - with reason, it is 
submitted - as an ineffective remedy.
Business and their lawyers are united in their demands for the
creation of functional guarantees within the Commission that will
render adjudication truly objective by *'ensur[ing] ... a formal
separation {or at least a complete and overt de facto separation
359of the functions" of prosecuting/investigating and judging.
Options available to the Council and Commission to 
bring about Structural Division of Roles in 
Infringement Decision-making
Amendment of Regulation No. 17
It was stated by Lord Scarman, chairman of the House of Lords 
Select Committee which issued the "Competition Practice" 3589
358. op. cit., supra fn 138, page 78.
359. i b i d ,  page  79, p a r a .  24.
*
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Report360, that, "[wjhereas one might like ... the Commission to 
be prosecutor and have an independent tribunal making up its mind 
... , one cannot do it that way because the Treaty does not allow 
it and that would require tremendous modification of the 
Treaty"361 362.
This, it is submitted, is not correct. The Treaty does not
provide that the application of Articles 85(l)/86 EEC is to be a
matter for the Commission alone; in fact, the Treaty does not even
mention that the Commission is to have any power to apply those
Articles. The only relevant reference to the Commission as such
is in Article 87(2)(d), which provides that Council provisions
giving effect to the principles laid down in Articles 85/86 EEC
shall be designed to, "define the respective functions of the
Commission and the Court in applying [those] ... provisions".
The participation of other bodies in the decision-making process
is not excluded by this Article. That this is so is evidenced by
the creation, in Article 10 of Regulation 17/62, of the Advisory
Committee on Restrictive Practices and Monopolies. It is
submitted that it is within the competence of the Council to amend
Regulation 17/62 so as to insert an independent body with a role
analogous to that of France's former "Commission de la 
36 2Concurrence" to perform adjudications on obligatory 'saisine' 
by the Commission and then to issue opinions determining the scope 
of the final Commission decision. This body's opinion, unlike 
that of the Hearing Officer, would constitute a decisive factor in
360. op. cit., supra fn 138.
361. ibid., page 33 (emphasis added).
362. See fn 343 supra.
» u  i  r
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decision-making, while, at the same time, respecting the balance
of powers established by the Treaty as enounced in the 'Meroni'
n 363 rule .
Amendment of Regulation 17/62 is not altogether likely, however, 
since the Commission is reluctant to make the proposals needed to 
initiate the amending process. Its reluctance is explained by the 
fear that such proposals could be 'hijacked' by the Council and 
used to bring about a general limitation of its substantive 
powers.
Commission Action
The Commission is prohibited, by the so-called 'AKZO' rule, from
364depriving the college of any of its powers of final decision
However, it may constitutionally delegate powers to take
365preliminary or preparatory decisions to subordinates . In this 
case, it is open to the Commission to delegate the power to 
conduct hearings, admit evidence and issue an initial decision to 
one of its employees (with suitable guarantees of independence), 
in much the same way as the US system involves the taking of an 
initial decision by an independent agency employee. This 
decision would have to be published and would then have to be 
confirmed by decision of the Commission. The only risk with this 3645
363. See text accompanying fns 198 to 204 supra.
364. See text accompanying fns 182 to 184 supra.
365. ibid.
í
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system would perhaps be that the final Commission decision, under 
the 'written procedure1, would remain the responsibility of the 
Competition Commissioner. In these circumstances, it might be 
open to him (legally, if not politically), in collaboration with 
DG IV, to alter the initial decision by drawing different 
conclusions from, or by placing different emphasis upon, the 
evidence presented in the 'file*. This sort of risk would, 
however, be small compared to the increased objectivity of the 
decision-making process.
Il
SUMMARY OP CONCLUSIONS
We examined, in chapter two, that legal decision-making - the 
application of legal norms of general application to concrete 
cases - falls essentially into two functional categories. On 
the one hand, we have adjudication or rule applying, which is the 
formally rational application of the rules of a closed legal
system in particular cases; it is oriented to the past and is
| characterised by decisional rigidity. On the other hand, we have
administration or policy applying, which is the substantively
rational application of the rules of an open textured legal system 
to individual circumstances ; it is oriented to the future and is 
characterised by decisional freedom. Applying these definitions, 
we were also able to categorise the application of Article 
85(1)/86 EEC as adjudication and that of Article 85(3) EEC as 
administration.
In chapter four we saw that the allocation of decision-making 
power reflects society's concern with the legitimate exercise of 
political power. Moreover, we decided that the creation of 
adjudicative power reflects a societal desire to achieve formally 
just results, whereas the creation of administrative power 
reflects an opposing desire to achieve results which are 
substantively just. The most important conclusion at which we 
arrived in chapter four was that the pursuit of formal justice 
implied that adjudication should be entrusted to a triadic 
decisional structure, but that in contrast no such structure was 
necessarily implicit in the pursuit of substantive justice by 
administration.
nJ
Chapter five dealt with the Commission structure used to carry out 
adjudications under Regulation 17/62 EEC. We saw that it was 
difficult to identify anywhere in that structure the triadic 
elements which would be appropriate to the carrying out of 
adjudication. Chapter five then proceeded to examine the 
reaction of the Court of Justice to arguments that the absence of 
Ì a triadic structure for adjudication of these cases was 
unconstitutional. We saw that, for cogent political reasons of 
its own, the Court refused to concede that the Commission was 
constitutionally obliged to behave triadically in deciding to 
I apply Articles 85(l)/86 EEC.
Notwithstanding its refusal to nullify the adjudicatory structure 
j provided by the Commission, we saw in chapter six that, in the 
context of the recours pour excès de pouvoir under Article 173 
EEC, the Court does differentiate between the administrative and 
adjudicative decisions which the Commission takes under Regulation 
17/62. Moreover, it is clear that the distinction which the Court 
makes between, say, infringement decisions and exemption decsions 
of the Commission corresponds closely to the functional one which 
we developed ourselves in chapter two. In making this 
distinction, the Court attempts to subject infringement decisions 
to a substantively stricter or higher standard of review than 
) exemption decisions? a standard which involves close examination 
of the factual/evidential basis of the former.
Chapters seven and eight dealt respectively with the difficulties 
encountered by the Court of Justice in undertaking 'high-level' 
review of infringement decisions and with the response of the 
Council of Ministers - in the shape of the Cour of First Instance 
I - to these problems. In chapter seven it was shown that two
! shortcomings: limited powers of disposal and lack of judicial 
; resources were to blame for the ineffectiveness of 'high level'

review by the Court. In chapter eight we concluded that in so 
far as it provided new judicial resources (although no increased 
powers of disposal) the Court of First Instance represented a 
largely positive reform.
Finally, in chapter nine we investigated the possibilities of 
tackling the fundamental problem of regulatory mis-match in 
Commission adjudications at first instance, instead of at the 
stage of judicial review. We looked at the adjudicatory 
structures employed in France and the United States to deal with 
the same sort of cases and saw that they were able to provide 
undertakings with adequate structural guarantees of triadic 
decision-making. We then proceeded to argue that there was no 
convincing legal reason why the Commission system could not be 
amended (by the Council or by the Commission itself) so that such 
guarantees were provided in adjudications under Regulation 17/62.
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